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XE/LON, GEORGE ROBERT. The Burger Court and the Public Schools. 
(1976) 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 225. 
The purpose of this study was to research United States 
Supreme Court decisions affecting public education from October, 
1969, through June, 1977, to provide a source of information for 
school administrators, school boards, and the general public as 
aa ail to the solution of some common problems in education. 
The study began by reviewing all Court decisions prior to 
October, 1969, which affected the educational process in the areas 
Of religion, desegregation, and academic freedom. The Court 
decisions from October, 1969, through June, 1977, were then 
studied. Analysis of the voting patterns of individual Justices 
was attempted based on concurrence or dissent with the majority 
opinion of the Court. 
In the area of church-etate relations, the decisions of 
Lemon I (1971) laid the cornerstones for subsequent judgment of 
cases involving public aid to non-public schools. The tests of 
legislative intent, primary effect, excessive entanglement, and 
political divisiveness potential were established to decide the 
legality of various state aid plans, such as tuition reimbursement, 
tax credit, construction grants, auxiliary services, remedial 
services, teaching equipment, and other assistance. 
In the area of desegregation, the decision of Swann (1971) 
provided the necessary guidelines for implementation of the Green 
mandate (1968) to desegregate the public schools immediately. 
S*iann decided the issues of racial quotas, existence of all-Negro 
and all-white schools, legality of school boundary rearrangement 
lor desegregation purposes, and busing of students. 
In the area of academic freedom, several cases established 
the extent of Constitutional protection, of substantive and proced­
ural rights of teachers and students. Also decided were the issues 
of the property tax in Rodriguez (1973) and parental rights in 
Yoder (1972). 
Church-state relations saw an easing of restrictions on the 
amount and type of state aid which may be granted constitutionally 
to non-public schools. While direct aid to religious schools is 
prohibited, aid which directly benefits the students is allowed 
in ever-increasing diversity. Successful legislation in this 
regard is written so as to simplify and minimize state supervision 
over the granted funds, thereby escaping the "entanglement" clause. 
Desegregation was immediate and rapid in the South, but was 
delayed more extensively whenever large metropolitan areas were 
involved. Until the Wright (1972) controversy, Court decisions on 
desegregation cases were unanimous. Cases involving desegregation 
of school districts and metropolitan areas outside the South were 
not readily solved due to absence of "de Jure" segregation laws 
I>rior to Brown I (195^)* The Court is clinging to the concept 
that such segregation must have been caused by zoning, school law, 
or state laws in order to be actionable under prior decisions. 
However, cities such as Dayton, Ohio, and Omaha, Nebraska, are 
going ahead with busing of students without Supreme Court mandates 
and with some encouragement from the Court. Court minority opinion 
holds that "de facto" and "de jure" segregation are distinctions 
without a difference. 
In the area of human rights, the Court supported the require­
ment of the loyalty oath as a prerequisite to public employment. 
The Court extended "due process" rights to non-tenured teachers, 
forewarning administrators in this regard. The Court also held 
school board members accountable for unlawful suspension of school 
children without due process. The legitimacy of the property tax 
as a means of financing schools was upheld as were the rights of 
parents to be responsible for secondary education of their 
children. 
The Court has continued and extended the degree to which 
state statutes may benefit non-public schools, has clarified the 
practical implementation of school desegregation plans, and has 
raised to new heights the substantive and procedural rights of 
individuals under the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of the United States of America is a 
unique and integral creation of the Constitution of the United 
States of America. Unique because there is no higher court of 
law in the land, and integral because it shares power with the 
legislative and executive branches of government and exerts 
checks and balaaces against both. When the Constitution was 
ratified by the fourteen, states during the period from December 
7, 1787» through January 10, 1?91» resolutions from the States of 
Virginia and New Yorlc eloquently expressed the States' anxiety 
that individual liberties be guaranteed and that State powers 
be preserved. Virginia delegates recommended that as the first 
order of business the new Federal governmenc should accomplish 
the following: 
Videlicet; That there he a Declaration of Bill of 
Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the 
essential and unalienable Rights of the People in 
some manner as the following; 
First, That there are certain, natural rights of 
which men, when they form a social compact cannot 
deprive or divest their posterity, among which are 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means 
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, 
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.1 
1 The Constitution of the United States of America (Richmond, 
Virginia: The Virginia Comnission on Constitutional Government, 
1965), p. 17. 
2 
Among other anxieties, Virginia delegates to the 1788 
convention which ratified the Constitution by a narrow vote of 
89 to 79 feared the establishment of hereditary offices, includ­
ing "Magistrate, Legislator or Judge, or any other public 
2 
office." Delegates from the State of New York, who ratified 
the Constitution by a vote of 30 to 27 on July 26, 1788, express­
ed concern about the judicial power of the Supreme Court: 
That the Judicial Power of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, or of any other Court to be instituted 
by the Congress, is not in any case to be encreased 
enlarged or extended by any Fiction Collusion or mere 
suggestion; - And That no Treaty is to be construed so to 
operate as to alter the Constitution of any State.3 
Joined by Massachusetts delegates who ratified the Constitution 
by a vote of 187 to 168, the States of Virginia and New York 
made it plain that acceptance of the Constitution was predicated 
on early action under Article V to proclaim a Eill of Rights or 
Declaration "asserting and securing from encroachment the essen­
tial and unalienable Rights of the People." 
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution of the United 
States of America established the judicial branch of the Federal 
Government according to the following rules: 
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
2 Virginia Commission, oj>. cit., p. 18. 
3 Ibid., p. 22. 
3 
their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated 
times, receive for their services, a compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their continuance in 
office.^-
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for a Chief Justice and 
five Associate Justices to serve as the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America with power to review 
(1) all cases in lower federal courts, and (2) all cases 
in state courts in which there is involved a question of 
the meaning or effect of a federal statute or a consti­
tutional provision.^ 
The first Chief Justice appointed by President George 
Washington was John Jay, whose tenure began in 1789 and ended 
in 1795* President Washington appointed ten Justices during 
his administration who were confirmed by the Senate and actually 
c 
served on the Court. Chief Justice John Rutledge served 
briefly in 1795 and was followed by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, 
who served from 1796 to 1799. The judicial record of the first 
decade was relatively undistinguished because the Court exercised 
relatively little influence during that time. 
Chief Justice John Marshall served from 1801 to I835j gaining 
power and prestige for the Court through adjudication of such 
politically controversial cases as Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
m which the majority opinion of the Court held that an act of 
k Ibid., p. 10. 
5 Edward C. Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on 
Public School Issues (Virginia: The Michie Company, 1973), p. 3. 
6 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents (New York: 
The Oxford Press, 1974), p. 
k 
Congress may be ruled unenforceable if the act violates the 
United States Constitution. That case established the suprem­
acy of the Constitution over laws passed by Congress and the 
right of the court to review the constitutionality of legislation. 
The Act of February 2if, 1807, provided for an increase of the 
Court to seven members. 
In 1856 Chief Justice Eoger B. Taney began a career on the 
Court which, was to last until 1863 and which would involve the 
Court in the issue of slavery through the Dred Scott v. Sanford 
case (1857). The Court held that the Negroes could not become 
United States citizens. However, in 1868 the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution made all former slaves citizens and 
gave them full civil rights. 
From the first appointment of Justice James W„ Wilson by 
President George Washington in 1789 to the last appointment of 
Justice John P. Stevens by President Gerald Ford in 1975, 
one hundred and one Justices have been confirmed by the Senate 
and have served on the Supreme Court, the result of 10/f success­
ful appointments. Justices Edward D. White, Charles Evans Hughes 
and Harlan F. Stone each served as both Associate Justice and as 
7 
Chief Justice. 
7 Ibid., p. 42. 
5 
The Flow of Judicial Action 
There are three ways that cases can reach the Supreme Court: 
The first is by appeal in which one side or party in the 
case wants to appeal to a higher court. In this appeal 
which is a writ of error, the court is not involved in the 
decision to carry the case to a higher court. The second 
is by certificate in which the lower court certifies certain 
points of the case that are in question and requests a de­
cision from the higher court. The parties in the case are 
not involved in this request. The third is by writ of cer­
tiorari in which both the court and a party in the suit are 
involved. The party in the suit petitions a higher court 
for a writ of certiorari. The higher court decides whether 
to grant the petition. If the petition is granted, the writ 
is issued to the lower court which is required to furnish 
the record of the case." 
The Constitution of the United States provides that the 
"judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish."9 Immediately below the 
Supreme Court in authority are the circuit courts, or courts of 
appeals, which hear most appeals from district courts and federal 
administrative agencies. The lowest federal court is the United 
States district court. 
A Justice of the Supreme Court is assigned to each circuit 
as the Circuit Justice, assuming judicial leadership of respect­
ive courts of appeals. There are eleven circuits, ten of which 
include the fifty States and administrative zones and possessions 
8 Ira Nell Turman, "United States Supreme Court Decisions 
Affecting Compulsory School Attendance Laws" (Ed. D. dissertation, 
East Texas State University, 1975)• P* 27. 
9 U.S., Constitution, art. I, sec. 1. 
6 
abroad. The purpose of the circuit courts is 
to relieve the Supreme Court of considering all appeals 
in cases originally decided by the federal trial courts. 
They are empowered to review all final decisions of dis­
trict courts, except in very rare instances in which the 
law provides for the direct review by the Supreme Court.10 
United States district courts are the trial courts in which 
most federal court cases are first heard. Questions of fact are 
decided by a judge or, if the parties wish, by a jury. There 
are 88 district courts serving the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. In certain instances the decision of a district 
court may be appealed directLy to the United States Supreme 
Court: 
Cases from the district courts are reviewed by the United 
States courts of appeals except that injunction orders of 
3-judge district courts, certain decisions holding acts of 
Congress unconstitutional, and certain criminal decisions 
may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.^ 
As Professor Bolmeler points out, the great majority of 
cases involving educational issues are related to the "human 
rights" provisions of the Constitution as spelled out in the 
amendments. 
The First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment have 
especially been Involved in cases dealing with racial 
discrimination and religion in the schools. Less fre­
quently the Fifth Amendment, dealing with self-incrimin­
ation, has been referred to in cases involving alleged 
subversive affiliations.^2 
10 Bolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 
7 
The First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment were among the 
first ten amendments proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, 
when they passed the Senate. These amendments were ratified by 
three-fourths of the States and were authenticated by Secretary 
of State Thomas Jefferson in a circular letter to Governors 
dated March 1, 1792.^ These amendments are as follows: 
Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or of the right of the people peace­
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.^ 
Article V» Wo person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre­
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in Jeojardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.^5 
However, these amendments restrained only the federal govern­
ment in dealing with human rights, leaving the states nearly free 
to violate these rights in. any way they might wish. 
Not until the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 
did it become possible for the federal courts and Con­
13 Virginia Commission, The Constitution, p. 25. 
14 U. S., Constitution, amend. I, 
15 S., Constitution, amend. V. 
8. 
gress to restrict state action in matters of human 
rights.16 
On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William H. Seward 
issued a proclamation that the Fourteenth Amendment was a part 
of the Constitution. 
Article XIV. Sect. 1. All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris­
diction the equal protection of the laws.1? 
Most litigation in the field of education has involved one or 
more of the amendments just cited. Cases involving the separation 
of church and state have been decided based on the First Amendment 
provision against legislation respecting the establishment of 
religion. Cases involving freedom of speech provisions of the 
First Amendment have arisen in student publication disputes, 
hair length cases, and in procest cases involving the wearing of 
armbands. Teachers have pleaded violation of First Amendment 
rights in connection with loyalty oath disputes and non-renewal 
of teaching contracts. Fifth Amendment rights have been held 
violated in litigation involving self-incrimination and lack of 
due process. 
16 Bolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 6. 
17 U. S., Constitution, amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
9 
The Fourteenth Amendment was held to absorb guarantees of 
the First Amendment and extend them to citizens of the states 
in mo. 
Before 1940 it was assumed, not without some justification, 
that only Congress was bound by the establishment clause, 
and that states were not so bound.18 
All speculation ended when Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 
(19^0) ruled that federal and state governments have the same 
relationship to religion expressed in the First Amendment. 
The flow of judicial action begins whenever an alleged vio­
lation of human rights guaranteed by the Constitution has occurred. 
Unless such allegation is made, no further judicial action will 
be forthcoming. Complaints may be directed by one party against 
another in either State courts or Federal courts. Clearly 
constitutional issues will be accepted for trial in District 
courts. 
The nature of complaints in educational matters has spanned 
the following alternatives: 
1. Suit to compel action -
a. Reinstatement of teachers or students; 
b. Declaration of State law unconstitutional; 
c. Declaration of local law unconstitutional. 
18 Michael R. Smith and Joseph E. Bryson, Church-State 
Relations: The Legality of Using Public Funds for Religious 
Schools, (NOLPE Monograph Series on Legal Aspects of School 
Administration Number One, 1972), p. 18. 
10 
2. Actions in equity 
a. Reiatoursement of court costs; 
b. Punitive damages; 
c. Specific performance. 
3. Suits to enjoin action 
a. Application of desegregation plan; 
b. Allocation of funds to non-public schools; 
c. Application of uniform dress codes. 
A key element in each case coming before federal courts is that 
rights protected by the Constitution must have been allegedly 
violated. State courts may hear cases involving educational 
disputes where negligence or culpability is a factor and crimin­
al proceedings are required or where Constitutional provisions 
are not clearly involved. 
Once the complaint is made, legal arguments are presented 
before the lowest court having jurisdiction. In the federal 
court system, as previously pointed out, the District Court would 
hear the case. Upon rendering a decision, the Court would rule 
for one litigaat or the other or would rule against one litigant 
or the other. The unsatisfied party then has the option to 
appeal to a higher court. Ia the federal court system, the Court 
of Appeals would review the case and would render a decision by 
majority rule either supporting the lower court decision or 
reversing it, in whole or in part. Upon notification of the 
decision, the unsatisfied party has the right to appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court for a final decision. 
11 
It should be noted that the unsatisfied party may be one or 
the other of two opposing parties at any stage in these proceed­
ings. However, the decision of the Supreme Court is final and 
irrevocable, although reversals of Court decisions have been 
noted over the years in similar cases. 
The pattern of litigation just described applies to most 
court cases involving educational issues. Any aspect of school 
law is subject to litigation, and it is important to realize 
that the body of school law derives from legislative acts of the 
federal government, state government, local municipal and quasi-
legislative bodies, and custom. 
The Burger Court 
The era of the Burger court began on June 23, 1969> when 
President Richard M. Nixon fulfilled his campaign promise to 
nominate to the bench: one whose work on the Court 
would "strengthen the peace forces as against the 
criminal forces of the land"; one who would have an 
appreciation of the basic tenets of "law and order," 
being "thoroughly experienced and versed in the crim­
inal laws of the country"; one who would see himself 
as a "caretaker" of the Constitution and not as a 
"super-legislator with a free hand to impose ... 
social and political view-points upon the American 
people"; one who was a "strict constructionist" of 
the basic document; and one who had had broad exper-,Q 
ience as an appeals judge on a lower judicial level. " 
19 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents (New Yorkr 
The Oxford Press, 197^), p. 
12 
Warren Earl Burger was born on September 17, 1907» in St. 
Paul, Minnesota, graduated magna cum laude from the St. Paul 
College of Law in 1931, entered public service in 1953 as 
assistant attorney general under President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
and became a member of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in 1956. On June 23, 1969» Judge Burger 
became the nation's 15th Chief Justice. 
Following a series of unsuccessful nominations, President 
Richard M. Nixon succeeded in securing the appointment of Harry 
Andrew Blackmun to the Court on June 9» 1970. Justice Blackmun, 
a lifelong friend of Chief Justice Warren Burger, was born 
November 12, 1908, in Nashville, Illinois, but has spent most 
of his life in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. He became 
a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in 1959. 
The retirement of Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan 
in 1971 prompted the selection of two more Justices for the 
Supreme Court. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Richmond, Virgin­
ia, was confirmed rapidly by the Senate by a vote of 89:1. 
Powell was a past-President of the American Bar Associa­
tion, a distinguished member of the legal profession in 
the Harlan mold with recorded views on criminal justice 
and governmental "paternalism" akin to those of the Pres­
ident. Here then was the President's "Southern strict 
constructionist"I20 
20 Ibid., p. 11 
13 
Justice V/illiam flubb Rehnquist was appointed to the Court 
on December 10, 1971: 
Rehnquist was a brilliant ideological conservative who 
had been one of Senator Barry Goldwater's chief aides 
in the latter's unsuccessful 136k campaign for the 
Presidency. Kehnquist's career had been chiefly political, 
but his legal credentials were considerable, including 
a stint as a law clerk on the Supreme Court to Mr. Justice 
Robert H. Jackson.21 
The retirement of Justice William 0. Douglas in 1975 
led to the selection of Judge John Paul Stevens as Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens had been a 
judge of the United States Court of Appeals since 1970. 
The United States Supreme Court, as constituted in January, 
1977» is presented as a group photograph in the Appendix. 
With the exception of three retired Justices, the Court sits 
as photographed for the 1977-1978 term. 
This brief introduction to the United States Supreme Court 
could be augmented by lengthy statements as to the qualifications 
of Justices, the selection process and political reasons for judg­
ments rendered. However, the scope of this study includes only 
those Court decisions which bear on the educational process. 
This research is directed toward better understanding of the 
decisions themselves as forecasters of future decisions in the 
area of religion, academic freedom, and desegregation case3. 
It is considered more fruitful to analyze the decisions on the 
21 Ibid., p. 11. 
basis of precedent and constitutional law rather than the 
personality and background of individual Justices. 
However, as human beings each Justice reflects personal 
ideals through decisions rendered in each case. Some Justices 
dissent more frequently than others. It should be recognized 
that the dissenting opinion of today may become the majority 
opinion of tomorrow. 
Purpose 
This study had as its purpose an examination and analysis 
of public school cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
during the period from June 23, 1969, through June 28, 1977* 
The accomplishment of this purpose was attempted through a 
review of Court decisions rendered during this period. Landmark 
cases were studied closely for concurring and dissenting opinion 
on the part of individual Justices. This study attempted to 
provide a source of information to school administrators, school 
boards and the general public as an aid in the solution of 
common problems in the educational process. 
Method of Procedure 
This study utilized United States Supreme Court Reports 
as the primary source of Court decisions during the period studied. 
Secondary sources are listed in the Bibliography. Cases were 
grouped under the following major headings: 
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1. Religion: cases which involved alleged violations of 
human rights under the First Amendment to the Consti­
tution. 
2. Desegregation: cases involving the establishment of 
unitary school systems and alleged attempts to avoid 
desegregation orders through redistricting or school 
board manipulation. 
3» Freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution: cases involv­
ing teacher dismissals, student suspensions and 
compulsory school attendance in which First, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment issues arose. 
An attempt was made to identify landmark cases according to the 
the criteria set forth by Professor E. C. Bolmeier (1973) as: 
1. The extent to which the decision has shaped educational 
policy; 
2. The extent to which the decision has aroused public 
concern; 
3. The reaction of the other two branches of the federal 
government on the actions taken by the judicial branch. 
Scope and Limitations 
This study included decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court which were rendered from the beginning of the October 
session, 1969* through the end of the June session, 1977* With 
few exceptions, cases studied concerned only elementary and sec­
ondary school issues and omit cases involving higher education 
or persons other than thoae directly involved in the educational 
process. 
Trends of decisions by the Burger Court were evaluated by 
reference to appropriate literary works to provide insight as to 
possible future rulings by the Court. For example, modern writers 
hold that the Burger court is not receptive to civil rights pleas 
and has repeatedly refused to contradict decisions of lower 
courts, causing compLainants to seek redress of grievances in the 
op 
legislative and executive branches of government,, 
Definitions of Terms Used 
affirm: to ratify, make firm, confirm, establish, reassert. 
Amicus Curiae; a frieni of the Court. A by-stander, usually 
a counsellor, who interposes and volunteers 
information upon some matter of law in regard 
to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken. 
Also, a person who has no right to appear in a 
suit tut is allowed to introduce argument, 
authority, or evidence to protect his interests. 
appellant; the party who takes an appeal from one court or 
jurisdiction to another. 
appellate: pertaining to or having cognizance of appeals and 
other proceedings for the judicial review. 
appellee: the party in a cause against whom an appeal is taken; 
that is, the party who has an interest adverse 
to setting aside or reversing the judgment. 
certiorari: the name of a writ of review or inquiry. Certiorari 
is an appellate proceeding for the re-examination 
of action of inferior tribunal or as auxiliary 
process to enable appellate court to obtain 
further information in pending cause. 
22 Dale Sismati, "State Courts Making Comeback," Richmond 
Times-Dispatch. 20 July 1977, p. 
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child-benefit theory: the theory that the benefit of state aid 
is intended for the child and that any 
simultaneous benefit accruing to a relig­
ious institution is incidental. 
concurring opinion: an opinion separate from that which embodies 
the views and decision of the majority of 
the court, prepared and filed by a judge 
who agrees in the general result of the 
decision, and which either reinforces the 
majority opinion by the expression of the 
particular judge's own views or reasoning 
or, more commonly, voices his disapproval 
of the grounds of the decision or the 
arguments on which it was based, though 
approving the final results. 
contract theory: the theory that a legislature may contract to 
purchase secular educational services from 
nonpublic (including parochial) schools, 
since these services would otherwise have 
to be provided by the legislature to fulfill 
its constitutional duty of providing educa­
tion for the people of the state. 
dissenting opinion: a separate opinion in which a particular 
judge announces his dissent from the conclu­
sion held by a majority of the court and 
expounds his own views. 
due process: law in its regular course of administration through 
courts of justice. 
en banc: in the bench. 
enjoin: to require; command, positively direct. To require a 
person by writ of injunction from a court 
of equity to perform, or to abstain or 
desist from some act. 
general welfare theory: the theory that derives from the fact 
that Congress is constitutionally charged 
with maintaining the welfare of all citi­
zens; aid may be extended under this theory 
even though it incidently aids a sectarian 
institution. 
parity: the concept that religious schools seek aid of the same 
magnitude as states grant to public schools. 
parochial school : a school controlled directly by the local 
church, parish, or diocese. 
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per curiam : a phrase used in the reports to distinguish an 
opinion of the whole court from an opinion 
written by any one judge. Sometimes it 
denotes an opinion written by the Chief 
Justice or presiding judge. 
public funds: funds which are derived from either federal or 
state revenues. 
religious school: may mean parochial school but is not necess­
arily tied to a local church, parish or 
diocese. 
remand: to send back 
reverse: to overthrow, vacate, set aside, make void, annul, 
repeal or revoke. 
supra (Latin): above, upon. This wor.d occurring by itself in 
a book refers the reader to a previous part 
of the book, like "ante," it is also the 
initial word of several Latin phrases. 
Sources of definitions: 
Black's Law Dictionary (1968). 
Turman, "U. S. Supreme Court Decisions . . p. 5. 
Smith and Bryson, Church-State Relations, p. 82. 
Organization of the Remainder of the Study 
This study was organized into six chapters. Chapter II 
presented the background of Supreme Court decisions involving 
educational issues which were made prior to the appointment of 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Chapter III presented a study 
of Burger Court cases involving religious issues in the schools. 
Chapter IV presented cases decided by the Burger Court with res­
pect to desegregation issues in the public schools. Chapter V 
presented those Burger Court cases which involved alleged viola­
tion of human rights guaranteed by the Constitution in which 
public school teachers or students were involved. 
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Chapter VI summarized all cases decided by the Burger Court 
which may affect the educational process in future years. A list 
of all cases studied was prepared in chronological order and placed 
in the Bibliography. 
The primary sources of data were the United States Supreme 
Court Reports. Over 60 cases were studied, of which 55 were re­
tained for this report. Several cases fell outside the scope of 
this study because they concerned non-school personnel, higher 
education tuition regulations or were connected with military 
personnel. Secondary sources were books and periodicals which 
were needed to provide necessary perspective. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
The development of universal education in the United States 
occurred about 100 years after Chief Justice John Marshall was 
appointed by President John Adams at the beginning of the 19th 
century. Educational matters did not concern the Supreme Court 
during the 19th century, although certain cases such as Brad field 
v. Roberts were said to have formed a basis of law for subsequent 
support of religious schools by use of public funds.In 1896 
the case of Plessy v. Ferguson supported the "separate but equal" 
doctrine by which public schools were governed until the Brown I 
2 
mandate of 1954» 
Background cases are categorized as follows: 
1. Religion - this category includes those cases which test 
constitutionality of actions mandated by state agencies, 
of which the school organization is but one, in which 
First Amendment provisions are involved. 
2. Desegregation - this category includes those cases which 
1 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899). 
2 Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U. S. 537 (1896). 
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test constitutionality of actions mandated by state 
agencies to maintain segregation of the races in viola­
tion of Fifth Amendment provisions, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
3» Freedoms Guaranteed by the Constitution - this category 
includes those cases which involve jeopardy of First, 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals. 
Following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196i+, litigation 
in the area of desegregation became widespread, and. immediate 
establishment of unitary school systems was demanded regardless 
of cost. Non-public schools continued attempts to secure public 
funds in spite of grudging concessions of the courts in allowing 
funds for textbooks and transportation but denying public support 
for other student services. Specific cases are cited in follow­
ing sections of this research to explain the background for each 
type of case cited. 
Religion 
It is significant that the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States of America enjoined only the Federal Govern­
ment in matters affecting individual religious beliefs and prac-^ 
tices. The two clauses of importance in this context are the 
"establishment of religion" clause and the "free exercise" clause. 
The Supreme Court has been called upon to rule in cases involving 
state statutes and actions of school districts which have had the 
effect of violating both of these clauses. 
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Quick Bear v. Leupp (1908) invoked a ruling from Chief 
Justice Melville W. Fuller that the Constitution precluded any 
law that would prohibit the free exercise of religion, saying 
• • • it seems inconceivable that Congress shall have 
intended to prohibit them (the Sioux Indians) from receiv­
ing religious education at their own cost if they desire 
it; such an intent would be one to prohibit the free 
exercise of religion amongst the Indians, and such would 
be the effect of the construction for which the complain­
ants contend.3 
At issue was the appropriation of Indian funds to secure an edu­
cation for Indian children at a Eoman Catholic School. Reuben 
Quick Bear and others sued to prevent such expenditure of funds, 
claiming violation of the "establishment" of religion clause. 
This case has been cited to support legislation calling for the 
expenditure of public funds to support non-public schools. 
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) involved the constitutionality of 
a Nebraska statute which forbade the teaching of any foreign 
language to students in or below the eight grade and which made 
it a crime to teach in any language other than English.** This case 
established the principle that the state may not interfere with 
constitutional rights of parents to guide the education of their 
children. 
3 
V 
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 at 82 (1908). 
Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U. S, 390 (1923). 
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Frothingham v. Mellon (1923) questioned the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress to appropriate funds for improved maternal 
care within states which agreed to comply v/ith provisions of the 
5 act. The complainant claimed deprivation of property without due 
process of law in that her taxes would be increased to support 
the program, which would "be of no direct benefit to her. The 
Court upheld lower court decisions to dismiss the complaint. 
This case established the legality of federal appropriations for 
any purpose. 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) tested the constitution­
ality of an Oregon statute which required children to attend only 
6 public schools. Citing Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the United States District Court of 
Oregon which enjoined that state from enforcing the statute. 
In discussing these cases, Professor E. C. Bolmeier spoke of 
the rights of citizens to private school education: 
In virtually all cases where legislation is in conflict 
with "the due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the legislation will be nullified. Legisla­
tors would do well to study the opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society before proposing 
an act which would deprive citizens of liberty and property 
without due process of law and the equal protection of the 
laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.7 
5 "Frothlngham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. kk7 (1923). 
6 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). 
7 Eolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 26. 
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Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (1930) tested 
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute which mandated free 
school books for all school children of the state. Cochran 
objected to free books for private schools and sought to restrain 
the act on Fourteenth Amendment grounds of deprivation of proper­
ty without due process. The lower court refused the injunction, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion given by Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes which represented the unanimous 
opinion of the Court: 
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed 
to it, we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the State 
is exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does 
not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its 
beneficiaries, or attempt to interfere with any matters 
of exclusively private concern. Its interest is educa­
tion, broadly; its method comprehensive. Individual 
interests are aided only as the common interest is safe­
guarded.° 
This decision has been referred to as the foundation of the 
"child benefit theory," the theory that the benefit of state 
aid is intended for the child and that any simultaneous benefit 
accruing to a religious institution is incidental. Many believe 
q 
that the theory can be stretched too far. 
8 Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 
370 at 37b (1930). 
9 Bolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 31* 
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Cantwell v. Connecticut (1<H0) tested the constitutionality 
of a Connecticut statute which required licensing of solicitors 
for any religious cause.^The lower courts which tried the case 
held Cantv/ell in violation of the law. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the Court held the statute in question offensive to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in that it summarily prevented Cantwell 
from practicing his religion and speaking, without due process of 
law. This Court decision established the power of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to bind State governments to enforce provisions of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. 
Everson v. Board of Education (1947) concerned a New Jersey 
statute which provided reimbursement of public funds to parents 
of parochial school students for bus service to the private 
schools.'1'"'' Everson objected on the grounds of deprivation of 
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment ban and establishment of religion under the First Amendment 
ban. The Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey statute based on a 
5-^ decision. In rendering a dissenting vote, Justice Wiley 
Rutledge made the following statement: 
Like St. Paul's freedom, religious liberty with a great 
price must be bought. And for those who exercise it 
most fully, by insisting upon religious education for 
10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (194-0). 
11 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947)• 
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their children mixed with secular, by the terms of our 
Constitution the price is greater than for others. 
Ninersville v. Gobitis (19^0) concerned the expulsion of 
two children for refusing to participate in a flag salute 
exercise, such action being contrary to their religious beliefs. 
The Court decision held the flag salute requirement valid by 
an 8-1 majority. Justice Harlan F. Stone's dissenting statement 
was prophetic: 
If these (Constitutional) guarantees are to have any 
meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from 
the state any authority to compel belief or the express­
ion of it where that expression violates religious 
convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the 
desirability of such compulsion.!^ 
15 The prophesy came true in the Barnette case three years later. 
The flag salute requirement was overturned 6-3» The majority 
opinion, delivered by Justice Robert H. Jackson, signalled an 
end to governmental power to prescribe how citizens should think 
and act where religious conviction firmly dictates to the 
contrary. The subject matter with which this case dealt was not 
destined to come before the Supreme Court again. Flag salute 
exercises in the public schools were virtually abandoned, although 
respect for the flag is universally encouraged. 
12 Abraham, Justices and Presidents, p. 223. 
13 Hinersville School District. Board of Education of 
Minersville School District et al. v. Gobitis et al., 310 U. S. 
586 (1940). 
14 Ibid., p. 60if. 
15 West Virginia State Board of Education et al.v. Barnette 
et al., 319 U. S.'62/+ (19*f3). 
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McCollum v. Board of Education (19^8) mounted an attack on 
religious instruction which utilizes state property or personnel. 
An ecumenical group arranged to provide classes in religious 
instruction within the framework of the school system, utilizing 
school facilities at no charge to school authorities. McCollum 
contended that such action was a violation of the First Amendment 
establishment clause. The Illinois state courts denied relief. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled the practice unconstitutional. 
Justice Hugo L. Black gave the Court's decision, saying that 
religious instruction in the public school buildings 
during public school time as practiced in the Champaign 
Public Schools, was illegal under the First and Fourteenth 
amendment to the Federal Constitution because it amounted 
to an "establishment of religion."-'-" 
Professor Bolmeier evaluated the decision as follows: 
Never before had there been a more forceful and unequivocal 
denunciation of church-school entanglements than that ex­
pressed in the majority opinion of McCollum. State courts, 
and even the federal courts, had struck dov?n certain prac­
tices of religious involvements in the public schools, but 
usually with some reservation and exceptions. In this case, 
however, the Court was adamant in abiding strictly by the 
"separation of church and state" principle. It left no 
doubt in its upholding the impregnability of the "wall of 
separation."1? 
16 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 
U. S. 203 at 205 (19*f8). 
17 Bolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 71. 
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But the decision in McCollum was shown to be more a matter 
of degree than principle. Zorach v. Clausen (1952) decided the 
constitutionality of granting free time for students to attend 
1 ft 
religious classes outside the public school system. Such 
classes were held entirely at the expense of the religious 
groups concerned. However, it was contended that the school 
system manipulated schedules to accomodate the released-time 
religious education program. The decision of the Supreme Court 
upheld lower court decisions sustaining the New York City pro­
gram in a 6-3 decision. 
Bible reading and prayer in the classroom were attacked ten 
years later. Engel v. Vitale (1962) challenged the legality 
of voluntary recitation of a prayer composed by the New York 
State Board of Regents:^ 
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, 
and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers 
and our Country. 
The trial court and the New York Court of Appeals found for the 
defendant, but on certiorari the United States Supreme Court 
reversed in an 8-1 decision, ruling the recitation of the Regent's 
prayer a violation of the establishment clause of the First 
18 Zorach et al- v. Clauson et al., Constituting the. Board 
of Education of the City of New York et al., 343 U. S. 306 (1952)• 
19 Engel v. Vitale. 370 U. S. 421 (1962). 
20 Ibid., p. 422. 
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Amendment. 
Abington School District v. Scheaipp (1963) concerned a 
Pennsylvania statute which required reading of the Bible without 
comment and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the start of 
21 each school day. Complainants brought suit to enjoin enforce­
ment of the statute, and the District Court for the Eastern Dis­
trict of Pennsylvania decided for the plaintiffs. Upon appeal 
by the school district, the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the district court. In rendering the decision, 
the Court reaffirmed the inviolability of the First Amendment 
of the Constitution and specified tests by which future cases 
would be decided: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose 
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is 
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact­
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed 
by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the 
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a 
secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion.22 
While attempts to indoctrinate religion under state auspices 
have ceased, no pause has been seen in the attempt to secure 
state aid for non-public schools. This activity has made signif­
icant progress during several terms of the Burger Court as will 
be seen in Chapter III, following. 
21 Abington School District v, Schempp, 37k U. S. 203 (1963). 
22 Ibid., p. 222. 
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Aid for non-public schools received further impetus as a 
result of the Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. 
2 •$ 
Allen (1968). At issue was the constitutionality of a New York 
statute that required Local public school authorities to lend 
textbooks, free of charge, to all students in grades seven through 
twelve, including parochial schools. The trial court found for 
the complainants, tut the New York Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment. Upon appeal of the plaintiffs to the Supreme Court, 
the Court found for the defendant, Commissioner of Education 
James E. Allen, in a 6-3 decision. The Court found that the 
New York statute has "a secular legislative purpose and a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."^ However, 
dissenting opinions of Justices Hugo L. Black and William 0. 
Douglas voiced concern over the potential advancement of ideolog­
ies by parocliial school administrators who would be in a position 
to recommend the types of books procured for all public school 
students. Alternatively, selection of books by non-Catholics 
might introduce secularism into the parochial schools. Together 
with Everson, Allen established legal precedent for future liti­
gation in disputes which arose over state actions to extend 
state aid to parochial schools beyond free textbooks and trans­
portation. 
23 Board of Education v. Allen. 392 U. S. 236 (1968). 
24 Ibid., p. 2if0. 
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Another New York action involved the use of funds allocated 
by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to purchase 
textbooks and other materials for parochial schools. Flast et al. 
v. Cohen (1968) contested the constitutionality of this action 
on the basis of First Amendment violation.^ The District Court 
for the Southern District of New York ruled against the plaintiff, 
Flast, on grounds that he lacked proper standing to bring suit. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the dis­
trict court and granted plaintiffs right to sue on those grounds. 
In the coming years 19 more cases arose in which the consti­
tutionality of state aid to parochial or non-public schools was 
litigated. Three of these cases concerned aid to higher education. 
Not until the Wolman v. Walter case (1977) did the Court allow 
more than textbook and transportation costs for elementary and 
secondary non-public schools. These cases are review in Chapter 
III, following. 
25 Flast et al v, Cohen, 392, U. S. 83 (1968). 
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Desegregation 
Supreme Court decisions which concern segregation of the races 
in the United States span over 80 years of this country's 200 year 
history. The first decision involved the constitutionality of 
segregation of the races in public transportation facilities, 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). An 1890 statute enacted by the Louis­
iana legislature established segregated railroad coaches. A group 
of Negro leaders organized a committee to fight the separate-but-
equal law through the courts. On June 2, 1892, Homer Adolph 
Plessy sat down in a car reserved for whites and was arrested by 
prior arrangement for violation of the Louisiana statute. Brought 
before Judge John H. Ferguson of the criminal district court, 
Plessy was defended by Albion Tourgee of Mayville, New York. 
Tourgee asked Judge Ferguson to rule the Louisiana statute uncon­
stitutional: 
The Judge refused, and an appeal was taken to the state 
supreme court against his decision, so that the case 
became for the record Plessy v. Ferguson.^? 
Almost three years later, the Supreme Court took up the appeal 
of Plessy. Tourgee argued that 
. • • the degradation of the black man was such that 
most white men would prefer death to living as a Negro 
in the United States. Tourgee went on to say the law 
was intended to debase blacks solely to gratify feelings 
of white superiority, as the exemption of nurses tending 
white children proved.28 
26 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1396). 
27 Morris L. Ernst, The Great Reversals (New York: Weybright 
and Talley, 1973), p. 159. 
23 Ibid., p. 163. 
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Justice Henry E. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, 
starting from the preriise that color is a reasonable basis for 
segregation. 
From that, he deduced that Jim Crow laws are constitutional 
as an exercise of the police power to preserve peace and 
order, that "separation (of the races) in places where they 
are liable to be brought in contact does not necessarily 
imply the inferiority of either," that laws can never 
"eradicate racial instincts or . . . abolish distinctions 
based on physical differences," and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended no more than what he vaguely called _Q 
"the absolute equality of the two races before the law. " 
The Court decision in PI easy was followed by progressively 
more rigid barriers against Uegroes. 
Schools and other facilities for Negroes were notoriously 
inferior and sedulously kept that way. During the next 
fifty years, little evidence of white revulsion against 
legally enforced segregation, can be discerned. Lynchings, 
the brutalities of chain gangs, and the more outrageous 
denials of the vote provoked popular indignation from time 
to time, but that vas all. 
In 1950, it is safe to say, the overwhelming masses of 
white Americans were quite tolerant of the racial status 
quo, and foreign observers marveled at the apparent 
submissiveness of blacks.30 
Because of the knowledge explosion, wherein knowledge was 
doubled between 1900 and 1950, the value of a college degree 
became more evident in securing good jobs. Legal actions were 
undertaken to desegregate higher education as a prelude to an 
attack on public school segregation policies. 
29 Ibid., p. 161 
30 Ibid., p. 163 
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Legal actions were initiated by the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People to secure both entry and 
equal treatment and facilities for Negro students. In Gaines 
v. Canada (1958) college entrance was obtained for a Negro 
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student in Missouri. In Sipuel v. Board of Regents (lgifS) 
52 college entrance was gained for a Negro student in Oklahoma. 
In NcLaurln v. Oklahoma (1950) equal treatment and facilities 
were obtained for a Negro student who had been segregated from 
fellow students in all classroom and other activities.^ In 
Sweatt v. Painter (1950) admission of a law student to the 
3k regular curriculum and facilities was obtained. 
By 1952, the Supreme Court had insisted six times that 
states mast enforce "equal" in higher education, even if 
it meant giving up "separate." All the decisions affec­
ted graduate schools, however, and no one else. 
The Court reached these decisions without having to 
confront Plessy v. Ferguson head on.35 
Having penetrated the walls of segregation in schools of higher 
education, counsels for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People took action to overcome racial 
barriers in elementary and secondary schools of Kansas, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. 
31 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, Registrar of the 
University of Missouri et al., 305 U. S. 337 (1938). 
32 Sipael v. Board of Regents of the University of Okla 
homa et al., 332 IT. S. 631 (19W). 
33 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education 
et al., 339 S. 637 (1950). 
3k Sweatt v. Painter et al., 339 U. S. 629 (1950). 
35 Ernst, The Great Reversals, p. 163. 
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Four cases were joined for appeal before the Supreme Court 
in 1952: 
1. Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka. (Kansas) 
2. Briggs et al. v Elliott et al. (South Carolina) 
3. Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, Va., et al. 
Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al. (Delaware) 
These suits were class actions by which minor Negro plaintiffs 
sought to obtain admission to public schools on a non-segregated 
basis. Counsel for the complainants was Thurgood Marshall, 
who was destined to become the Court's first Negro Justice in 
1967. Questions arose concerning the circumstances surrounding 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it was by no 
means clear that the intent of the Amendment included the 
abolition of school segregation, and arguments were rescheduled 
for December 8, 1953«"^ 
During the interim, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson died, and 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Earl '.Varren to that 
position. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the ultimate decision 
following unanimous declaration of the Court that 
Segregation of children in public schools solely on the 
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and 
36 Brown et al., v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee 
County, Kan., et al., 3W? U. S. 483 at 483 (1954)• 
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other tangible factors may be equal, deprives the children 
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, 
in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.37 
38 The Brown I ruling was applied to the Boiling v. Sharpe case, 
which involved segregated school facilities in the District of 
Columbia, on the same day. All casas were restored to docket for 
further argument regarding formulation of decrees. 
Brown II was initiated in 1955 for* the purpose of implement­
ing the Brown I decision. 
Because of the nationwide significance of the decision, 
the Court invited the Attorney General of the United 
States and the attorneys general of all states requiring 
or permitting racial discrimination in public education 
to present their views for resolving issues that lay 
ahead. After hearing a number of briefs, the Court arriv­
ed at a decision and remanded the cases to district 
courts to "take such proceedings and enter such orders 
and decrees consistent with their opinion as are necessary 
and proper to admit to public schools on a nondiscriminat­
ory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these 
cases. 39 
Brown II resulted in guidelines for courts to follow in 
implementing desegregation decisions: 
. . .  t h e  c o u r t s  m a y  c o n s i d e r  p r o b l e m s  r e l a t e d  t o  a d m i n ­
istration, arising from the physical condition of the 
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, 
revision of school districts and attendance areas into 
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission 
37 Brown et al., v. Board (195^) !• ̂ 83. 
38 Boiling et al. v. Sharpe et al., 2>W? U. S. 497 (1954)* 
39 Bolmeier, Supreme Court Decisions, p. 95* 
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to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision 
of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in 
solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider 
the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to 
meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a 
racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this 
period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction 
of these cases.40 
The case of Cooper v. Aaron ^ is regarded as an 
important landmark decision of the Supreme Court in education 
following the Brown decisions. The desegregation program 
planned by the Little Eock, Arkansas, School Board called for 
integration at the senior high school level in 1957• During 
subsequent years, integration would continue through the junior 
high schools and elementary schools, with all levels to be 
desegregated by 1963- Then, the School Board filed a petition 
in District Court to postpone further desegregation programs 
for two and one-half years. The relief was granted by the 
district court but was then denied by the Court of Appeals. 
On September 29, 1958, the Supreme Court announced a unanimous 
decision which affirmed the Circuit Court in that a Legislature 
and Governor of a state were powerless to obstruct the rulings 
of the Federal Court. 
40 Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., 
349 U. S. 294 at 300-1 (1955). 
41 Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the 
Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al., v. 
Aaron et al., 358 U. S. 1 (1958). 
38 
Another case involved responsibility of private schools 
to observe the mandates of Brown I. Pennsylvania v. Board ruled 
that when a state action is involved in operation of the insti-
i p 
tution, desegregation is mandated. 
In Goss v. Board (1963) the Supreme Court ruled that a school 
transfer plan operating on racial factors would perpetuate de 
facto segregation in the school systems concerned and was unconsti­
tutional.^ 
In McNeese v. Board (1963) the issue was whether or not 
state aid could be withdrawn from school districts v/hich had not 
complied with rules affecting such aid.^S/hen fifth and sixth grade 
classes from an all-white school were transferred bodily into 
an all-Negro school, the State Superintendant of Public Instruc­
tion withdrew aid to that school district. The Court ordered 
state aid restored to protect petitioners rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This case demonstrated that state remedies 
need not be exhausted before seeking relief in a federal court 
under the federal Civil Rights Act. Justice John M. Harlan 
provided the lone dissenting vote in this case. 
42 Pennsylvania et al. v. Board of Directors of City 
Trusts of the City of Philadelphia. 353 U. S. 230 (1957). 
Jf3 Goss et al. v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 
et al., 373 U. S. 683 (1963). 
kk McNeess et al. v. Board of Education for Community Unit 
School District 187» Cahokia, Illinois, et al., 373 U. S. 668 
(1963) 
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Griffin v. School Board (196if) tested the constitutionality 
of county action to close public schools in defiance of deseg-
Z4.5 
regation mandates posed by Brown I and Brown II. After scliools 
in Prince Edward County, Virginia, were closed in 1959» suit was 
brought to corapel reopening of the schools. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the state may not allow schools to close in one- county 
and remain open in another because of racial factors. The schools 
were ordered to be reopened under the supervision of the district 
court. 
Rogers v, Paul (1965) concerned the adequacy of a desegreg-
46 ation plan on the basis of one grade per year. The Court decision 
was split 5-4 in favor of declaring the plan inadequate 011 the 
grounds that some children would be denied the opportunity to 
attend a desegregated school. 
In Green, v. County School Board (1968) the issue was vihether 
the school board's adoption of a "freedom of choice" plan consti­
tuted adequate compliance with the mandate of Brown II»^ The 
Court decision ruled against "freedom of choice," saying 
The burden on a school board today is to come forward with 
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises 
realistically to work now.^° 
45 Griffin et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County et al., 377 U. S. 218 (1964). 
46 Rogers et al. v. Paul et al., 383 U. S. 198 (1965). 
47 Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968). 
48 Ibid., p. 434» 
In companion cases to Green the issue was "free transfer" 
plans adopted by school boards as a method of desegregation. 
In Moaroe v. Board the free transfer plan was held unacceptable. 
We do not hold that "free transfer" can have no place 
in a desegregation plan. But like "freedom of choice," 
if it canaot be shown that such a plan will further 
rather than delay conversion to a unitary, nonracial, 
nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held un­
acceptable ,50 
In Raney v. Board of Education a similar plan was held unaccept­
able.51 
Follov/ing the resignation of Chief Justice Earl '.Varren and 
the subsequent appointment of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 
the dissatisfaction evidenced by those who desired immediate 
desegregatloa of school facilities was expressed by the large 
numbers of desegregation suits filed in 1969 and beyond. From 
1969 through 1977 twenty-four cases were prosecuted involving 
requests for stay of desegregation orders, contesting desegre­
gation procedures, requesting new desegregation procedures and 
requesting remedial action to offset the effects of enforced 
segregation. These cases are presented in Chapter IV, following 
49 Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U. S. k50 (1968). 
50 Ibid., p. 459. 
51 Baaey v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968). 
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Academic Freedom 
Before the advent of the Burger court in 1969» academic 
» 
freedom issues were raised in several court cases. 
Garner v. Los Angeles (1951) concerned the constitutionality 
of a city ordinance requiring all public employees to sign a 
loyalty oath stating whether or not he or she had ever been or 
52 was a member of the Communist Party. The lower courts of the 
state upheld dismissal of public employees for refusal to sign 
the oath. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision 
in a 5-4 opinion, rejecting the petitioners' contentions that 
the ordinance operated to punish past actions as a "bill of 
attainder" and denied due process. The Court did not consider 
dismissal from employment in public service as punishment. 
Adler v. Board of Education (1951) posed similar circumstan­
ces, except that the persons involved were public school teachers. 
At issue was the constitutionality of loyalty oath requirements 
54 involving the Feinberg Law. The teachers refused to sign the 
oath and were dismissed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Kings County, Special Term, judgment was given for the teachers. 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, 
reversed, thereby upholding the teachers' dismissal. The Court 
52 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 
0. S. 716 (1951). 
53 Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 
72 S. Ct. 330 (1951). 
54 New York, Civil Service Law, Article 7, Title C, Section 
105. 
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of Appeals upheld their dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court decision 6-3» rejecting appallants' contention 
that Constitutional freedoms had been violated and that the oath 
requirement was a bill of attainder. Mr. Justice Sherman Minton 
gave the Court decision, holding that teaching is a privilege 
and not a right and that school authorities have the right and 
duty to maintain high standards of qualification among teachers. 
Wieman v. Updegraff (1952) concerned the legality of an 
Oklahoma statutory loyalty oath which was required of all teachers. 
The salaries of Wieman and others who refused to take the oath 
were cut off, and legal action was begun to free the salaries. 
The District Court of Oklahoma County denied relief to the 
teachers. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed". The United 
States Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that scienter was 
not a provision of the loyalty oath. The Court held that the 
oath was unconstitutional because it violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court suggested that 
membership in subversive organizations may be innocent, and 
that many organizations start out innocent but later develop 
subversive activities. Therefore, the "indiscriminate classifi­
cation of innocence with knowing activity must fall as an 
assertion of arbitrary power. 
55 Wieman v. Updegraff. 3^ U. S. 183 (1952). 
Slochov/er v. Board (1956) concerned the discharge of a 
college professor employed by a tax-supported college in the 
City of Nev/ York.^The teacher was questioned about alleged 
prior membership in the Communist Party over 15 years previous. 
Slochower invoked the Fifth Amendment before an investigating 
committee of the United States Senate and was summarily dis­
charged from his position under provisions of the New York City 
57 Charter. Slochower appealed through the Supreme Court of 
Kings County, the Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals 
without success. Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
the Court reversed 8-1, holding that there had not been any 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action, which was 
58 a denial of due process. 
Beilan v. Board (1958) tested the legality of discharge of 
a teacher for refusing to answer questions pertaining to his 
alleged affiliation with the Communist Party in 19Vf. ̂Beilan 
was given a hearing on charges of incompetency and persistent 
willful violation of the school laws. The Board of Education 
ordered Beilan's discharge. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania sustained the action of the Board of Education. 
56 Slochower v. the Board of Higher Education of the City 
of New York, 76 S. Ct. 637 (1956). 
57 New York City, Charter. Section 903. 
58 Slochower v. the Board, p. 6^1. 
59 Beilan v. Board of Education School District of 
Philadelphia, 78 S. Ct. 1317 (1958). 
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court upheld 
the dismissal in a 5-4 decision which held that incompetency was 
proper grounds for discharge. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) concerned the legality of a 
1951 New Hampshire statute which made all subversive persons 
ineligible for state employment.^ Professor Sweezy refused to 
respond completely to questioning by investigators from the 
Attorney General's office. Sweezy testified that he had never 
been a member of the Communist party, but he refused information 
on alleged membership in the Progressive Party. Upon appeal of 
the discharge from state employment, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled the investigation unconstitutional because it was 
made by a delegated agency which operated under broad, unclear 
guidelines. 
Barenblatt v. United States (1959) tested the legality of 
Congressional inquiry into alleged Communist infiltration into 
educational institutions.^ Barenblatt refused to answer questions 
posed by the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities and was discharged for incompetence. Upon appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court, the Court upheld the discharge 
in a 5-4 decision. 
60 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, by Wyman. Attorney General, 
354 U. S. 234 (1957). 
61 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 (1959). 
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Sheiton v. Tucker (I960) tested the constitutionality of 
a 1958 Arkansas statute which required, a teacher to list all 
organizations to which the teacher had belonged during the 
62 
past five years, such an affidavit to be filed annually. 
The list of prohibited organizations included the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that such a requirement restricts 
the teacher's right of association and constitutes deprivation 
of the teacher's right to academic freedom -which is protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Cramp v. Board (1961) concerned the legality of a statute 
requiring teachers to swear that they have not given "aid, 
support, advice, counsel or influence11 to the Communist Party.^ 
Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled such an oath 
overly vague and unenforceable. 
Baggett v. Bullitt (1964) involved the constitutionality 
of a state statute requiring all teachers to take an oath under 
threat of termination of employment, and constraining teachers 
from joining any subversive organization or advocating the 
overthrow of the government by force or violence.^ The Court 
held this statute to be ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable. 
62 Sheiton et al. v. Tucker et al, , U. S. V79 (I960). 
63 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 
368 U. S. 278 (1961). 
6if Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 ( l S 6 k ) .  
b6 
Elfbrandt v. Russell (1966) tested the constitutionality of 
an Arizona statute requiring state employees to take a loyalty 
oath containing provisions for criminal penalties and discharge 
from employment if the employee had knowledge of unlawful purpose 
of the organization. Barbara Elfbrandt, a teacher, refused to 
take the oath and brought suit for declaratory relief in Superior 
Court. The Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute and denied relief, a ruling which was subsequently upheld 
by the Arizona Supreme Court. Judgment was vacated by the United 
States Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for further con­
sideration. The Arizona Supreme Court reinstated the Superior 
Court's original judgment (97 Ariz lifO, 397 P^d 9^f) • On certio­
rari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 5-k that: 
Since the statute did not require a showing that an 
employee was an active member with the specific intent 
of assisting in achieving the unlawful ends of an organ­
ization which had as one of its purposes the violent 
overthrow of the government, the statute infringed 
unnecessarily on the freedom of association protected 
by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and was unconstitutionally broad.66 
While majority opinion held the statute in question as "unconsti­
tutionally vague," minority dissenting opinion of Justices White, 
Clark, Harlan, and Stewart held that even if the statute's 
65 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 38*t S. 11 (1966). 
66 Ibid., p. 11. 
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criminal provisions were unconstitutional, its provision for 
discharge from employment was not. 
Ke.yishian v. Board of Regents (1967) challenged the consti­
tutionality of New York statutes involved in the Feinberg Certif­
icate which rendered teachers ineligible for public employment 
67 
on account of seditious activities. The State University of New 
York at Buffalo required each faculty member to sign a certificate 
(the "Feinberg certificate") declaring that, among other things, 
he was not now a member of the Communist party and if he ever 
had been, he had communicated that fact to the president of the 
university. Four of the five plaintiffs declined to sign the 
certificates. Keyishian's term ended and appointment not renewed. 
On July 8, 196*f, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit 
against a large part of the educational hierarchy of the State 
of New York, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the 
civil statutes concerning employment of subversives and of the 
regulations and procedures used to implement those statutes. 
The plaintiffs argued that the objectionable regulations infringe 
upon freedom of expression without being justified by any legit­
imate state interest. The plaintiffs invoked the Bill of Attainder 
Clause, the Sx Post Facto Clause, and the Due Process Clause in . 
their defense. The District Court for the Western District of 
67 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the 
State of New York. 385 U. S. 859 (1967). 
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New York gave judgment for the defendants, the Board of Regents, 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 
decision, declaring the New York statutes involved in the 
Feinberg Certificate unconstitutional on at least three counts: 
1. Vagueness; 
2. First Amendment's freedom of expression and association; 
3. Impermissible overbreadth. 
Whltehill v, Elkins (1967) challenged the constitutionality 
of a Maryland teacher's oath, which read as follows: 
1. I, , do hereby (Print Name - includ­
ing middle initial) certify that I am not engaged in one 
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government 
of the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any 
political subdivision of either of them, by force or 
violence. 
2. I further certify that I understand the aforegoing state­
ment is made subject to the penalties of perjury prescribed 
in Article 27, Section 439 of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland (1957 edition).68 
The teacher sued for declaratory relief that the oath required of 
teachers was unconstitutional. A three-judge Federal District 
Court dismissed the complaint. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed. 
68^ Howard Joseph Whitehill v. Wilson Elkins, President, 
University of Maryland, et al., 389 U. 3. 54 at 55.(1967). 
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Mr« Justice William 0. Douglas announced the majority opinion of 
the Court, saying: 
The lines between permissible and impermissible conduct 
are quite indistinct. Precision and clarity are not 
present. Rather we find an overbreadth that makes poss­
ible oppressive or capricious application as regimes 
change. That very threat, as we said in another context . . . 
nay deter the flowering of academic freedom as much as 
successive suits for perjury.69 
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented on the.grounds 
that the oath itself was not unconstitutional. 
Pickering v. Board (1968) concerned the dismissal of a teach­
er who had written an article for publication in a local newspaper 
criticizing the way in which the Board of Education and the 
Superintendant of Schools had handled past proposals to raise new 
70 
revenue for the schools. The Circuit of Will County, Illinois, 
upheld the dismissal, and the Supreme Court of Illinois, two 
justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that in the absence of proof of false statements knowingly 
rendered by the teacher, the dismissal violated First Amendment 
rights to free speech. 
Epperson v. State of Arkansas (1968) concerned the consti­
tutionality of an Arkansas State Statute enacted in 1929 which 
provided severe penalties against "any teacher or other instructor 
in any University, College, Normal, Public School or other 
institution who taught that mankind asGended or: descended from..a, 
69 Ibid., p. 62. 
70 Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, 291 U. S. 563 "CL9S8K 
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71 lower order of animals." Susan Epperson, v/ho was aware of the 
statute and fearful of prosecution as a result of circumstances 
which would make her liable for dismissal and fine under the law, 
applied to the state Chancery Court for a declaration that such 
statute was void and enjoining the state officials from dismiss­
ing her for violation of the statute. 
The Chancery Court declared the statute unconstitutional, 
but on appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, sustaining 
the statute as an exercise of the state's power to specify the 
curriculum in public schools. On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed, holding 7-2 that the statute was contrary 
to the mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, 
Amendment, as conflicting with the constitutional prohibition of 
state laws respecting establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. Separate opinions were entered by 
Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart, concurring in the result. 
The last case adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court 
during Chief Justice Earl Warren's tenure was Tinker v. Pes Moines. 
This case tested the constitutionality of school regulations 
which banned the wearing of black armbands as a means of protest-
72 ing the Vietnam war. Five students, from second grade to 
eleventh grade, mainly members of the same family, violated the 
71 Susan Epperson, et al., v. State of Arkansas, 393 U. S. 
97 (1968)": 
72 John F. Tinker and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et al., 
v. Pes Moines Independent Community School Pistrict et al., 
393 U. S. 503 (1969). 
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school regulations by wearing black armbands to school and were 
expelled. Upon complaint of the parents, who sought an injunction 
restraining the school authorities from disciplining the petition­
ers and nominal damages, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa dismissed the complaint on the grounds 
that the school regulation was reasonable in order to prevent 
disturbances of school discipline, On. appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion. 
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that 
the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of the case was 
closely akin to "pure speech" and was protected by the First Amend­
ment. In rendering the 7-2 opinion of the Court, Justice Fortas 
said: 
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the 
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. 
From 1969 through 1977 twelve additional cases reached the 
United States Supreme Court which involved teacher dismissals, 
student suspensions, compulsory education, financing of schools 
and loyalty oath requirements. These cases are presented in 
Chapter V, following. 
73 Tinker v. Pes Moines, 393 U. S. 503 at 506. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELIGION 
Introduction 
The inception of the Burger Court in 1969 formed a nexus 
with the rising tide of public demand for aid to non-public 
schools which was to require much judicial interpretation 
during coming years. The legacy of Everson (1947) and Allen 
(1968) in which the use of public funds was sanctioned for the 
support of transportation costs and textbooks for parochial 
school students fuelled the hopes of parochial schools for more 
aid. Listed below are the Decade of the 70's Supreme Court 
decisions as of June 28, 1977, affecting public funds for 
religious non-public schools. 
The Cases 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) contested the legality of Pennsyl­
vania and Rhode Island statutes which benefited non-rpublic : 
school teachers by supplementing teacher salaries and providing 
other financial benefits.^" The Supreme Court declared both 
statutes unconstitutional, with Justice Byron R. White recording 
the lone dissenting vote with respect to the Rhode Island case. 
This case will be discussed further in a later section. 
1 Lemon v. Kurtzman and DiCenso v. Robinson, 403 U. S. 
602 (1971). 
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Tilton v. Richardson (1971) was decided on the same day as 
2 
Lemon. It concerned the constitutionality of the Higher Educa­
tion Facilities Act of 1963 which provided Federal construction 
grants for sectarian colleges and universities. The Supreme 
Court upheld constitutionality of the Act in a decision. 
The majority decision was announced by Chief Justice Burger, 
joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart and.Blackmun. Justices 
Black, Douglas and Marshall dissented, saying: 
Religious teaching and secular teaching are so enmeshed 
in parochial schools that only the strictest supervision 
and surveillance would insure compliance with the condi­
tion* A parochial school operates on one budget. Money 
not spent for one purpose becomes available for others.3 
Justice White concurred in the finding. 
Johnson v. Sanders (1971) concerned the constitutionality of 
Connecticut's Nonpublic School Secular Education Act which 
authorized the State to contract with parochial elementary 
and secondary schools for purchase of secular educational services. 
A three-judge Federal District Court unanimously decided 
against the Act, holding that 
that law which authorized state to contract with parochial 
elementary and secondary schools for "purchase" by state 
of "secular education services" to be supplied to children 
was invalid under establishment clause.^ 
^ Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). 
3 Ibid., p. 693. 
4 Johnson v. Sanders, Civ. A. No. 13^32, 319 F. Supp. 
1*21 (1970^ 
3k 
In a unanimous decision, without written opinion, the Supreme 
5 Court uphald the district court decision. 
Essex v. Wolman (1972) tested the constitutionality of an 
Ohio statute which authorized payment of a portion of the tuition 
as reimbursement to parents of children attending non-public 
schools. A three-judge Federal District Court of the Southern 
District of Ohio held the statute unconstitutional: 
that portion of Ohio educational grant statute authorizing 
grants to reimburse parents of non-public school children 
for a portion, of tuition paid by them, though expressing a 
valid secular purpose, fails to provide any mechanism to 
insure that public monies provided to parents of parochial 
school children will not ultimately be used for religious 
purposes, as opposed to sectarian, nonsecular ends, and, 
as such, fosters an excessive government entanglement with 
religion by transferring public funds to religiously orien­
ted private schools in violation of the establishment 
clause." 
On October 10, 1972, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
7 the district court in this case. 
Johnson v. New York State challenged the constitutionality 
of Mew York education laws which require that local school dis­
tricts furnish, textbooks free to students in grades 7 through 12, 
but which provide for free textbooks for children in grades 1 
through 6 only upon a vote of the majority of the school district's 
O 
eligible voters to assess a tax to provide necessary funding. 
3 Sanders v. Johnson, 91 S. Ct. 2292 (1971). 
6 .Volman v. Essex, Civ. A. No. 71-396, 3^2 F. Supp. 399 
(1972). 
7 Essex v. Wolman, 92 S. Ct. l?6l (1972). 
8 Johnson v. New York State Education Department, 409 U. S. 
75 (1972). 
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After certiorari was granted, voters of the respondeat school 
district elected by majority vote to assess a tax for the purchase 
of textbooks for grades 1 through 6. On November 20, the Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the District Court for determination of 
whether or not the decision of the District Court had become moot. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973)» known as Lemon II« was decided on 
Q 
April 2, 1973> as a sequel to Lemon I (1971). Lemon II concerned 
jayment of state funds for educational services performed before 
the date of the Supreme Court decision of Lemon I. The Court 
decision of Lemon I enjoined payment of state funds for educa­
tional services performed after the date of the decision (June 
28, 1971)i hut did not prohibit such payments for services given 
before that date. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court to enjoin 
further payments of state funds. Five members of the Court, 
although not agreeing on an opinion, agreed that the Judgment 
should be affirmed. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart 
dissented on the grounds that there had been clear warning 
against such payments. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not partic­
ipate in the decision. 
On June 25, 1973» seven cases: were decided which Included 
three landmark decisions which were destined to have significant 
9 Alton J. Lemon et al» v. David H. Kurtzman, Etc. et al., 
411 U. S. 192 11973). 
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impact on future church-state activities. The three cases were: 
1. Committee For Public Education and Religious Liberty et 
al. v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973)« 
2. Levitt v. Committee For Public Education and Religious 
Liberty et al., 413 0. S. 472 (1973). 
3. Sloan v. Lemon et al,, 413 U. S. 825 (1973). 
These cases are discussed under Selected Cases later in this 
manuscript. 
The other four cases decided June 25, 1973» were: 
4. Kosydar v. 7/olman et al., 353 F. Supp. 744> 93 S. Ct. 
61 (1973). At issue was the constitutionality of an Ohio statute 
which authorized a tax credit to parents of children who attended 
non-public schools. The statute had been signed into law follow­
ing the decision of V/olman v. Essex (1972) which outlawed the 
proposed parental reimbursement plan. The three-judge Federal 
District Court declared the tax credit statute unconstitutional 
based on the same arguments heard in Wolman. The Supreme Court 
upheld the decision of the District Court by a 6-3 majority vote. 
5. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey v. 
Harbur^er, 93 S. Ct. 2728 (1973). This case involved a New 
Jersey Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The 
Act provided state aid as reimbursement for the cost of secular, 
nonideological text books, instructional materials and supplies, 
with unused textbook funds to be diverted to other uses. Other 
uses included secular services, equipment and auxiliary services. 
The three-judge Federal District Court held the Act entirely 
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unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
6. Richard W. Hunt v. Robert E. McNair et al., 413 U. S. 
734- (1973). This case involved legal action against the South 
Carolina Educational Facilities Act which authorized issuance 
of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist College at 
Charleston. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower 
courts to permit issuance of the bonds under the three-part rule 
advanced in Lemon I. 
7. Norwood et al. v. Harrison, Sr. et al., 413 U. S. 455 
(1973)• A class action suit had been initiated in Mississippi 
to enjoin public school officials from loaning state-owned text­
books to children attending racially segregated private schools 
in the state. In a 7-1 judgment, the Supreme Court held that a 
state's loaning textbooks to students attending racially discrim­
inatory private schools is unconstitutional. 
Wheeler v. Barrera concerned the legitimacy of channeling 
federal funds to parochial schools in Missouri.^ The plain­
tiffs claimed that the defendants arbitrarily and illegally were 
approving Title I programs that deprived eligible nonpublic 
school children of services comparable to those offered eligible 
public school children. The Federal District Court denied relief, 
holding that the state had fulfilled its obligations under Title 
I. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed (475 F. 2d. 1338). The Supreme Court upheld the ruling 
10 Wheeler et al. v. Anna Barrera et al., 417 U. S. 402 
(1974). 
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o f  the Court of Appeals and directed proper implementation of 
Title I as pleaded. Mr. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the 
8-1 majority opinion of the Court: 
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as we have 
noted, that petitioners failed to meet their broad 
obligation and commitment under the Act to provide 
comparable programs.I1 
Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, saying: 
Federal financing of an apparently nonsectarian aspect 
Of parochial school activities, if allowed, is not even 
a subtle evasion of First Amendment prohibitions.!2 
We should say so now, and save the endless hours 
and efforts which hopeful people will expend in an 
effort to const!tutionalize what is impossible without 
a constitutional amendment.^3 
Three constitutional issues were raised in Wheeler: 
1. Does Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary 
Educational Act require the assignment of publicly employed 
teachers to provide remedial instruction to private schools 
attended by Title I eligible students? 
2. Would the presence of Title I funded teachers in parochial 
echools constitute a violation of the establishment clause 
of the First Amendment? 
3. Are other options feasible, such as neutral sites or 
summer programs to avoid on-the-premises conflict? 
11 Ibid., P. >420. 
12 Ibid., P. ̂ 31 • 
13 Ibid., P. 432, 
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The Court did not decide the question of whether or not 
Title I required the assignment of publically employed teachers 
to teach "on the premises." Also, it was unnecessary for the 
Court of Appeals to reach the issue, in view of the fact 
that Title I does not obligate the state to provide such instruc­
tion but only to provide "comparable" (not identical) services. 
On remand, the District Court found 
that while most of the Title I funds allocated to public 
schools in Missouri were used "to employ teachers to 
instruct in remedial subject," the petitioners had refused 
'J to approve any applications allocating money for teachers 
in parochial schools during regular school hours.," The 
court did find that petitioners in some instances had 
approved the use of Title I money to "provide mobile 
educational services and equipment, visual aids, and 
educational radio and television in parochial schools. 
Teachers for after-school classes, weekend classes, and 
summer school classes have all been approved."1^ 
The main contention lay in failure of the authorities to provide 
federally funded Title I teachers to teach in those schools 
15 during regular school hours. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun, in delivering the majority opinion 
of the Court in this case, held that "the mere fact that public 
school children are provided on-the-premises Title I instruction 
does not necessarily create an obligation to make identical 
16 
provision for private school children. 
While the Court did not specify action required to assure 
lJf Ibid., P. 409 
15 Ibid., P. 409 
16 Ibid., P. 421 
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desirable distribution of Title I funds, least of all suggest 
that "on—the—premises'1 public school teachers be prescribed, 
Justice Blackmun suggested three broad alternatives: 
1. Develop "comparable" instructional programs that would 
effectively exclude "on-the-premises" instruction; 
2. Relegate all Title I programs to other means, such as 
a neutral site or a summer program. 
3» Do not participate in the Title I program. 
Faced with Missouri State Law which prohibits the use of state 
funds to support religious institutions, the parochial schools 
have Initiated action 
to recover paid public school tax on the constitutional, 
theological and philosophical premises that the public 
schools teach a religion called "secular humanism" and 
that this violates the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment.17 
There is recent evidence that this line of thought is gaining 
1 A 
support. 
Marburger v. Public Fund (1974) concerned the legality of 
a New Jersey Statute which provided funds for reimbursement of 
parents of non-public school children for expenditures for 
19 textbooks, instructional materials and supplies. 7 A Federal 
17 Joseph E. Bryson, "Recent Developments in Church-
State Issues," New Directions in School Law (NOLPE 21st Annual 
Convention, Colorado Springs, Colorado, November 11-13» 1975)» 
PP. 31-40. 
18 James J. Kilpatrick, "New Attack on Religion in the 
Classroom," The Progress-Index. 2 December 1977, p. 4. 
19 Marburger, State Commissioner of Education et al. v. 
Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey et al., 94 S. Ct. 
3163 (1974). 
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District Court declared the reimbursement plan unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court upheld the decision 6-3 without written 
opinion. 
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann (1974) tested the constitutionality 
of a Missouri statute which provided transportation for students 
to public schools but disallowed similar transportation to 
20 parochial schools. The three-judge Federal District Court decided 
in favor of the statute. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the ruling of the district court. Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. There was no written 
Supreme Court opinion. The decision was analyzed as follows: 
In judicial summary, the United States'Supreme Court 
in the above case plowed no significant new church-
state ground; the case has considerably less constitutional 
importance than first seemed. In substance, the Supreme 
Court has simply affirmed Missouri statutes that provide 
public bus transportation to public schools and disallows 
public transportation to private and parochial schools. 
While church-state separatists can applaud a minor judicial 
victory, no serious damage to Everson and the "child 
benefit" theory can be detected. 
Franchise Tax Board v. United Americans for Public Schools 
(1974) concerned a California statute which authorized a tax 
credit for parents of parochial school children as reimbursement 
pp 
for a portion of tuition paid to the parochial schools. The 
three-judge Federal District Court ruled against the statute. 
20 Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 95 S. Ct. 167 (1974). 
21 Joseph E. Bryson, "Recent Church-State Litigation," 
Contemporary Legal Problems in Education (NOLPE 20th Annual 
Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, 1974), p. 2*+8. 
22 Franchise Tax Board of California v. (Tnited Americans 
for Public schools. 95 S. Ct. 166 (1974). " 
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In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the 
district court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and 
Rehnquist dissented "for the reasons stated in my dissent in 
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
415 U. S. 756, 813-82/*, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 37 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1973). 
The final paragraph of the dissent indicates the tone of Nyquist; 
At the very least I would not strike down these statutes 
on their face. The Court's opinion emphasizes a partic­
ular kind of parochial school, one restricted to students 
of particular religious beliefs and conditioning attendance 
on religious study. Concededly, there are many parochial 
schools that do not impose such restrictions. Where they 
do not, it is even more difficult for me to understand 
why the primary effect of these statutes is to advance 
religion.24 
Meek v. Plttenger (1975) challenged the constitutionality of 
25 two Acts of the Pennsylvania Legislature: '
Act 194—An auxiliary service statute providing counseling, 
testing, psychological services, and speech and 
hearing therapy for parochial school children. 
The Act also provided teachers and other related 
services for exceptional children, for remedial 
students, and for educationally disadvantaged 
23 Franchise Tax Board v. United Americans, ̂ 19 U. S. 890 (1974)• 
24 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756 at 824 (1973). 
25 Sylvia Meek et sd., v. John C. Plttepger, Etc.» et al., 
421 U. S. 349 (1975). 
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Btudents. The Act also provided for "secular" 
services currently enjoyed by all public school 
children. 
Act 195—Provided textbooks, instructional materials such as 
periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound record­
ings, films, and printed or published materials. 
Also provided projection equipment, recording equip­
ment, and laboratory equipment be loaned to private 
and parochial schools. 
A District Court ruling allowed all proposed services except those 
relating to the loan of instructional equipment which could be 
diverted to religious purposes. The Supreme Court struck down all 
but the textbook loan provisions of the Pennsylvania statutes in 
a 6-3 decision on May 19, 1975* Justice Potter Stewart announced 
the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion which expressed 
the view of six members of the Court: 
This potential for political entanglement, together with 
the administrative entanglement which would be necessary 
to ensure that auxiliary services personnel remain strictly 
neutral and nonideological when functioning in church-
related schools, compels the conclusion that Act 19^ 
violates the constitutional prohibition against laws 
respecting an establishment of religion.26 
Justice William J. Brennan dissented with the majority ruling 
which permitted operation of the textbook loan program, as did 
Justices William 0. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall. The voting 
pattern of the Court is tabulated in Table 4 and 5 on pages 93 
and 94. Justice Brennan*s dissent included the following comment: 
26 Ibid., p. 372. 
It is pure fantasy to treat the textbook program as a loan 
program. . . . The guidelines make crystal clear that the 
non-public school, not its pupils, is the motivating force 
behind the textbook loan, and that virtually the entire 
loan transaction is to be, and. is in fact, conducted between 
officials of the non-public school, on the one hand, and 
officers of the State, on the other. 
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger concurred with the 
Court majority opinion only insofar as it affirmed the judgment 
of the District Court: 
But this holding does more: it penalizes children— 
children who have the misfortune to have to cope with the 
learning process under extraordinarily heavy physical 
and psychological burdens, for the most part congenital. 
This penalty strikes them not because of any act of theirs 
but because of their parents' choice of religious exercise. 
Justices Rehnquist and White joined the judgment of the Court 
•with regard to the textbook loan program but dissented insofar 
as the other aid programs were held to be unconstitutional. 
Quoting from Nyquist, Justice Rehnquist said: 
I remain convinced of the correctness of Mr. Justice White's 
statement in his dissenting opinion in Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, Jfl3 U. S. at 81/+-
815, 
"Positing an obligation on the State to educate 
its children, which every State acknowledges, 
it whould be wholly acceptable for the State to 
contribute to the secular education of children 
going to sectarian schools rather than to insist 
that if parents want to provide their children 
with religious as well as secular education, the 
State will refuse to contribute anything to their 
secular training."29 
27 Ibid., P. 379 
28 Ibid., P- 386 
29 Ibid., P. 395 
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Roemer v. Board of Public Works tested the constitutionality 
of a Maryland statute which authorized non-categorical aid to 
state-accredited private colleges, including religiously affil­
iated institutions,^ The grant program provided 15% of the 
state cost per pupil for secular studies, excluding religious 
programs. The action was initiated by four Maryland citizens and 
taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of the statute under 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to 
four Roman Catholic colleges. A three-judge Federal District 
Court in a 2-1 decision held the statute constitutional. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
the district court. Justice Blackmun announced the decision of 
the court, divided 5-^: 
In reaching the conclusion that it did, the District 
Court gave dominant importance to the character of the 
aided institutions and to its finding that they are ,, 
capable of separating secular and religious functions. 
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall: 
Presently the Act is simply a blunderbuss discharge of 
public funds to a church-affiliated or church-related 
college.32 
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented: 
The findings in Tilton clearly established that the 
30 John C. Roemer, IIIt et al. v. Board of Public Works of 
Maryland, et al., 426 U. S. 736 (1976). 
31 Ibid., p. 766. 
32 Ibid., p. 770. 
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federal building construction grants benefited academic 
institutions that made no attempt to inclucate the 
religious beliefs of the affiliated church. In the 
present case, by contrast, compulsory theology courses 
may be "devoted to deepening religious experiences in 
that particular faith."33 
The majority decision was based on application of the three-
part test of Lemon I which was based on cumulative criteria 
developed by the Court over many years: 
1. First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose. 
2. Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion. 
3. Finally, the statute must not foster an excessive entangle­
ment with religion. 
The first part of Lemon I's three-part test is not in 
issue: appellants do not challenge the District Court's 
finding that the purpose of Maryland's aid program is the 
secular one of supporting private higher education gener­
ally, as an economic alternative to a wholly public system. 
The focus of the debate is on the second and third parts.35 
The majority opinion attempted to determine if the primary effect 
rule was violated. In order to advance religion, the funds must 
be channeled to religious efforts through a primarily religious 
organization. But the Court found the institutions concerned 
33 Ibid., p. 7?if. 
34 Lemon v. Kurtzman, ^03 U. S. at 612 (1971). 
35 Roemer, p. 754* 
% 
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as free of religious influence as other schools which had prev­
iously been authorized aid: 
The general picture that the District Court has painted 
of the appellee institutions (Notre Dame, Mount Saint 
Mary's, Loyola and Saint Joseph) is similar in almost 
all respects to that of the church-affiliated colleges 
considered in Tilton and i-Iunt.3o 
Therefore, the primary effect of aid to these colleges was not 
found to advance religion, as alleged by appellants. 
The entanglement test was applied by comparison of the need 
for church-state interaction in Roemer with Tilton. It was 
decided that no more than annual supervision of college facilities 
would be needed to assure that funds were not diverted to religious 
purposes. Also, the secular and sectarian activities of the 
colleges were easily separable for occasional audit. 
They (the audits) and other contacts between the Council 
and the colleges are not likely to be any more entangling 
than the inspections and audits incident to the normal 
process of the colleges* accreditations by the State.37 
The danger of political divisiveness foreseen in Lemon I 
was adjudged substantially less when the aided institution is 
not an elementary or secondary school, but a college whose 
student constituency is not local but diverse and widely dis­
persed. 
36^ Ibid., p. 758. 
37 Ibid., p. 76^. 
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The major contention of the appellants in Roemer was that 
this case is controlled by previous cases in which the 
form of aid was similar (Lemon I, Nyquist, Levitt) rather 
than those in which the character of the aided institution 
was the same (Tilton, Hunt). We disagree.38 
The Court held that aid to elementary and secondary schools 
struck down in Lemon It Nyquist and Levitt concerned permanent, 
nonannual tax exemption of predictably expanding nature as the 
years go by. In Tilton the Court upheld a program for one-time, 
single-purpose construction grants, renewable annually. 
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, concurred 
in the judgment based on the "secular legislative purpose" and the 
"primary effect" of the judicial test for constitutionality of 
state aid to noil-public schools. Justice White expressed the 
opinion that the "entanglement" test was superfluous: 
I have never understood the constitutional foundation 
for this added element; it is at once both insolubly 
paradoxical , . . and — as the Court has conceded from , 
the outset— a "blurred, indistinct and variable barrier"^' 
The fourth dissenting vote came from Mr. Justice Stevens: 
I would add emphasis to the pernicious tendency of a 
state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise 
their religious mission without wholly abandoning it. 
The disease of entanglement may infect a law discouraging 
wholesome religious activity as well as a law encouraging 
the propagation of a given faith.^ 
38 
39 
kO 
Ibid., p. 766. 
Ibid,, p. 768. 
Ibid., p. 775^ 
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Wolman v. Walter (1977) challenged the constitutionality of 
an Ohio statute which authorized the following services to 
i± l 
non-public school children: 
1. Secular textbooks; 
2. Auxiliary services; 
a. Standardized tests and scoring services. 
b. Speech, hearing and psychological diagnostic services. 
c. Therapeutic, guidance and remedial services. 
3. Instructional materials, such as projectors, tape record­
ers, maps, globes and science kits; 
*f. Transportation on field trips; 
3 »  Dental and optical services. 
A three-judge District Court held the statute constitutional 
in every respect. The majority opinion of the Court held the 
textbook and auxiliary services provisions of the statute consti­
tutional but barred funds for instructional materials as violative 
of the "primary effect" clause of the Lemon I test and for field 
trip transportation as violative of the "entanglement" clause of 
the Lemon I test. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun announced the opinion of the Court, 
using a complicated breakdown of the issues as shown in Table 1. 
Benson A. Wolman et al. v. Franklin B. Walter et al., 
U. S. (1977), 53 L. Ed. 2d., 714). 
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in Wolman v. Walter U. S. (1977) 
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• 
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1. Textbook pr 
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL 
ovision and 2. Standardized testing service. 
C X X X D C C D C C C D 6 
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL 
2. Speech, hearing and diagnostic services. 
C X X X D C c C C c c C 8 
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL 
2. Therapeutic, guidance and remedial services. 
C X X X . D C c D C c c c 7 
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
3. Instructional materials and equipment. 
D X X X C C D C C CD D c 6 
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
if. Transportation on field trips. 
D X X X C c D C C D D c 5 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; CD - Concur in part 
X - Retired or absent N - Non participant 
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Textbook Provision and Standardized Testing 
The procurement of secular textbooks and the granting of 
auxiliary services which included standardized testing and. scoring 
procedures received the support of 6 members of the Court as con­
stitutional. A striking resemblance was seen between the textbook 
loan provisions in this case and the Allen case. Appellants' 
arguments were based on a fear that substitutes would be authorized 
in lieu of books which would not be constitutionally acceptable. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented. Justice Brennan 
saw approval of any part of the statute as having potential polit­
ical divisiveness, saying 
This subsidy to sectarian schools amounts to 388,800,000. . . 
This suffices without more to require the conclusion that 
the Ohio statute in its entirety offends the First Amendment 
prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of 
religion." 
Justice Marshall blamed the decision in Allen for deterioration 
of the wall separating church and state, saying 
I am now convinced that Allen is largely responsible for 
reducing the "high and impregnable" wall between church 
and state erected by the First Amendment. . . to a "blurred, 
indistinct and variable barrier."^ 
Justice Stevens expressed the view that the First Amendment 
should be interpreted as prohibiting any state subsidy of 
sectarian schools, regardless of the form of the subsidy. 
if2 Ibid., p. 736. 
lf3 Ibid., p. 738. 
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Other Auxiliary Services 
Speech, hearing and psychological diagnostic services received 
the support of 8 members of the Court. The Court held that the 
diagnostician would have so little time in contact with each child, 
unlike teachers or counselors, that there would be little risk of 
fostering ideological views. 
It follows that there is no need for excessive surveil­
lance, and there will not be impermissible entanglement* 
We therefore hold that paragraphs 3317*06 (D) and (F) 
are constitutional.^ 
Justice Brennan registered a lone dissent due to potential polit­
ical divisiveness previously mentioned. 
Therapeutic, guidance and remedial services were sanctioned by 
7 members of the Court, provided that such services were rendered 
to both public and non-public school students simultaneously in 
public schools, public centers or mobile units. Justice Brennan's 
blanket disapproval of all forms of aid to sectarian schools was 
reinforced by Mr. Justice Marshall who, having recorded a dissenting 
view with regard to textbook provisions, advocated overrule of Allen: 
By overruling Allen, we would free ourselves to draw a 
line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of aid 
that would be both capable of consistent application and 
responsive to the concerns discussed above. That line, 
I believe, should be placed between general welfare pro­
grams that serve children in sectarian schools because 
the schools happen to be a convenient place to reach the 
programs' target populations and programs of educational 
assistance.^ 
bk Ibid., p. 730 
^5 Ibid., p. 739 
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Instructional Materials and Equipment 
The Court ruled 6-3 in declaring these provisions of the 
Ohio statute unconstitutional. Drawing on Meek v. Pittenger, 
the majority opinion announced by Justice Harry A. Blackmun said: 
Thus, even though the loan ostensibly was limited to 
neutral and secular instructional material and equip­
ment, it inescapably had the primary effect of provid­
ing a direct and substantial advancement of the 
sectarian enterprise. 46 
Appellees protested that loan of equipment was made to the pupil 
or his parent, not to the school itself. However, the Court 
would not exalt form over substance in this matter, holding that: 
Despite the technical change in legal bailee, the program 
in substance is the same as before: the equipment is 
substantially the same; it will receive the same use by 
the students; and it may still be stored and distributed 
on the non-public school premises. In view of the 
impossibility of separating the secular education function 
from the sectarian, the state aid inevitably flows in part 
in support of the religious role of the schools.47 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist dissented 
as to this finding of the Court. 
Transportation on Field Trips 
The Court voted 5-4 in declaring these provisions of the 
Ohio statute unconstitutional. Appellees claimed this feature 
to be constitutionally indistinguishable from the bus trans-
46 Ibid., p. 733 
47 Ibid., p. 734 
portation sanctioned by Everson. However, majority opinion of 
the Court held that 
First, the non-public school controls the timing of the 
trips and, within a certain range, their frequency and 
destination. Thus, the schools, rather than the children, 
truly are the recipients of the service and, a6 this Court 
has recognized, this fact alone may be sufficient to in­
validate the program as impermissible direct aid. 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist and Powell 
dissented as to this finding of the Court. Justice Powell said 
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian 
purpose, have provided an educational alternative for 
millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome 
competition with our public schools; and in some States 
they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to 
the operation of public schools.^9 
Overall Impact 
The impact of this ruling was interpreted as easing the 
rules by which parochial school aid may be granted from public 
50 
funds. The resulting decision in Wolman is little different 
from that reached in Meek, where auxiliary services were not 
allowed due to potential entanglement caused by performance of 
such services by non-public school personnel on non-public 
school grounds. The voting pattern between the two cases shows 
some change in attitude toward state aid to non-public schools 
on the part of Justice Harry A, Blackmun. 
48 Ibid., p. 736. 
b9 Ibid., p. 741. 
50 "Parochial School Aid Rules Eased," Richmond Times-
Dispatch, 25 June 1977, p. A-2. 
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Justice Blackmun concurred in holding auxiliary services 
and materials and equipment grants of Meek unconstitutional, 
but in Wolman concurred in holding therapeutic guidance and 
remedial services constitutional. However, the facts of each 
case differ in that remedial services in Wolman were to be given 
in public facilities rather than private. 
Justice W. O. Douglas retired from the Court between Meek 
and Wolman, having voted to declare all provisions of the 
Pennsylvania aid act unconstitutional. As replacement, Justice 
Stevens voted to hold all auxiliary services constitutional. 
Justice Potter Stewart also voted to uphold constitutionality 
of auxiliary services in Wolman, reversing from Meek due to the 
slightly different method of administering such services. 
Justice Marshall approved speech, hearing and diagnostic services 
portions of auxiliary services in Wolman, reversing from Meek. 
Justice Powell also supported auxiliary services during Wolman. 
Justices White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger sustained 
the same position in both cases, upholding the constitutionality 
of auxiliary services to students whether administered within 
public or non-public school administrative areas. Justice 
Brennan remained opposed to state aid to non-public schools in 
any form. 
The Supreme Court vote change from Meek (6-3) to Wolman 
(8-1) in an about-face on the issue of auxiliary services indicates 
that 5 Justices either found the facts of each case sufficiently 
different to warrant the change in vote or had a change of heart. 
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Selected Cases 
Lemon v. Kurtzman and DiCenso v. Robinson is landmark in 
that the three-part test of the constitutionality of state aid 
to parochial schools was enhanced as the foundation for decisions 
in future cases involving aid to non-public schools/'"*' As previous­
ly discussed, these cases tested the constitutionality of state 
statutes which authorized the issuance of funds to non-public 
schools. In Lemon, the statute in question was a Pennsylvania 
legislative action which provided financial support to non-public 
elementary and secondary schools which were church-related. This 
support consisted of reimbursement for the cost of teachers' sala­
ries, textbooks and instructional materials. Schools had to pass 
the following eligibility tests: 
1. Reimbursement was limited to courses presented in the 
curricula of the public schools. 
2. Funds were limited solely to courses in the following 
secular subjects: mathematics, modern foreign languages, 
physical sciences, and physical education. 
3. Textbooks and instructional materials included in the 
program must be approved by the state Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. 
if. Reimbursement was prohibited for any course that contained 
any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the 
morals or worship of any sect. 
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman and DiCenso v. Robinson, if03 U. S. 
602 (1971). 
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In DiCenso the statute provided salary supplements to teachers of 
non-public schools up to 1556 of regular salary, subject to several 
restrictions: 
1. The recipient must teach in a non-public school at which 
the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education is 
less than the average in the State's public schools during 
a specified period. 
2. Schools involved must submit financial information to enable 
separation of costs of secular education. 
3. Teachers must teach only those subjects that are offered 
in the State's public schools. 
Teachers must use only teaching materials which are used 
in the public schools. 
Teachers applying for salary supplements must first agree, 
in writing, not to teach a course in religion for so long 
as or during such time as they receive any salary supple­
ment under the Act. 
A three-judge Federal Court was convened to try each case in 
respective jurisdictions. In the Lemon case, the district court 
held that the Act violated neither the Establishment nor the Free 
Exercise Clause. Lemon appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In the DiCenso case, the district court concluded that the 
Act violated the Establishment Clause because it fostered 
excessive entanglement between government and religion. 
The voting pattern of the Court is given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
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The decision of the Court was announced by Chief Justice 
Burger. By a. 7-1 vote the district court decision in Lemon was 
reversed. By an 8-1 vote the district court decision in DiCenso 
was affirmed# The constitutionality of both the Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island statutes was denied. 
In presenting the near-unanimous decision of the Court in 
these cases, Chief Justice Burger cited the need for guidelines 
by which to adjudicate allegations of First Amendment violations 
in the area of establishment of religion. This was necessary 
because: 
The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
is at best opaque, particularly when compared with other 
portions of the Amendment. Its authors did not simply 
prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state 
religion, an area history shows they regarded as very 
important and fraught with great dangers. Instead they 
commanded that there should be "no law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion." A law may be one "respecting" the 
forbidden objective while falling short of its total realiz­
ation. 52 
Therefore, the now-famous three-part test was composed with regard 
to constitutionality of legislative statutes which do not commit 
the constitutional offense. 
1* The statute must have a secular legislative purpose. 
2» Its primary effect must not be one that advances or inhibits 
religion. 
52 Ibid., p. 612 
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3. It must not involve an excessive entanglement of 
government with religion. 
The legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania concluded that 
secular and religious education are identifiable and separable, 
a concept with which the Court had no quarrel. The legislatures 
sought to create statutory restrictions designed to guarantee 
the separation between secular and religious functions and to 
ensure that State financial aid supports only the former. This 
was the conclusion upon which Allen was based: 
In Allen the Court acknowledged that secular and religious 
teachings were not necessarily so intertwined that secular 
textbooks furnished to students by the State were in fact 
instrumental in the teaching of religion.53 
As in Allen, the Court found nothing that undermines the stated 
legislative intent to enhance the quality of the secular education. 
in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. 
Furthermore, the Court did not feel constrained to rule on the 
basis of the "primary effect" test, because both cases involved 
an excessive degree of entanglement of government with religion 
and both State statutes were ruled unconstitutional on that 
account. 
Excessive entanglement was found in both cases. The act of 
subsidizing teachers' salaries made it mandatory that certain 
53 Ibid., p. 613. 
81 
policing actions be taken to be sure that the teachers were living 
up to their end of the bargain by not teaching religious subjects 
or injecting religious ideology into their classroom teaching. 
As we noted earlier, the very restrictions and surveillance 
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideo-
logical role give rise to entanglements between church and 
state. The Pennsylvania statute, like that of Rhode Island, 
fosters this kind of relationship.5^ 
Another factor was the provision of state aid directly to the 
church-related school: 
This factor distinguishes both Everson and Allen, for in 
both cases the Court was careful to point out that state 
aid was provided to the parents —not to the church-related 
school.55 
The potential of political divisiveness was discussed in the 
opinion of the Court: 
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous 
or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of 
our democratic system of government, but political division 
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against 
which the First Amendment was intended to protect.5° 
Also, the need for continuing annual appropriation was deemed to 
seriously aggravate political divisiveness related to religious 
belief and practice, as was the likelihood of larger and larger 
demands as costs and populations grow. The parochial school sys­
tems found themselves in deepening financial crises due to the 
need to replace lower paid teachers with lay teachers. 
5*f Ibid., P. 620 
55 Ibid., P. 621 
56 Ibid., P. 622 
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The judicial cornerstones were laid in Lemon for a wide 
variety of cases to come. These include the following: 
1. Direct aid to religious schools is forbidden. 
2. Direct intermingling of public school teachers with 
parochial school pupils in the parochial schools is 
forbidden. 
3. No tax, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions. 
Aid which benefits all school children, public or private, 
is constitutional. 
5» Public funds spent in support of religious schools are 
released subject to restraints on the normal customs of 
the school and the teachers which may have the effect of 
denial of freedom to worship. 
The three cases decided on June 25, 1973, for which discussion 
was deferred until this section contributed further to the basis 
for jurisprudence laid in Lemon I. 
Committee For Public Education v. Nyquist^? concerned a New 
York statute which authorized reimbursement of non-public schools 
for expenses of services for various purposes:-*® 
1. Direct money grants for maintenance and repair of school 
facilities. 
2. Tuition reimbursement plan for parents who had annual 
taxable income below $5,000. 
57 Committee For Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, U3 U. S. 756, 790, 813 (1973). 
58 Ibid., p. 762. 
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Tax relief for parents who fail to qualify for tuition 
reimbursement. 
A three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that maintenance and repair grants and tuition 
reimbursement provisions were invalid, but that statutory 
system of providing income tax benefits to parents of children 
attending New York non-public schools did not violate the estab­
lishment clause. Mr. Justice Powell announced the decision of 
the Court which held that each of New York's aid provisions had 
the primary effect which advanced religion and offended fconsti-
tutional provision against laws respecting the establishment of 
59 
religion. 
Application of the three-part test of Lemon I resulted in 
identification of the test which the New York statute failed: 
Because we have found that the challenged sections have 
the impermissible effect of advancing religion, we need 
not consider whether such aid would result in entangle­
ment of the State with religion in the sense of "(a) 
continuing, discriminating and comprehensive state 
surveillance.""0 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion which 
culminated in the following statement: 
The increasing difficulties faced by private schools in 
our country are no reason at all for this Court to readjust 
the admittedly rough-hewn limits on governmental involve- ,, 
ment with religion found in the First and Fourteenth Amend. 
59 Ibid., P. 798 
60 Ibid., P. 79k 
61 Ibid., P. 813 
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Once again, a shift in the voting pattern of the Justices 
occurred from Lemon I to Nyquiat. Comparing Table 3, the voting 
pattern of Nyquist, with Table 2, the voting pattern of Lemon I» 
it can be seen that in both cases involving direct aid statutes, 
all of which were declared unconstitutional by the Court, some 
change was seen in Chief Justice Burger's vote in Nyquist. The 
Chief Justice dissented in Nyquist with the ruling of the Court 
which held tax relief and tuition reimbursement plans unconstitu­
tional. Justice Byron R. White maintained a consistent position 
in both cases, thereby supporting Pennsylvania's and Rhode Island's 
salary supplement plan and New York's tuition reimbursement and 
tax relief plan. Justice fiehnquist sided with the Chief Justice 
as a comparative newcomer to the Court, while Justice Powell main­
tained a solid concurrence with the majority decision. 
The net change from Lemon I to Nyquist in voting strength 
against direct aid to non-public schools was a reduction of two 
concurring votes, considerably increasing tha odds of futuro 
approval of direct aid statutes. 
Levitt v. Committee For Public Education was decided the same 
62 
day as Nyquist. This case tested the constitutionality of New 
York statute which authorized reimbursement of non-public schools 
for expenses of services for pupil testing. Services included 
educational administration activities such as grading, compiling 
62 Levitt v. Committee For Public Education and Religious 
Liberty et al., U. S. 472 (1973). 
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and reporting test results. A three-judge Federal District Court 
determined that the overwhelming majority of testing in non-public 
schools was of the type drafted by school teachers for the purpose 
of measuring the pupils' progress in subjects required to be taught 
under state law. The District Court made findings that the 
Commissioner of Education had construed and applied the Act to 
include as permissible schools which 
1. Imposed religious restrictions on admissions; 
2. Require attendance of pupils at religious activities; 
3. Require obedience by students to the doctrines and dogmas 
of a particular faith; 
k* Require pupils to attend instruction in the theology or 
doctrine of a particular faith; 
5. Are an integral part of the religious mission of the 
church sponsoring it; 
6. Have as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious 
values; 
7. Impose religious restrictions cn faculty appointments; 
8. Impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty 
may teach.^ 
63 Committee For Public Education v. Levitt, 3F. Supp. at 
i»40-ififl (1972). 
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The district court held the Act unconstitutional and enjoined 
Comptroller Levitt from enforcement of the Act, concluding that 
this case was controlled by the Supreme Court decision in Lemon I. 
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the district court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren Burger announced 
the majority decision, saying: 
We hold that the lump-sum payments under Chapter 138 
violate the Establishment Clause. Since Chapter 138 
provides only for a single per-pupil allotment for a 
variety of specified services, some secular and some 
potentially religious, neither this Court nor the Dis­
trict Court can properly reduce that allotment to an 
amount corresponding to the actual costs incurred in 
performing reimbursable secular services. That is a 
legislative, not a judicial, function.6^+ 
Mr. Justice Byron R. White recorded the lorie dissent without written 
opinion. 
Two flaws were found in the New York Act: 
However, the Act contains no provision authorizing state 
audits of school financial records to determine whether 
a school's actual costs in complying with the mandated 
services are less than the annual lump sum payment. 
Nor does the Act require a school to return to the Re­
state moneys received in excess of its actual expenses. 
An additional flaw was noted: 
Yet, despite the obviously integral role of such testing 
in the total teaching process, no attempt is made under 
the statute, and no means are available, to assure that Z, 
internally prepared tests are free of religious instruction. 
6^. Levitt v. Committee, ̂ 13 U. S. J+?2 at if82. 
65 Ibid., p. 477. 
66 Ibid., p. k50. 
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In the Court decision in Levitt the cornerstone laid in Lemon I 
forbad© direct aid to religious schools. The New York statute 
was found infirm under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment for failing to provide safeguards against the possible 
use of tax funds to promote religious activities of the private 
religious schools benefited by the Act. Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice .R'ehnquist drew a line between authorizing aid to 
parents in Nyquist, which drew dissenting votes and showed favor 
for such aid, and authorizing direct aid to religious schools. 
Finally, the Court decision in Sloan v. Lemon concerned the 
permissibility of direct aid to parents under a Pennsylvania Act.^? 
The Act provided reimbursement of tuition paid by parents who 
send their children to non-public schools. A three-judge District 
Court held that the law violated the Establishment Clause and 
was therefore unconstitutional. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme 
Court upheld the judgment of the district court. Mr. Justice 
Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, saying: 
We certainly do not question now, any more than we did 
two Terms ago in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the reality and 
legitimacy of Pennsylvania's secular purposes. 
However, the legislative Act was found to have th§ impermissible 
effect of advancing religion, as did the Act disputed in Nyquist.^ 
67 Sloan v. Lemon et al., 1+13 U. S. 025 (1973)• 
68 Ibid., p. 829. 
69 Ibid., p. 830. 
1 
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Justice Powell maintained that the Pennsylvania Statute 
could not be differentiated from the New York Statute on the 
basis that Pennsylvania law did not restrict benefits to low-
income families, saying: 
Our decision is not dependent upon any such speculation. 
Instead we look to the substance of the program, and no 
matter how it is characterized its effect remains the 
same. The State has singled out a class of its citizens 
for a special economic benefit. Whether that benefit 
be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive 
to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, 
or as a reward for having done so, at bottom its intend­
ed consequences is to preserve and support religion-
oriented institutions.'0 
Another point of difference between the Pennsylvania and 
New York statutes was the severability clause, which stated: 
If a part of this act is invalid, all valid parts that 
are severable from the invalid part remain in effect. 
If a part of this act is invalid, in one or more of its 
applications, the part remains in effect in all valid 
applications that are severable from the invalid applic­
ations. ' 
Justice Powell commented on this point: 
Although the Act contained a severability clause, the 
court reasoned that, in view of the fact that so sub­
stantial a majority of the law's designated beneficiaries 
were affiliated with religious organizations, it could 
not be assumed that the state legislature would have 
passed the law to aid only those attending the relative­
ly few nonsectarian schools. 
Therefore, the Court decision held that aid to the nonsectarian 
70 Ibid., p. 832. 
71 Pennsylvania, Parent,Education Act for Nonpublic 
Education. (1971) Act 92. 
72 Sloan v. Lemon, p. 833* 
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73 school could not be severed from aid to the sectarian. 
Trends of Court Decisions In 
Church-State Issues 
This chapter has reviewed church-state cases which have been 
decided during the period from 1969 through 1977* The landmark 
decision of Lemon I in 1971 provided the groundwork in jurispru­
dence for all subsequent Court decisions. 
During this nine year period, 17 cases have reached the 
Supreme Court. Lemon I (1971) vae followed immediately by 
Tilton and Sanders where a distinction was made between the consti-
titutionality of state aid to religious institutions at college 
and at elementary school level. State aid at the elementary level 
was denied unanimously, while at college level the vote was split 
in favor of such aid to sectarian colleges. In 1972 Essex 
and Johnson unanimously overthrew an Ohio tuition reimbursement 
plan and remanded a free textbook plan for grades 1 through 6 
for determination of mootness, But in 1973» following retirement 
of Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan from the bench, the 
Lemon II case showed the development of serious splits in the 
opinion of the Court. These cases are reviewed for voting pattern 
in Table if. on page 93* 
The split vote continued to dominate cases tried in 1973> 
73 Ibid., p. 834. 
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as shown in Table 5 on page 94. Three public school cases, Wolman 
v. Kosydar, Sloan v. Lemon, and Norwood v. Harrison resulted in 
Court decisions which held tax credits, tuition reimbursement and 
loaning of textbooks to racially discriminatory schools unconsti­
tutional. A 1973 case involving state support of Baptist College 
was held constitutional in Hunt v. McNair, following the precedent 
set by Tilton. In 1974 a New Jersey statute granting cost of 
secular textbooks and supplies to sectarian schools was ruled 
unconstitutional in Harburger v. Public Funds. The significant 
characteristic of these decisions is that all except one were 
decided by a 6-3 split decision of the Court. 
The Nyquist decision of 1973 has already been reviewed, with 
voting patterns as shown in Table 3 on page 84. Decisions holding 
certain Acts of the legislature unconstitutional were of the 6-3 
variety, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and Justice 
Rehnquist providing the dissenting votes. 
The same voting pattern held steady in 1974 decisions shown 
in Table 6 on page 95» In 1975 votes were similarly recorded 
holding Pennsylvania auxiliary services and instructional materials 
and equipment grants unconstitutional. Decisions in which Federal 
Title I funds to aid parochial schools in Missouri were held 
constitutional and where a Missouri statute upholding reservation 
of public transportation to public schools only was held consti­
tutional were given a firmer vote. 
A final case involving Maryland state aid to sectarian and 
non-sectarian colleges was approved by a low 5-4 vote, as shown 
92 
in Table 7 on page 96. 
The WoIraan v. Walter case treated earlier was summarized as 
a separate Table 1 on page 70 due to the many-faceted nature of 
the decision. Upon examination of the vote against constitution­
ality of instructional materials and equipment and transportation 
on field trips, low majority votes of 6-3 and 5-b are seen. On 
the other hand, auxiliary services were approved 8-1 and 7-2. 
Standardized testing service was approved 6-3> as was the provision 
of textbooks for sectarian school children. 
The trend of Court decisions in Church-State issues appears 
on the surface to be becoming more and more liberal where aid to 
elementary and secondary schools is concerned. However, this may 
be only a surface effect. Where the majority of the Court feels 
that direct aid is not given to non-public schools without adequate 
safeguards against establishment of religion by improper use of 
this aid, the aid stands a better chance of approval by the Court. 
The skill of legislators in drafting acceptable statutes giving 
state aid to sectarian or other private schools seems to be the 
most important ingredient in the success of such an effort. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DESEGREGATION 
Introduction 
A legacy of freedom and equality of educational opportunity 
bequeathed to minority races by the Warren Court in the 1954 
Brown I decision encountered resistance during the implemeatation 
phase following Brown II which rose to a crescendo during the 
period from 1969 to 1977* The Brown I decision held that 
Segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other tangible factors may be equal, deprives the 
children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities, in contravention of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.-*-
The Fourteenth Amendment provides the constitutional guaran­
tee that no person shall be deprived of the equal protection of 
the laws. Almost all cases involving desegregation have turned 
on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with 
the exception of Boiling v. Sharpe (1954)> which was decided on 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Under the principle that state-imposed segregation by 
race in public schools denies equal protection of the 
laws, the objective is to eliminate from the public 
schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation, and 
1 Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee 
County, Kansas , _et al., 3V? U. S. 483 (1954). 
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school authorities are clearly charged with the affirm­
ative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
will be eliminated root and branch.2 
As previously pointed out in Chapter II, equality before the 
law implies no separation of students by schools according to 
race so that all laws anywhere equally apply to all students 
regardless of race. Such a purpose can not be served by segreg­
ated schools. 
The segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other tangible factors may be equal, deprives the 
children of minority group of equal educational oppor­
tunities, and amounts to a deprivation of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.3 
However, the Supreme Court has realized that education is 
primarily a state and local responsibility. The initiative has 
almost always fallen to local school boards to prepare desegre­
gation plans consistent with court decisions. Where local boards 
failed to assume the responsibility for desegregation, the District 
Courts have been empowered to act as school administrators. 
Beginning with Green, the tempo of desegregation efforts 
quickened and the dictum of the Brown decision, "all deliberate 
speed," became more urgent: 
The burden on a school board today is to come forward 
2 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U. S. 1-(1971), 29 L. Ed. 2d., p. 556, Headnote: Civil Rights, 
par. 6, 12.5 - schools - racial segregation. 
3 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, 
Kansas, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 74 Supreme Court Reporter, p. 686, 
Headnote: Constitutional Law, 220. 
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with a plan that promises realistically to work, and 
promises realistically to work now.^ 
The mandate of the Supreme Court during recent years has 
been to abolish "de jure" segregation. This edict means that all 
governmental bodies, of which the public school is one, may make 
no school laws which tend to polarize races into schools which 
may be characterized as "white" or "black" by any criterion. 
However, absolute proportioning of races according to the local 
population is not mandated, as will be seen in the review of the 
Swann decision. On the other hand, proportioning of faculties by 
race is recognized as a legitimate desegregation tool. Busing of 
school children is also permitted as an aid to desegregation 
efforts. 
As the years have passed following the Brown I decision, it 
is still possible to find schools in which the student population 
is nearly all white or nearly all black. So long as the situation 
exists without active or passive encouragement by state agencies, 
the desegregation mandate is not violated. This situation may be 
referred to by some as "de facto" segregation, not without bitter­
ness. 
During the period from 1969 through 1977, the Court decided-
19 desegregation cases which originated in 10 different states. 
^ Green County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968). 
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Six additional cases involving applications for stay of desegreg­
ation orders were settled by individual Justices in Circuit 
Justice capacities. 
Cases Decided in Circuit Courts 
As pointed out in Chapter I, the purpose of Circuit Courts of 
Appeal is to screen cases for referral to the Supreme Court. In 
the process of screening, the individual Justice acts as surrogate 
for the entire Court. These cases are reviewed in following sec­
tions. 
Dr. J, W. Edgar v. United States (1971) concerned application 
for a stay, pending certiorari, of a District Court order which 
5 directed comprehensive desegregation steps. Texas education 
officials v/ere brought under the threat of v/ithholding funds and 
accreditation for school districts which failed to meet their 
constitutional obligation to eliminate remaining vestiges of 
the dual school system. Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, as Circuit 
Justice for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied the stay 
on the basis of Green and Swann decisions, saying that 
It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order 
of the District Court that, in ray view, does no more than 
endeavor to realize the directive of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and the decisions of this Court that racial discrimin­
ation in the public schools must be eliminated root and 
branch." 
5 Dr. W. Edgar v. United States, U. S. 1206 (1971). 
6 Ibid., p. 1207. 
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Corpus Chrlsti School District v. Cisneros (1971) followed 
Edgar closely in time and presented Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black 
with another opportunity to stay a desegregation plan."^ The stay 
had first been ordered by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against a judgment entered by another 
District Court in a desegregation suit. As can be surmised 
from this complicated situation, Justice Black acted to uphold 
the stay, saying: 
The case was in an undesirable state of confusion and 
presented questions which had not been previously passed 
on by the full Court, but which should be.^ 
Winston-Salem v. Scott (1971) concerned an application for a 
stay of District Court desegregation orders in August, 1971, for 
q 
the Winston-Salem, North Carolina school district. Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger, as Circuit Justice for the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, denied the stay. Supporting decisions from 
Swann, Davis, McDaniel and North Carolina State Board were referred 
to by the Chief Justice in support of denial of the stay. All of 
the referred cases had been decided on April 20, 1971. 
Gomperts v. Chase (1971) originated when a preliminary injunc­
tion was sought against a school board's plan for voluntary 
integration of certain California schools.^ 
7. Corpus Christi School District v. Jose Cisneros, 404 U. S. 
1211 (1971). . 
8 Ibid., p. 1211. 
9 Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. 
Catherine Scott, 404 U. S. 1221 (1971). 
10 Robert Gomperts v. Charles E. Chase, 404 S. 1237 (1971)• 
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Mr. Chief Justice William 0. Douglas, as Circuit Justice 
for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied the application, 
saying: 
If this were the classical de jure school segregation, 
the injunction plainly should be granted. But the precise 
contours of de jure segregation have not been drawn by the 
Court.11 
Drummond v. Acree (1972) concerned a desegregation plan which 
12 was to begin operation in Augusta, Georgia. State statutes 
forbade busing to achieve racial balance until all appeals had 
been exhausted. Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, as Circuit Justice 
for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied the application for 
a stay, saying: 
I accept the holding of the courts below that the order 
was entered to accomplish desegregation of a school system 
in accordance with the mandate of Swann and not for the 
purpose of achieving a racial balance. The stay application 
must, therefore, be denied.13 
Pasadena v. Spangler (1975) dealt with a California school 
board decision to return students assigned to a new school to 
their original classrooms.The action had been ordered by the 
District Court. An appeal for a stay in the order was granted 
by Mr. Justice William H. Rehnquist, as Circuit Justice for the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Stay was granted pending action 
under certiorari to review the Pacadena issues* 
11. Ibid., p. 1238. 
12 Ann Gunter Drummond v. Robert L. Acree, k09 U. S. 1228 
(1972). 
13 Ibid., p. 1231. 
lb Pasadena City Board of Education v. Nancy Anne Spangler, 
if23 U. S. 1335 (1975). 
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Cases Decided Prior to Swarm 
Five cases were decided by the full Court during 1969 and 
15 1970 prior to the landmark decision of Swann (1971). All cases 
involved implementation of desegregation plans, and all decisions 
were announced with the unanimous vote of the Court. 
Alexander v. Holmes County (1969) involved a Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals order suspending plans for desegregation of 33 
16 Mississippi school districts. The Court of Appeals postponed the 
date for submission of desegregation plans 
upon motion of the Department of Justice and the 
recommendation of the Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare, the position taken being that time was 
too short to accomplish a complete and orderly imple­
mentation of the desegregation plans for the coming 
year.I? 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the suspension order of 
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case 
for the issuance of an order, effective immediately, 
declaring that each of the school districts involved 
may no longer operate a dual school system based on. 
race or color, and directing that the school districts 
begin immediately to operate as a unitary school system 
within which no person is to be effectively excluded from 
any school because of race or color.18 
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish (1969) combined three cases 
19 seeking desegregation of Louisiana school districts. 
15 Svfann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, i+02 
U. 3. 1 (1971). 
16 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education. 396 U. S. 
19 (1969). 
17 Ibid., p. 19. 
18 Ibid., p. 19. 
19 Carter v. V/est Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 
226 (1969). 
lOif 
United States District Courts rejected terminal desegregation 
plans submitted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
for the 1969-1970 school year. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the orders of the district courts and ordered the school 
boards to desegregate faculties completely and adopt plans for 
conversion to unitary school systems by February 1, 1970. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals authorized a delay in pupil deseg­
regation until September, 1970. The Supreme Court, in a per 
curiam opinion, granted a preliminary injunctive order requiring 
the school boards to prepare for complete student desegregation 
by February 1, 1970. The Court vacated that portion of the decision 
of the Court of Appeals pertaining to delay in implementation 
of student desegregation plans. 
Powell v. Board pertained to an order of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma v/hich approved 
a school board's proposal for furthering desegregation of Okla­
homa City schools by revising school attendance boundaries 
PC 
effective at the start of the 1969-1970 school year. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order. On certiorari, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that 
the Court of Appeals erred in vacating the lower court's 
approval of the boundary changes, and the Court of Appeals 
should have permitted implementation of the desegregation 
measures pending decision of the appeal.21 
20. Dowell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public 
Schools. 396 U. S. 259T1959'). 
21 Ibid., p. 269. 
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Carter v. West Feliciana (1970) was a further treatment of 
the delay previously authorized in Carter (1969) by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in desegregation plans for Louisiana 
22 school districts. The Supreme Court fully reversed the judg­
ments of the Court of Appeals, holding that 
insofar as the Court of Appeals had authorized deferral 
of student desegregation beyond February 1, 1970, it had 
misconstrued the holding in Alexander v. Holmes County 
Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19, as to the obligation of 
every school district to terminate dual school systems at p* 
once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools. 
Finally, Northcross v. Board (1970) concerned a petition 
which requested modification of a desegregation plan developed 
for schools of Memphis, Tennessee, which 
permitted unrestricted free transfers, and petitioners 
desired a plan without such a provision, and one that 
would also provide among other things for a complete 
faculty desegregation. ^ 
The 1966 plan permitted unrestricted free transfers. Petitioners 
to the District Court desired a plan without free transfer 
provisions and one that would also provide among other things 
for complete faculty desegregation. Upon denial of this petition, 
the case was taken to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where 
petitions were filed for summary reversal of the desegregation 
22 Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U. S. 
290 (1970). 
23 Ibid., p. 290. 
2/f Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, 
Tennessee, City Schools, 397 U. S. 232 (1970). 
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plan and for adoption of a unitary system now. Both motions 
were denied by the Court of Appeals, which said that 
the Court of Appeals is satisfied that the respondent 
Board of Education of Memphis is not now operating a 
"dual school system" and has, subject to complying with 
the present commands of the District Judge, converted 
its pre-Brown dual system into a unitary system 
"within which no person is to be effectively excluded 
because of race or color."25 
Petitioners then filed a! petition for certiorari, which was 
granted by the Supreme Court on the basis of following facts: 
1. The finding by the District Court that the state-imposed 
dual system had not been dismantled and did not have real 
prospects for dismantlement "at the earliest possible date. 
2. The premature decision of the Court of Appeals relative to 
the effectiveness of a desegregation plan not properly 
brought before the court. 
The Court ruled 6-0 (Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not 
participate) to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court calling 
for remand of the case to the District Court for consideration of 
issues before it consistent v/ith the Alexander case. 
In concurring with the majority opinion in Northcross, Chief 
Justice Burger stated that 
the time has come to clear up what seems to be a confusion, 
genuine or simulated, concerning this Court's prior 
25 Ibid., p. 234. 
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mandates. These school cases present widely varying 
factors; some records reveal plans for desegregating 
schools, others have no plans or only partial plans; 
some records reflect rezoning of school districts, 
others do not; some use traditional bus transportation 
• . .others use school bus transportation for a differ­
ent purpose. ... As soon as possible, however, we 
ought to resolve some of the basic practical problems 
when they are appropriately presented including whether, 
as a constitutional matter, any particular racial 
balance must be achieved in the schools; to what extent 
school districts and zones may or must be altered as a 
constitutional matter; and to what extent transportation 
may or must be provided to achieve the ends sought by 
prior holdings of the Court. 
All five cases discussed in this section refer to the attempt 
of desegregationist forces to break down the passive restraints 
of custom and tradition and expedite the establishment of truly 
integrated public schools all over the country. The burden of 
establishing acceptable and workable desegregation plans was 
placed directly on the school boards. Heroic efforts were made 
by school boards to develop satisfactory desegregation plans. 
Guidelines for practical desegregative efforts were badly needed 
as a palliative for the widespread disorder engendered by Green 
in 1968, particularly in metropolitan neighborhoods wherein 
large populations of various ethni? backgrounds lived in close 
proximity. 
The first major landmark case came in 1971 and concerned the 
desegregation of the school district of the city of Charlotte and 
Mecklenburg County in North Carolina. 
26 Ibid., p. 237 
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27 The Swann Case 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education had been in a 
state of continuous litigation since Green (1968) and had taken 
many steps to implement a unitary school system, including: 
1. Closing schools and reassigning jpupils with a specific 
purpose of increasing pupil integration; 
2. Adjusting attendance zones to promote integration; 
3* Merging white and black athletic programs; 
Fostering white and black organizations of parents, 
teachers and students; 
5* Adjusting school bus routes to foster desegregation; 
6. Dampening the effects of free pupil transfer plans; 
7. Integrating all faculties and administrative staffs. 
However, the efficacy of these measures was disputed: 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, the 43rd larg­
est in the nation, encompasses the city of Charlotte and 
surrounding Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The area 
is large—550 square miles—spanning roughly 22 miles east-
west and 36 miles north-south. During the 1968-1969 
school year the system served more than 84,000 pupils in 
107 schools. Approximately 71% of the pupils were found 
to be white and 29% Negro. As of June, 1969, there were 
approximately 24,000 Negro students in the system, of 
whom 21,000 attended schools within the city of Charlotte. 
Two-thirds of those 21,000—approximately 14»000 Negro 
students—attended 21 schools which were either totally 
Negro or more than 99% Negro. 
Therefore, litigation was initiated in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for the 
27 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U. S. 1 (1971). 
28 Ibid., p. 6. 
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purpose of requiring the defendant school board to cease maintain­
ing a racially segregated, dual public school system. The District 
Court ordered the school board to come forward with a plan for both 
29 faculty and student desegregation. ? Following submission of a 
partially completed plan in November, 1969, the District Court held 
that the board's submission was unacceptable and appointed an expert 
in administration, Dr. John Finger, to prepare a desegregation plan. 
In February, 1970, the District Court was presented with the two 
alternative plans.^ 
The Board Plan 
This plan closed seven schools and reassigned their pupils. 
School attendance zones were restructured to achieve greater racial 
balance. However, the plan maintained existing grade structures 
and rejected such techniques as pairing and clustering. It created 
a single athletic league, eliminated the previously racial basis of 
the school bus system, provided racially mixed faculties and admin­
istrative staffs, and modified its free-transfer plan into an 
optional majority—to—minority transfer system.^ 
Proposed attendance zones were pie-shaped, affording the 
residents of the central city access to suburban schools. 
Considerable racial imbalance remained in elementary, junior high, 
and high schools. More than half of the Negro elementary pupils 
were left in nine schools that were 86% to 100% Negro. 
29 Ibid., P. 7 
30 Ibid., P. 8 
31 Ibid., P. 8 
32 Ibid., P. 9 
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The Finger Plan 
This plan adopted the school board zoning plan for senior 
high schools, calling for additional busing to overcome the low 
ratio of Negroe attendance at Independence High School. Junior 
high schools combined the rezoning plan of the board with the 
creation of nine "satellite" zones. A satellite zone is an area 
which ie not contiguous with the main attendance zones surrounding 
the school. 
Elementary schools relied on zoning, pairing and grouping 
techniques, with the result that student bodies throughout the 
system would range from 9% to 38% Negro. 
Action by the District Court 
The District Court selected the Finger plan for the following 
reasons: 
Like the board plan, the Finger plan does as much by 
rezoning school attendance lines as can reasonably be 
accomplished. However, unlike the board plan, it does 
not stop there. It goes further and desegregates all the 
rest of the elementary schools by the technique of group­
ing two or three outlying schools with one black inner 
city school; by transporting black students from grades 
one through four to outlying white schools; and by 
transporting white students from the fifth and sixth 
grades from the outlying white schools to the inner 
city black school.34 
33 Ibid., p. 9. 
34 Ibid., p. 9. 
Ill 
On February 5, 1970, the District Court adopted the board 
plan, as modified by Dr. Finger, for the junior and senior high 
schools. The court rejected the board elementary school plan 
35 and adopted the Finger plan as presented. 
Action by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's 
order as to faculty desegregation and the secondary school plans, 
but vacated the order respecting elementary schools. 
While agreeing that the District Court properly dis­
approved the board plan concerning these schools, the 
Court of Appeals feared that the pairing and grouping 
of elementary schools would place an unreasonable burden 
on the board and the system's pupils.36 
The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration 
37 and submission of further plans. 
Further Action by the District Court 
Two new plans were considered by the District Court: 
1. A plan prepared by the United States Department of Health, 
Education and V/elfare (the H. E. W. plan) based on contig­
uous grouping and zoning of schools. 
2» A plan prepared by four members of the nine-member school 
board (the minority plan) achieving substantially the 
same results as the Finger plan but apparently with less 
35 Ibid., P. 10 
36 Ibid., P. 10 
37 Ibid., P* 10 
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transportation. 
After some debate, the school board indicated that it would 
accept the Finger plan, reiterating that it felt the plan was 
unreasonable. The District Court, by order dated August 7, 1970, 
30 
directed that the Finger plan remain in effect. 
Action by the Supreme Court 
On April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed 
the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent that the Court of 
Appeals had affirmed the District Court's judgment, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order reinstating 
the Finger plan for elementary school students. 
In announcing the decision of the Court, Chief Justice 
Burger said: 
The central issue in this case is that of student assign­
ment, and there are essentially four problem areas: 
(1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas 
may be used as an implement in a remedial order to 
correct a previously segregated system; 
(2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must 
be eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial 
process of desegregation; 
(3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement 
of school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial 
measure; and 
(**) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transpor­
tation facilities to correct state-enforced racial school 
segregation.^ 
38 
39 
W 
Ibid., p. 11. 
Ibid., p. 11. 
Ibid., p. 22. 
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In answer to these questions, Mr. Chief Justice Burger said: 
The constitutioaal command to desegregate schools does 
not mean that every school in every community must al­
ways reflect the racial composition of the school system 
as a whole.^1 
In the light of the above, it should be clear that the 
existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually 
one-race, schools within a district is not in and of it­
self the mark of a system that still practices segregation 
by law.^2 
We hold that the pairing and grouping of noncontinguous 
school zones is a permissible tool, and such action is 
to be considered in the light of the objectives sought.^ 
In these circumstances, we find no basis for holding 
that the local school authorities may not be required 
to employ bus trasnportation as one tool of school de­
segregation.^ 
Although the central issue in the Swann case was that of 
student assignment, the issue of busing was high-lighted by the 
decision of the Court of Appeals which vacated the busing pro­
vision of the District Court order. The Court of Appeals held 
that the amount of additional busing would be unnecessarily 
extensive and therefore "unreasonable." 
However, the District Court had found that the school system 
would have to employ 138 more buses than it had previously oper­
ated. But 105 of those buses were already available and the 
others could easily "be obtained. Additionally, 
it should be noted that North Carolina requires provision 
of transportation for all students who are assigned to 
schools more than one and one-half iniles from their homes.^5 
Ibid., P. 2*t. 
bZ Ibid., P« 26 
*f3 Ibid., P. 28 
kk Ibid., P. 30, 
Ibid., P. 30 
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The Court noted that the trips for elementary school pupils 
averaged about seven miles under the desegregation plan recomm­
ended by the District Court and that they would take "not more 
k6 
than 35 minutes at the most." The previous transportation plan 
operating in Charlotte transported 23*600 students on all grade 
levels an average of 15 miles one way for an average trip requir­
ing over an hour.**'' In discussing the matter of busing, the Court 
said: 
An objection to transportation of students may have 
validity when the time or distance of travel is so 
great as to either risk the health of the children , 
or significantly impinge on the educational process. 
The substance of these remarks was to be quoted in later cases 
involving substantial busing of students. 
The Court also recorded an important statement for future 
litigation of desegregation issues: 
It does not follow that the communities served by such 
(unitary) school systems will remain demographically 
stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. 
Neither school authorities nor district courts are consti­
tutionally required to make year-by-year adjustment of the 
racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative 
duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial 
discrimination through official action is eliminated 
from the system.49 
46 Ibid., P« 30 
47 Ibid., P. 30 
48 Ibid., P* 30 
49 Ibid., P. 31 
115 
In summary, the Supreme Court decision in Swann provided 
necessary guidelines for the practical implementation of future 
desegregation efforts and provided a basis of precedent for many 
litigations to come. 
Cases "Following Swann 
Four desegregation suits were decided by the Court on the 
same day as Swann, on April 20, 1971* All of these cases were 
decided by unanimous vote of the Court. 
Davis v. Board was a suit to compel the school board of 
Mobile County, Alabama, to cease operating a racially segregated 
50 
dual public school system. The metropolitan area of the county 
was divided by a major north-south highway, and most of the Negro 
elementary school children in the metropolitan area lived on the 
east side of the highway and attended all-Negro or nearly all-
Negro schools. A desegregation plan was approved by the Federal 
District Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held the plan deficient in faculty and staff desegregation and 
in student assignment. The Court of Appeals directed reassign­
ment of faculty and staff members to achieve a ratio of Negro and 
white substantially the same as for the entire school system. 
The Court of Appeals further ordered additional desegregation of 
students but required no busing of students, with the result that 
more than 90% of the students in each of nine elementary schools 
50 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 
402 U. S. 33 (1971). 
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in the eastern part of the metropolitan area would be Negro. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in part but remanded for additional consideration as to 
the possible use of bus transportation and split zoning to improve 
the desegregation plan. 
McDaniel v. Barresi concerned the operation of a Georgia 
county school board's desegregation plan for public elementary 
51 
schools. The plan created new school attendance zones and required 
busing to achieve 20% to 50% Negro population of students in each 
school. The Superior Court denied injunctive relief sought against 
52 operation of the plan, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the plan 
violated two legal codes: 
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which was offended when the school board treated students 
differently because of their race in attempts to achieve 
a racial balance under the board's plan; 
2. The Federal Civil Rights Act of 196£f, which opposed the 
assignment and busing of students to achieve racial 
balance. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
51 Charles McDaniel et al.t v. Joseph Barresi, Jr, et al., 
*f02 U. S. 39 (1971). 
52 226 Ga /f56, 175 S. E. 2d. 6^9. 
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Georgia Supreme Court. The unanimous decision of the Court was 
announced by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, holding that 
1. The county school board, as part of its affirmative 
duty to disestablish a dual school system, properly took 
into account the race of its elementary school children 
in drawing attendance lines;53 
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not restrict state school 
authorities in the exercise of their discretionary powers 
5k to assign students within their school systems. ^ 
North Carolina State Board v. Swann tested the legality of 
55 
a North Carolina statute known as the Anti-Busing Law. ^ In part, 
the law read as follows: 
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any 
school on account of race, creed, color or national origin, 
or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio of race, 
religion or national origins. Involuntary bussing of 
students in contravention of this article is prohibited, 
and public funds shall not be used for any such bussing.56 
A three-judge District Court held this statute unconstitutional 
57 and enjoined its enforcement. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 
The opinion of the Court was announced by Chief Justice Burger, 
reading in part: 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 North Carolina State Board of Education v. James E. 
Swann. 402 U. S. 43 (1971). 
56 Ibid., p. 43. 
57 Ibid., p. 43. 
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• • • the statute exploits an apparently neutral form to 
control school assignment plans by directing that they 
be "color blind"; that requirement, against the background 
of segregation, would render illusory the promise of 
Brown v. Board of Education, J>b7 U. S. ̂ 83 (195^)* Just as 
the race of students must be considered in determining 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also 
must race be considered in formulating a remedy.58 
The Supreme Court also concluded that the statute would unduly 
hamper desegregation efforts: 
We likewise conclude that an absolute prohibition against 
transportation of students assigned on the basis of race, 
"for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio," will 
similarly hamper the ability of local authorities to 
effectively remedy constitutional violations.59 
Finally, Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board challenged the 
constitutionality of the North Carolina anti-busing statute.^® 
Both parties argued to the three-judge court that the 
anti-busing law was constitutional and urged that the 
order of the District Court adopting the Finger plan 
should be set aside."-1-
The three-judge Federal District Court declared a portion of the 
North Carolina anti-busing statute unconstitutional and enjoined 
its enforcement. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal, holding that there existed no case or contro-
62 versy within the meaning of ArticLe III of the Constitution. 
58 Ibid., p. Zf6. 
59 Ibid., p. 46. 
60 Mrs. Robert Lee Moore et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education et al., ̂ 02 U. S. 47 (1971)* 
61 Ibid., p. 
62 Ibid., p. 48. 
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The Winston-Salem Case^ 
While this case was not considered by the full Court, it is 
considered worthy of further exploration because of the important 
part played in its final solution by the Swann case. Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger, as Circuit Justice of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, declined to overrule an order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 
which approved a revised plan to achieve a fixed racial balance 
in the schools through a substantial increase in pupil busing. 
The District Court had approved a modified plan for desegre­
gation of certain North Carolina schools, and appeals were pending 
in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals when the Supreme Court 
decided Swann on April 20, 1971. As a result of the Swann deci­
sion, the Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to 
the District Court to meet the requirements of the Swann decision. 
(UM F. 2d., 99). 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger reviewed the background of the case 
as important: 
Respondents, who are Negro pupils and parents in the 
school system, commenced action alleging that the School 
Board was operating a dual school system, and seeking 
appropriate relief. ... The District Court found that 
in December, 1969* there were 67 schools in the system 
with approximately 50,000 students. The total student 
63 Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. 
Catherine Scott, 4Ok U. S. 1221 (1971). 
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population was 72.5% white and 27.5% Negro. Of the schools, 
15 were all-Negro and seven were all-white. Of the remain­
ing schools, 31 had less than 5% of the minority race. The 
school system was operated under a geographical attendance 
zone system, with freedom-of-choice transfer provisions for 
all students regardless of race. 6^-
Two plans had been submitted originally for approval of the 
District Court: 
1* The Larsen Plan 
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Swann, the plain 
tiffs submitted a plan which was designed to achieve 
as closely as possible a mathematical racial balance 
in all of the schools of the system equal to that 
of the system as a whole. It employed satellite 
zoning and extensive cross-busing. The District 
Court rejected the plan as not constitutionally 
required and unduly burdensome. 
2. The School Board Plan 
This plan retained geographic zoning and freedom-of-
choice transfer provisions, 
but with certain modifications allowing priority to 
majority-to-minority transfers and increasing the 
racial "balance" of several schools. The District 
Court in 1970 approved the Board's plan, subject to 
alterations which prevented minority-to-majority 
transfers, made changes affecting three attendance 
zones, and added a requirement that the Board create 
"innovative" programs designed to increase racial 
contact of the students.66 
64 Ibid.., P. 1222. 
65 Ibid., P. 1222. 
66 Ibid., P. 1223. 
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In rejecting the Larsen plan and approving the modified 
Board plan, the District Court found that 
1« The boundaries of the attendance zones 'had been drawn 
in good faith and without regard to racial consider­
ations; 
2. Pupils attended the schools nearest their home; 
3. The racial concentration of Negroes was not caused by 
public or private discrimination or state action, but 
by economic factors and the desire of Negroes to live in 
their own neighborhoods rather than in predominantly 
67 
white neighborhoods. 
The decision of the District Court was appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals by all parties. Meanwhile, the Swann 
decision was reached by the Supreme Court, and the „Court of 
Appeals by per curiam opinion en banc remanded the Winston-Salem 
case and several others to their respective district courts 
with instruction to receive from the school boards new 
plans "which will give effect to Swann and Davis." F. 
2d. 99,100 (1971).58 
The District Court understood the remand to require "the 
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." 
6? 
68 
69 
Ibid., p. 1223. 
Ibid., p. 122Zf. 
Ibid., p. 1225. 
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The District Court concluded that 
Despite the substantial difference between the findings 
of this Court, v/hich formed the predicate for this Court's 
June 25, 1970, opinion in this case, and the findings which 
form the predicate of the decision of the District Court 
in Swann» it is apparent that it is as "practicable" to 
desegregate all the public schools in the Y/inston-Salem/ 
Forsyth County system as in the Charlotte-Kecklenburg 
system and that the appellate courts will accept no less. 
Consequently, this Court can approve no less. . .70 
The District Court then ordered the School Board to comply 
with the time schedule set by the Court of Appeals in submitting 
the required plan. The school authorities, declaring that they 
considered themselves required to do so, adopted a revised plan 
which was expressly designed "to achieve a racial balance 
throughout the system which will be acceptable to the Court." 
(Emphasis added,) Prior to the adoption of the revised plan, 
the school system transported about 18,000 pupils per day in 
about 216 buses. The drafters of the revised plan estimated 
that it would require at a minimum, with use of staggered 
school openings, 157 additional buses to transport approx­
imately 16,000 additional pupils.71 
The School Board submitted the plan as required, but with 
the statement that "it is not a sound or desirable plan, and 
should not be required. • . appended. 
On July 26, 1971, the District Court accepted the plan, 
noting that it was "strikingly similar" to the Larsen 
plan which it had previously refused to implement as not 
constitutionally required.72 
70 Ibid., p. 1225. 
71 Ibid., p. 1225. 
72 Ibid., p. 1226. 
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In rendering the decision in this case, Mr. Chief Justice 
Burger quoted extensively from the Court decision in Swann. 
Although expressing concern about the thinking of the District 
Court in requiring that the racial ratios in schools must corres­
pond to the racial ratios in the community as a whole, the Chief 
Justice said: 
On the record now before me it is not possible to conclude 
with any assurance that the District Court in its order 
dated July 26, 1971, and the Court of Appeals in its remand 
dated June 10, 1971, did or did not correctly read this 
Court's holding in Swann and particularly the explicit 
language as to a requirement of fixed mathematical ratios 
or racial quotas and the limits suggested as to transport­
ation of students. The record being inadequate to evaluate 
these issues, even preliminarily for the limited purposes 
of a stay order, and the heavy burden for making out a case 
for such extraordinary relief being on the moving parties, 
I am unwilling to disturb the order of the District Court 
dated July 26, 1971, made pursuant to the remand order of^. 
the Court of Appeals which is sought to be reviewed here. 
In summary, the Court allowed the District Judge wide lati­
tude in interpreting the decisions of Sv/ann which implied exact 
racial quotas as the "ideal" and which sanctioned significant 
busing toward achievement of the ideal desegregation plan. 
Although this action was brought only to stay the desegregation 
order of the district court, pending an application for certiorari, 
the immediate and continuing effect was to initiate the plan. 
73 Ibid., p. 1231. 
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Creation of New School Districts 
Two cases were decided by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1972. 
Both cases concerned alleged attempts to avoid desegregation of 
public school systems through creation of new school districts. 
The first case, Wright v. Council, invoked the first split decision 
of the Court in deciding a desegregation issue since Brown I. 
Wright concerned the creation of a new school district in 
Emporia, Virginia.The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia entered an order requiring the deseg­
regation of a dual, racially segregated county school system 
consisting of 3k% white students and 66% Negro students. The 
City of Emporia then undertook creation of a separate school 
district which would consist of k&% white students and 52% Negro 
students and would leave the surrounding county's public schools 
with 28% white students and 72% Negro students. The District Court 
enjoined creation of the separate city school district on the basis 
that dismantling of the existing dual school system would be imped­
ed. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
the city's purpose in creating a separate school district was not 
75 shown to have been to perpetuate segregation. However, the 
mandate of the Circuit Court was stayed pending action on a petit-
76 ion for certiorari. 
7k Pecola Annette V/riflht et al., v. Council of the City of 
Emporia et al. t bO? U. 3. /+51 (1972). 
75 Ibid., p. i+58. 
76 Ibid., p. i*59 
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In a 5-4 split decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judg­
ment of the Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Potter Stewart announced 
the majority opinion of the Court: 
We hold only that a new school district may not be created 
where its effect would be to impede the process of dismantl­
ing a dual system.77 
Dissenting opinion was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
E* Burger, with whom Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined: 
The District Court and the petitioners have placed great 
emphasis on the estimated six-percent increase in the 
proportion of Negro students in the county schools that 
vould result from Emporia's withdrawal. I do not see how 
a difference of one or two children per class would even 
be noticed, let alone how it would render a school part 
Of a dual system.78 
United States v. Scotland Neck concerned the city of Scotland 
79 
Neck, North Carolina. ^ Following the issuance of a desegregation 
plan by the State Department of Public Instruction, the State 
legislature enacted a bill to authorize creation of a new school 
district bounded by the city limits of Scotland Neck, upon approval 
by a majority of the city's voters. Following voter approval, 
steps were taken toward beginning a separate school system in the 
fall of 1961. The District Court enjoined implementation of the 
Act, finding 
the Act in its application creates a refuge for white 
77 Ibid., p. if70. 
78 Ibid., p. 473. 
79 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
®t al., 407 U. S. 434 (1972). 
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students and promotes segregated schools in Halifax 
County, and further that "the Act impedes and defeats 
the Halifax County Board of Education from implement­
ing its plan to completely desegregate all of the public 
schools in Halifax County by the opening of the school 
year 1969-70"80 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed: 
The Court of Appeals did not believe that the separa­
tion of Scotland Neck from the Halifax County system 
should be viewed as an alternative plan for desegregating 
the county system because the "severance was not part of 
a desegregation plan proposed by the school board but was 
instead an action by the Legislature redefining the bound­
aries of local governmental units." 442 F. 2d. at 583*^ 
In a.unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling 
Of the District Court by reversing the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. Mr. Justice Potter Stewart announced the opinion of the 
Court: 
• • • we cannot but conclude that the implementation of 
Chapter 31 would have the effect of impeding the dis­
establishment of the dual school system that existed in 
Halifax County. 
Concurring opinion was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
E. Burger, with whom Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnqulst 
joined: 
• • . the new system was designed to minimize the number 
of Negro children attending school with the white children 
residing in Scotland Neck.°3 
80 Ibid., p. 487. 
81 Ibid., p. 488. 
82 Ibid., p. 490. 
83 Ibid., p. 492. 
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The decisions in Wright and Scotland Neck made clear the 
following mandates: 
1* The Court will not allow redistricting of schools for the 
purpose of perpetuating racial segregation; 
2« Even cities which are permitted by State Constitutions to 
redistrict are forbidden to do so if such action would 
impede the dismantling of an historically segregated dual 
school system; 
3« State statutes must fall if they permit counties to form 
cities for the purpose of maintaining segregated schools, 
Inter-District Desegregation Plans 
The Richmond case involved desegregation of public schools of 
Richmond, Virginia, and the adjacent Henrico and Chesterfield 
&k 
Counties. A suit was originated in 1961 by 11 Negro parents and 
guardians against the School Board of the city of Richmond as a 
class action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to desegregate the 
public schools. On March 16, 196^+, after extended consideration, 
the District Court approved a "freedom of choice" plan by which 
<» 
every pupil was permitted to attend the school of the pupil's or 
the parents' choice. A second "freedom of choice" plan was approv­
ed on March 30, 1966, under which the Board of Education undertook 
to eliminate a dual school system in the assignment;of pupils.®^ 
8if School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, et al., 
T. State Board of Education of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al., 
$12 U. S. 92 (1973). 
83 Carolyn Bradley et al., v. School Board of City of 
R i c h m o n d  e t  a l . ,  / + 1 6  U .  S .  6 9 ^  a t  7 0 5 . ( 1 9 7 k ) »  
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While the 196k plan was in effect, Green (1968) was decided 
in which a "freedom of choice" plan was not acceptable where methods 
promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary system 
were reasonably available. On March 10j 1970, petitioners filed 
with the District Court a motion for further relief. 
Specifically, petitioners asked that the court "require 
the defendant school board forthwith to put into effect" 
a plan that would "promptly and realistically convert the 
public schools of the City of Richmond into a unitary, non-
racial system," and that the court "award a reasonable fee 
to (petitioners') counsel.66 
Following a hearing, the District Court, on April 1, 1970, entered 
a formal order vacating its order of March 39, 1966, and enjoining 
the defendants to "disestablish the existing dual system" and to 
87 
roplace it "with a unitary system." 
oa 
Three plans were offered by the Board of Education: 
1. The initial plan, co-authored by The Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, was held unacceptable because it 
failed to consider residential patterns in determining 
school zones, racial factors in zoning and the use of 
busing. 
Z , .  The second plan was held unsatisfactory, although it was 
adopted by the District Court as an interim plan for the 
1970-71 school year, which was to begin in two weeks. 
86 Ibid., P. 701 
87 Ibid., P. 702 
88 Ibid., P. 703 
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The interim plan included contiguous and satellite zoning, 
pairing, and some public transportation, principally of 
those pupils who were indigent. Still, a large number of 
elementary school pupils would attend schools that were 
over 90% Negro. Also, four elementary schools would remain 
all white, and two high schools and certain secondary 
schools would continue to be racially identifiable. 
After hearing three more plans, the District Court adopted 
the third plan. This plan, adopted April 5, 1971, called for 
extensive busing of students, proximal geographic zoning, clusters, 
satellites and faculty racial balance. In addition, the elementary, 
niddle and high schools were to have a minority-majority ratio 
of students under which each group's projected enrollment in a 
particular school was to be at least half of the group's projected 
89 
city-wide ratio. 
Meanwhile, legal moves were initiated to join the City of 
Richmond school board with those of Henrico and Chesterfield 
Counties. On January 10, 1972, the District Court ordered into 
effect a plan for the integration of the Richmond schools with 
those of the outlying counties of Henrico, which surrounds the 
90 
city of Richmond, and Chesterfield, which forms the south border. 
89 Ibid., p. 703, footnote 
90 Ibid., p. 705. 
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
reversed, holding that 
state-imposed segregation had been '.'completely removed" 
in the Richmond school district and that the consolida­
tion was not justified in the absence of a showing of 
some constitutional violation in the establishment and 
maintenance of these adjoining and separate school dis­
tricts. 91 
After argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals by an equally divided vote, in which Mr. Justice 
92 
Lewis F. Powell took no part.v Justice Powell had previously 
been a member of the Richmond School Board and the Virginia State 
Department of Public Instruction. 
The subject of the later Bradley case (1974) in which much of 
the Richmond case (1973) is reviewed was the award of attorney 
Q-Z 
fees to the plaintiffs after a long and protracted court fight. J 
After initial submission of the case to the Court of 
Appeals, but prior to its decision, the Education Amend­
ments of 1972, of which paragraph 718 of Title VII of 
the Emergency School Aid Act is a part, became law. Section 
718 . . . grants authority to a federal court to award a 
reasonable attorney's fee when appropriate in a school 
desegregation case."^ 
The Supreme Court decided in favor of awarding attorney's fees to 
plaintiffs in the Richmond case prior to enactment of paragraph 
718. Announcing the unanimous decision of the Court, Mr. Justice 
91 Ibid., p. 705. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
9k Ibid., p. 709. 
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Blackmun said: 
If forced to bear the burden of attorneys' fees, few 
aggrieved persons would be in a position to secure 
their and the public's interests in a nondiscriminat­
ory public school system.95 
In summary, the Richmond desegregation case marked an un­
willingness of the Court to interfere with local school district 
lines without a showing of racial reasons for establishment of 
district boundaries. Had Justice Powell participated in this 
decision, the result might have gone either way. However, future 
cases would show that the crossing of school district boundaries 
so as to involve more than one district in desegregation efforts 
would be supported only if the offense to the Constitution were 
shared by those districts. 
Keyes v. School District (1973) was decided on June 21, 1973, 
96 
about one month after the Richmond case had been decided. Suit 
was brought by parents of Denver school children in the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The District 
Court found that the Denver school board had engaged in a policy 
of deliberate racial discrimination with respect to schools in the 
97 
Park Hill area for almost a decade.7' The District Court found 
1. Segregated core city schools were educationally inferior 
95 Ibid., p. 708. 
96 Wilfred Ke.yes v. School District No. 1, 1+13 U. S. 189 
<1973). 
97 Ibid., p. ^13. 
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to those in the predominantly white schools in other parts 
of Denver. 
2* Plaintiffs failed to show "de jure" segregation in other 
areas of the city. 
Therefore, the District Court ordered a remedial plan for the core 
city schools, short of an all-out desegregation plan. The court 
98 
also ordered desegregation of the Park Hill schools. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to 
the core city schools and affirmed as to the Park Hill schools. 
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court on the issue of 
core city school remedial action. The Supreme Court vacated the 
ruling of the Circuit Court in a 7-1 decision, with Justice White 
not participating. The case was remanded to the District Court 
for a determination of the proper status of the Park Hill suburb 
schools as part of a dual school system and to plan appropriate 
99 desegregation efforts under the law. 
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas declared that there was no 
difference between de jure and de facto school segregation in 
joining the Court's opinion. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in 
part and dissented, in part on the ground that the distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation should be abolished in 
favor of a constitutional rule requiring genuinely integrated 
public school systems. 
98 Ibid., 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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Mre Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented on the ground that 
unconstitutional segregation in the Park Hill area did not prove 
that the entire district was unconstitutionally segregated. 
A Review of the Voting Record of 
The Supreme Court 
1971 - 1973 
The voting record of Supreme Court Justices is given in Tables 
fi, 9 and 10, which follow. 
Table 8 shows unanimous vote of all Justices during the 1969-
1970 period when implementation of desegregation plans was being 
litigated. 
Table 9 shows unanimous vote of all Justices on the five cases 
decided on. April 20, 19?1» when the full Court voted on implement­
ation of desegregation plans. 
Table 10 shows a breaking down of Court unanimity after the 
retirement of Justices Hugo L. Black and John M. Harlan and the 
appointments of Justice Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist. 
Action to invalidate the formation of a new city school district 
ia "Virginia for the purpose of evading desegregation efforts was 
supported by the barest margin of However, unanimity was 
once more regained in a similar case in North Carolina. The North 
Carolina case was to be the last case through 1977 in which the 
Court attained unanimity of decision in segregation cases. The 
Richmond case called for extending desegregation procedures over 
three school districts, which failed in a l+rk decision. Finally, 
the Denver case drew a 7-1 decision to compel remedial action in 
Denver, Colorado schools. 
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• - Announced decision. 
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United States \ • Scotland Neck City Board of Education et al 
407 U. S. 434 (1972) 
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. Action 
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C X C X C C* C C C C C X 9 
School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia v. State 
Board of Education, 412 U . S. 92 (1973). Appeal to unite 
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X X N X 4 
Wilfred Keyes v . School District Mo . 1, 413 U . S. 189 (1973) 
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desegregation of Denver city schoolE 
in core citv schools. Remanded 67c 
; and 
1/73 
C X C X C C N C C C/D D X 7 
LEGEND: C - Concur; D - Dissent; c/D Concur in part; 
N - Nonparticipant; X - Retired or not yet seated. 
* - Announced decision. 
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Milliken I 101 
Milliken I is known by the surname of the then-Governor of 
the State of Michigan, William G. Milliken. Plaintiffs in this 
case were Negro citizens of the city of Detroit, Michigan, whose 
public schools were, in mauy Instances, 75 to 93% black. Plaintiffs 
sued in United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan for desegregation of Detroit public schools. 
The District Court found that 
1* the defendants had engaged in unconstitutional activities 
for which the state was responsible and which had resulted 
in de jure segregation in the city school district; 
2. it could properly consider relief in the form of an inter-
district, metropolitan desegregation plan involving 53 
suburban school districts, even though there was no show­
ing (nor was it originally alleged) that the suburban 
school districts had committed any constitutional viola­
tions; 
3. proposed "Detroit-only" desegregation plans were inadequate 
and would only accentuate the racial identifiability of the 
city school system as a black system; 
if. school district lines were simply matters of political 
convenience, and to effectively desegregate Detroit public 
schools it was necessary to develop a metropolitan plan 
to include the 53 suburban school districts and Detroit. 
101 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974). 
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5« A specified number of school buses should be obtained 
to provide transportation under an interim plan to be 
developed for the coming school year.-*-^ 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for 
Joinder of all suburban districts that might be affected by the 
metropolitan remedy, finding that: 
1» de jure segregation existed in the Detroit school district 
2« a metropolitan desegregation plan was proper and necessary 
3« the State was responsible for the de jure segregation in 
Detroit schools; 
if* the State had authority to control local school districts. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
the formulation of a decree restricted to the city of Detroit. 
Mr# Chief Justice Burger, expressing the views of five members 
Of the Court, held that: 
1. a federal court could not properly impose a multi-district 
remedy to a single district de jure segregation problem, 
unless it was first established that unconstitutional 
racially discriminatory actn of the other districts had 
caused inter-district segregation, or that district lines 
had been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. 
2« The remedy must be limited to the Detroit school district 
only; 
102 Ibid., P. 734 
103 Ibid., P. 734 
104 Ibid., P. 757 
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3« the record established de jure segregation in the city 
schools only; 
If* a metropolitan remedy might seriously disrupt the state's 
structure of public education and would give rise to many 
problems due to scale busing of students, financing 
and administration. 
Justices Douglas, White, Brennan and Marshall dissented. 
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas held that: 
I® a metropolitan remedy was proper in the instant case, since 
under Michigan law education is a state project with very 
little local control 
2* by various devices, including creation of school districts, 
selection of school building sites and dispersal of public 
funds to build racial ghettos, the state had created black 
school districts and white school districts; 
3* the Court's ruling against a metropolitan remedy meant that 
there could be no violation of the equal protection clause 
even though the schools were separated by race and the 
black schools were not only "separate" but also "inferior." 
if* there was no difference between de facto and de jure 
segregation, the creation of school districts in metro­
politan Detroit either maintaining existing segregation or 
causing additional segregation." 
105 Ibid., p. 757. 
106 Ibid. , p. 758-761. 
1/fO 
Mllliken II (1977) derived from Milliken I in that the District 
Court mandate to "make desegregation work" resulted in the inclusion 
Of remedial reading programs and in-service training for teachers 
107 
and administrators. Four educational components were identified 
in which remedial education would go forward: 
1« Reading - to eradicate the effects of past discrimination; 
2« In-Service Training - to train teachers, administrators, 
professional and instructional personnel to cope with the 
desegregation process in Detroit; 
3. Testing - to develop tests to measure pupil progress which 
were culturally unbiased; 
if* Counseling and Career Guidance - to deal with normal tensions 
arising during the conversion from a dual system to a unitary 
system. 
The cost of this program was determined to be about $11,600,000 
with half of the cost charged to the State and half to the local 
school board. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
action by the District Court to assess costs against the State for 
the remedial program. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed 
in a unanimous decision which restored Court cohesiveness on the 
segregation issue. Mr. Chief Justice Burger announced the opinion 
of the Court, saying: 
1°7 Milliken v. Bradley, U. S. (1977). 
Ufl 
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's 
de j ure segregated school system, which was so pervasive 
and persistently segregated that the District Court found 
that the need for the educational components flowed direct­
ly from constitutional violations by both state and local 
•officials. These specific educational remedies, although 
normally left to the discretion of the elected school 
board and professional educators, were deemed necessary 
to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the 
position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had 
the se components been provided in a nondiscriminatory man­
ner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial 
discrimination.1°8 
Cases Following Milliken I 
Pasadena v. Spangler (1976) concerned the legality of a 
Federal District Court order for desegregation of the Pasadena 
Unified School District in 1970.^"^ The order required that there 
be no school "with a majority of any minority students." On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court 
action. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' 
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court, 
divided 6-2 with Justice Stevens not participating, issued the 
opinion as announced by Justice William H. Rehnquist: 
Because the case is to be returned to the Court of Appeals, 
that court will have the opportunity to reconsider its 
decision in the light of our observations regarding the 
appropriate scope of equitable relief in this case.1-1-0 
108 Ibid. 
10.9 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Nancy Anne Spangler, 
A27 U. s. k2k (1976). 
110 Ibid., p. 440. 
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The District Court had included the proviso that there 
would be no school "with a majority of any minority students" 
in the 1970 desegregation order under the "Pasadena Plan." 
Literal compliance with this requirement had occurred only in the 
initial year of the plan's operation. This non-compliance was 
brought about by shifting of population through routine entry 
and exit of citizens, not caused by school officials. 
The Pasadena City Board of Education felt required to alter 
school attendance zones annually in response to demographic changes 
within the Pasadena Unified School District and sought relief 
from the necessity for this action. Petitioners sought 
1« that the District Court's 1970 order should in all respects 
be dissolved; 
that the District Court's jurisdiction over the Pasadena 
Unified School District should be terminated; 
3» that petitioners' plan should be accepted as an alternative 
to the present plan. 
By remanding the case for further proceedings as to appropriate 
scope of equitable relief in this case, the Supreme Court thought 
it unnecessary to consider other contentions of petitioners. 
Justices William J^.Brennan and Thurgood Marshall dissented, 
on the basis that the original desegregation plan, following the 
initial success of the first year, had not taken substantial hold 
and should be repeated as an affirmative duty to desegregate the 
Pasadena school system. 
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Austin v. United States (1977) concerned the legality of a 
lower court order to begin massive busing of students in the Austin, 
Texas, Independent School District to achieve racial balance. 
The case was appealed from decision of the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals which had af*ixa«tLAa pari, reversed, and remanded in 
part a decision of the United States District Court for the West-
1*12 
em District of Texas. 
The district court had considered this school desegregation 
case earlier: 
This school desegregation case was filed in August, 1970, 
by the United States against the Texas Education Agency 
and seven school districts, including the AISD. The com­
plaint alleged that (1) historically, the defendants had 
operated a dual system based on race, and continued to do 
so, and (2) the defendants discriminatorily assigned 
Mexican-Americans to schools identifiable as Mexican-
American schools or as schools intended for blacks and 
Mexican- Americans. 
The district court found no de jure discrimination against Mexican-
Americans and afforded them no relief. It then held that 
"the vestiges of a dual system continue to exist with res­
pect to blacks" and adopted, with minor modifications, 
the AISD plan for establishing a unitary school system 
in Austin. The high schools and junior high schools were 
to be desegregated primarily by busing about 2200 blacks 
to previously predominantly white schools. The elementary 
schools were "clustered" into groups of six schools each. 
One week per month the students of each cluster were to 
meet together to engage in certain planned activities.il4 
111 Austin Independent School District, v. United States, 
429 U. S. 990 (1976). 
112 United States v„ Texas Education Agency, 532 F. 2d. 
380 (5th Cir. 1976). 
113 Ibid., p. 384-
Ilk Ibid. 
Ikh 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting £n banc, reversed 
smd remanded the case to the district court with directions to 
eliminate the unconstitutional segregation of Mexican-American 
and black students "at once." The Court itemized a hierarchy of 
desegregation tools that the district court should consider using. 
The district court then called for submission of a single 
desegregation plan by parties concerned. Plans were submitted by 
the Austin Independent School District and the black intervenors. 
The AISD Plan 
The school district plan would establish six sixth grade 
centers that would draw all sixth-graders in the school district. 
Students in grades K to 5 would be assigned to the schools closest 
to their homes.The new desegregation plan required busing 
Of about 1900 students in connection with Sixth Grade Center Plan 
implementation, but it left untouched the students in grades K-5 
and 7-12.117 
The Finger Plan 
The Mexican-American intervenors submitted a desegregation 
plan prepared by Dr. John A. Finger, Jr., a professor of education 
11.8 
at Khode Island College. The "Finger" plan would convert the 
school system to a k-k-k grade structure; that is, elementary 
115 Ibid., P. 385 
116 Ibid., P. 394 
117 Ibid., P. 393 
118 Ibid., P- 395 
145 
schools would contain grades K to middle schools would contain 
grades 5 to 8, and high schools would continue to operate grades 
9 to 12. 
The practical effect of the Plan is that kindergarten-to-
fourth-grade students in East Austin would be bused to 
West Austin and fifth-to-eighth-grade students in West 
Austin would be bused to East Austin. Elementary and 
junior high schools that are between 50 and 90 percent 
Anglo are defined as "naturally desegregated" and would 
remain unchanged. When changing demographic patterns 
cause any of these schools to fall outside the "naturally 
desegregated" range, the schools would be brought within 
the Finger Plan 4-^-4 system. The high schools would 
be integrated by selecting, for each high school, feeder 
schools that would maximize the integration of that high 
school. Dr. Finger estimates that 18,659 (the AISD says 
25»000) of Austin's public school students would be bused 
under his plan.11^ 
The district court adopted, with minor modifications, the 
AISD's plan for establishing an integrated school system, holding 
that 
the AISD had successfully rebutted this prima facie case 
(of intentional segregation of blacks) by demonstrating 
that its racial policies had been unrelated to its treat­
ment of Mexican-Americans and that there was an absence 
of segregative intent toward Mexican-Americans.120 
The court, relying on Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 
Colorado, held that it would therefore be improper to order 
121 
"all-out desegregation" of Mexican-Americans. 
119 
120 
121 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 386. 
Ibid. 
1^6 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of 
the district court, holding that 
school authorities may not constitutionally use a neighbor­
hood assignment policy that creates segregated schools in a 
district with ethnically segregated residential patterns. 
When this policy is used, we may infer that the school au­
thorities have acted with segregative intent. 
The segregation is de jure and unconstitutional because 
it is the result of school board action taken with the ob­
vious (though, not necessarily predominant) intent to create 
or maintain segregated schools.^22 
In a 7-2 decision., the Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a Memorandum Decision 
issued December 6, 1976, Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell was joined 
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Mr. Justice William H. 
Rehnquist in a concurring opinion which stated that 
the Court of Appeals may have erred by a readiness to impute 
to school officials a segregative intent far more pervasive 
than the evidence justified. That court also seems to have 
erred in ordering in scope a desegregation plan far exceed­
ing in scope any identifiable violations of constitutional 
rights. 
The majority opinion of the Court explained the equitable standard 
involved: 
I do not suggest that transportation of pupils is never 
a permissible means of implementing desegregation. I 
merely emphasize the limitation repeatedly expressed by 
this Court that the extent of an equitable remedy is de­
termined by and may not properly exceed the effect of the 
constitutional violation. . . 
122 Ibid., p. >92. 
123 Austin Independent School District v. United States, 
429 U. S. 990 (1976), 50 L. Ed. 2d. at 60/*. 
124 Ibid., p. 605. 
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The "triggering" condition of the Finger plan, under which 
croes-town busing of students would occur as a result of changing 
demographic patterns, was interpreted by the Court as an attempt 
to achieve some predetermined racial and ethnic balance in the 
schools rather than to remedy the constitutional violations com­
mitted by the school authorities.125 This plan was considered 
impermissible in view of the Court's holding in Pasadena Board 
of Education v. Spangler (1976). Also, the Court could not draw 
a comparison between the Austin case and the Swann case, in which 
high percentages of students were to be bused to and from school, 
because the Charlotte-Mecklenburg system covered a large area 
(550 square miles) and included rural areas wherein busing was 
necessary apart from desegregative efforts. 
Dissent was expressed by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood 
Marshall on the basis that the Court of Appeals correctly inter-
1 27 
preted and applied the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court. ' 
Keyes required proof of segregative intent as a prerequisite to 
a decree to desegregate a de facto system.in Denver, Colorado. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found evidence of such intent 
in that establishment of neighborhood school systems within rac-
128 ially segregated areas, 
125 Ibid., p. 60U, footnote 3« 
126 Ibid., p. 605, footnote 
127 Ibid., p. 603. 
128 United States v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F. 2d. 
380 (5th Cir. 1976), p. 388. 
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Dayton v. Brinkman (1977) concerned the allegation that there 
had been a violation of the equal protection clause in the oper­
ation of public schools in Dayton, Ohio. After the lawsuit was 
begun for remedial action, the District Court filed its original 
decision on February 7, 1973.Plaintiffs, students in the 
public school system, asked the court to restructure the adminis­
tration of that system. 
The District Court findings were: 
1. the teaching staff of the Dayton public schools became 
and still remains substantially integrated; 
there was no evidence of racial discrimination in the 
establishment or alteration of attendance boundaries or 
in the site selection and construction of new schools and 
school additions; 
3« there was no evidence that the District's "freedom of 
enrollment" policy had been unfairly operated or that 
black students had been denied.transfers, because Of race. 
However, the District Court's ultimate finding was that 
the racially imbalanced schools^ optional attendance zones, 
and recent Board action ... are cumulatively a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.131 
The District Court called for plans for correcting the condition. 
-129 Dayton Board of Education et al., v. Mark Brinkman et al., 
(1977), 97 Sup. Ct. 2766, 53 L. Ed. 2d. 851, 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
Ik9 
A district-wide racial distribution plan was approved by the 
District Court which would bring the racial content of every school 
to within 15% of the black-white population ratio of Dayton. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the plan. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In a 
8-0 decision, with Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall not participating, 
it was held that 
1. the constitutional violations found by the District Court 
did not justify the broad district-wide remedy imposed; and 
2. the case must be remanded to the District Court for the 
making of more specific findings and if necessary, the taking 
of additional evidence. 
Mr. Justice William H. Rehnquist announced the decision of the 
Court, saying that 
It is clear from the findings of the District Court that 
Dayton is a racially mixed community,,.and that many of its 
schools are either predominantly white or predominantly 
black. This fact without more, of course, does not offend 
the Constitution.132 
The District Court plan, which mandated extensive busing of 
students, was in effect when the Supreme Court decision was 
announced. 
. . .  i t  i s  u n d i s p u t e d  t h a t  i t  h a s  b e e n  i n  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  
Dayton school system during the present year without crea­
ting serious problems. . . we think that the plan should 
remain in effect for the coming school year. . . 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
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School District of Omaha v. United States (1977) concerned 
a considerable racial imbalance in school attendance patterns in 
Omaha, Nebraska.The District C ourt decision concluded that 
"the respondent had not carried the burden of proving a deliberate 
155 
policy of racial segregation." v Therefore, the District Court 
approved a desegregation plan involving the system-wide transport­
ation of pupils. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that 
• • • the evidence justified a presumption that segrega­
tive intent permeated defendants' policies concerning 
faculty assignment, student transfers, optional attendance 
zones, school construction, and the deterioration of 96% 
black Tech High School.136 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, vacated the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals based on recent decisions which disavow that 
• . • a law or other official act, without regard to 
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, 
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact.137 
The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration 
in the light of Village of Arlington Heights and Dayton. Justices 
Bxennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented. 
In summary, the Court cases since Milliken I (197*t) have 
evidenced a reunification of opinion among Justices of the Courtr 
&8 summarized in Table 11 on page 151* Primary dissenters remain 
Justices White, Marshall and Brennan. 
13^ School District of Omaha et al. v. United States et al., 
U. S. (1977), 33 L. Ed. 2d. 1039. 
135 Ifcid. 
136 IM-d. 
137 Washington v. Davis. *t26 U, S. 229, 239 (1976). 
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CHAPTER V 
FREEDOMS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION 
Introduction 
• 
The Constitution of the United States provides safeguards to 
human rights through the first ten amendments, referred to as the 
Bill of Rights. As previously mentioned in Chapter I, the great 
majority of cases involving education issues are related to the 
provisions of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment safe­
guards. 
These amendments are as follows: 
Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or of the right of the people peace­
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.! 
Article XIV. Sect. 1. All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en­
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop­
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.2 
1 U• S., Constitution, amend I. 
2 U. S., Constitution, amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
15k 
Certain provisions of these Amendments have been cited by 
litigants in suing for reinstatement of public employment denied 
them by virtue of state and local laws. The most frequently cited 
in this event is the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Another is the "freedom of speech" provision of the First 
Amendment which has been alleged violated in loyalty oath cases. 
The "free exercise" of religion has been claimed violated by State 
statutes which require compulsory school attendance. The "equal 
protection" clause has been cited in support of contentions against 
the equitability of the property tax as a method of school finance. 
This chapter reviews those cases decided by the Burger Court 
from its inception on June 23, 1969, through the end of the June, 
1977, term. These cases included loyalty oath requirements for 
public employment, administrative rules and procedures involving 
teacher dismissals or other restrictions on public employment, 
student suspensions and expulsions, school finance and compulsory 
school attendance. 
Loyalty Oath 
The Constitution of the United States prescribes an oath to 
be taken by the President^and provides that the officers of the 
federal and state governments shall be bound by oath or affirma­
tion to support the Constitution.^ 
3 U. S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1. 
k U. S. Constitution, Art, VI. 
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However, the requirement of an oath as a condition of public 
employment has expanded in scope as federal government programs 
have proliferated. Following the rise of Communism prior to 
World War II, loyalty and security programs became increasingly 
prevalent as government sought to guard against subversion. The 
execution of a loyalty oath has become a means of insuring that 
only loyal persons should occupy positions of public trust and 
influence. Loyalty in this context means fidelity to the national, 
5 etate or local government and its laws and forms. 
Because the concept of loyalty encompasses elements 
of belief, expression, and association, as well as 
overt acts, every challenge to a loyalty oath must 
be supposed to raise at least a potential issue as 
to undue infringement of freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.6 
Since the early 1950's the Supreme Court has been called 
upon to weigh the constitutionality of many loyalty oath require­
ments. It has never ruled that such oaths are unconstitutional 
7 per se. 
The Supreme Court has examined such loyalty oath 
provisions, particularly those relating to past con­
duct or association, to determine whether they constituted 
bills of attainder or ex post facto laws prohibited 
by the Constitution. In no recent case has the court 
invalidated an oath requirement on these grounds." 
5 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 5k (1967), 19 L. Ed. 2d. 
1333 annotation, "Validity of governmental requirement of oath 
Of allegiance or loyalty." 
6 Ibid., par. 5. 
7 Ibid., par. 3« 
8 Ibid., par. 2. 
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The Court has condemned loyalty oath provisions susceptible 
Q 
of resulting in penalty for guiltless knowing behavior. Many 
state and municipal loyalty programs required of public employees, 
and especially of teachers, require a disavowal of membership in 
subversive organizations. Tie Supreme Court adopted a knowing-
conduct standard as a measure of the constitutional validity of 
such requirements, 
under the view that deprivation of employment or other 
penalty for innocent association would be a denial of 
due process.1-® 
The Court has held unconstitutional those loyalty oath 
requirements which suffer vagueness and overbreadth. The Court 
has also condemned as oversweeping oath requirements which, 
although unambiguous in their terms, have concerned themselves 
with too wide a range of conduct and association. 
The Court has held freedom of speech violated by a state 
statute which required every teacher to swear a loyalty oath, 
thereby infringing academic freedom: 
The Supreme Court found that such a teacher, with consci­
entious regard for the solemnity of an oath and sensitive 
to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, 
could avoid the risk, of loss of employment and perhaps 
profession only by restricting his conduct to that 
which was unquestionably safe . • . .12 
9 Ibid., par. 6(a) • 
10 Ibid., par. 6(a). 
11 Ibid., par* 2. 
12 Ibid., par. 6(b). 
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Connell v. Higginbotham (1971) concerned dismissal of a 
teacher for refusing to sign a loyalty oath."^ The oath con­
sisted of 5 parts and applied to public employees of the State of 
Florida, as follows: 
1. I will support the Constitution of the United States and 
of the State of Florida; 
2« I am not a member of the Communist Party; 
3. I have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice, 
counsel or influence to the Communist Party; 
if« I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or of the State of Florida by force 
or violence; 
5« I am not a member of any organization or party which 
believes in or teaches directly or indirectly, the over­
throw of the Government of the United States or Florida 
by force or violence.^ 
The teacher brought action to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Florida statute and the loyalty oath upon which the plaintiffs 
action was conditioned. 
The three-judge District Court declared parts 2, 3 and 5 of 
13 Stella Connell v. James M. Higginbotham et al., i*03 U. S. 
207 (1971). 
1** Joseph E. Bryson, Legality of Loyalty Oath and Non-Oath 
Requirements for Public School Teachers,(Boone, North Carolina: The 
Miller Printing Company, 19&3), p. 62. 
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the oath unconstitutional but upheld the constitutionality of parts 
1 and !+• 
The three-judge U. S. District Court declared three of the 
five clauses contained in the oaths to be unconstitutional, 
and enjoined the State from conditioning employment on the 
taking of an oath including the language declared unconsti­
tutional. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
part 1 by unanimous vote: 
The first section of the oath upheld by the District Court 
requiring all applicants to pledge to support the Constitu­
tion of the United States and of the State of Florida demands 
no more of Florida public employees than is required of all 
state and federal officers. U. S. Const., Art VI, cl. 3. r 
The validity of this section of the oath would appear settled. 
However, the constitutionality of part which was upheld by the 
District Court, was reversed by eight members of the Court, with 
Justice Potter Steward dissenting: 
The second portion of the oath, approved by the District 
Court, falls within the ambit of decisions of this Court 
proscribing summary dismissal from public employment with­
out hearing or inquiry required by due process. Slochower 
v. Board . . . That portion of the oath, therefore, cannot 
stand.£7 
Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. 
Justice Brennan joined, concurred in the result: 
But in my view it simply does not matter what kind of evi­
dence a State can muster to show that a job applicant 
"believes in the overthrow." For state action injurious to 
an individual cannot be justified on account of the nature 
of the individual's beliefs, whether he "believes in the 
overthrow" or has any other sort of belief. 
15 Ibid., P. 297. 
16 Ibid., P. 208. 
17 Ibid., P. 209. 
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Teacher Employment 
Four cases were decided by the Supreme Court during the period 
from June 29, 1972 to June 17, 1976, which involved adjudication 
of rules and regulations governing employment of teachers. 
The first two cases concerned the rights of the nontenured teacher 
to procedural due process of law when denied continuing employment. 
The third case concerned employment regulations of two school 
hoards with regard to pregnant teachers. The fourth case involved 
the legality of dismissal of teachers who were on strike. 
Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) concerned a teacher who was 
denied reappointment as an assistant professor at Wisconsin State 
*1 Q 
State University-Oshkosh.. The teacher alleged that the decision 
not to rehire him was an attempt to punish him for certain state­
ments he had made which were critical of the university 
administration* Under Wisconsin law a state university teacher 
without tenure is entitled to nothing beyone his one-year appoint-
19 ment. There are no statutory administrative standards defining 
eligibility for re-employment. State law thus .clearly leaves ̂ 
the decision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for another 
year to the unfettered discretion of university officials.^ 
18 The Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v. 
Da-vid F. Roth. Etc., kOS> U. S. (1972). 
19 Ibid., p. 566. 
20 Ibid., p. 567. 
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Roth brought action in Federal District Court alleging that 
the decision not to rehire him for the next year infringed his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specific allegations were: 
1. The true reason for the decision was to punish him for 
certain statements critical of the University administra­
tion, and that it therefore violated his right to freedom 
of speech. 
2* The failure of University officials to give him notice 
of any reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a 
hearing violated his right to procedural due process of 
law.21 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the teacher 
on the procedural issue, ordering the University officials to 
provide him with reasons and a hearing. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
of the District Court for partial judgment. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered the question of 
whether the respondent had a constitutional right to a 
statement of reasons and a hearing on the University's 
decision not to rehire him for another year.22 
In a 5-*f decision, the Court decided that Both did not have such 
a right. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court: 
21 Ibid., p. 568. 
22 Ibid., p. 569. 
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Thus, the terms of the respondent's appointment secured 
absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next 
year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of 
entitlement to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was 
there any state statute or University rule or policy 
that secured his interest in re-employment or that crea­
ted any legitimate claim to it.23 
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented. Mr. 
Justice William 0. Douglas said: 
When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, 
the reasons for dismissal or for nonrenewal of an employ­
ment contract must be examined to see if the reasons 
given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes protected 
by the Constitution. ... 
In the case of teachers whose contracts are not re­
newed, tenure is not the critical issue. In the Sweezy 
case, the teacher, whose First Amendment rights we 
honored, had no tenure but was only a guest lecturer. 
In the Keyishian case, one of the petitioners (Keyishian 
himself) had only a "one-year-term contract" that was 
not renewed. 
Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall held that individuals have a 
property right in their employment, whether public or private: 
In my view, every citizen who applies for a government 
job is entitled to it unless the government can estab­
lish some reason for denying the employment. This is 
the "property" right that I believe is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that cannot be denied "without 
due process of law." And it is also liberty - liberty 
to work - which is the "very essence of the personal free­
dom and opportunity" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But the majority opinion refuted this philosophy, saying: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.26 
23 Ibid., P- 578 
24 Ibid., P« 582 
25 Ibid., P» 588 
26 Ibid., P- 577 
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27 Perry v. Sindernann (1972) was a companion case to Roth. 
Robert Sindermaan was a teacher in the state college system of 
the state of Texas. He was employed for ten successive years 
within the state college system, the last four under a series 
28 
of one-year written contracts. As president of the Texas Junior 
College Teachers Association, he testified before committees of 
the Texas Legislature, and he became involved in public disagree­
ments with the policies of the college's Board of Regents. 
Finally, in May of 1969» the teacher's one-year employment contract 
expired, and the Board of Regents voted not be offer him a new 
29 contract for the next academic year. ? 
Sindermaan brought action in Federal District Court, alleging 
that the Regents' decision not to rehire him was based on his 
public criticism of the policies of the college administration 
and thus infringed his right to freedom of speech. He also 
alleged that their failure to provide him an opportunity for a 
hearing violated the guarantee of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.^ 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the Board of 
Regents, concluding that the respondent had "no cause of action 
against the petitioners since his contract of employment terminated 
2? Charles R. Perry et al. v. Robert P. Sindermann, etc., 
/f08 U. S. 593 (1972). 
28 Ibid., p. 59b. 
29 Ibid., P« 595. 
30 Ibid., P. 595. 
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May 31> 1969, and Odessa Junior College has not adopted the 
31 tenure system."*^ 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of 
the District Court, holding that: 
1* Despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the nonrenewal 
of his contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
If it in fact was based on his protected free speech. 
2* Despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the failure to 
allow him an opportunity for a hearing would violate the 
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process if the 
respondent had an "expectancy" of re-employment. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered the question of 
whether the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure 
right to re-employment, taken alone, defeats his claim 
that the nonrenewal of his contract violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.31 
In a 5-*t decision, the Court decided that lack of tenure did not 
defeat Sindermann's claim. Kr. Justice Potter Stewart delivered 
the majority opinion of the court: 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear 
that even though a person has "no "right" to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infring­
es his constitutionally protected interests . ... 32 
31 : Ibid., P. 596. 
32 Ibid., p. 597. 
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The Court further affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
in remanding the case to the District Court for a hearing by the 
college board. 
Mr# Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment: 
I concur in the Court's judgments and opinions in Perry 
and Roth, but there is one central point in both decis­
ions that I would like to underscore since it may have 
been obscured in the comprehensive discussion of the 
cases. That point is that the relationship between a 
state institution and one of its teachers is essentially 
a matter of state concern and state law. The Court holds 
today only that a state-employed teacher who has a right 
to re-employment under state law, arising from either an 
express or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guaran­
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment to some form of prior 
administrative or academic hearing on the cause for 
nonrenewal of his contract.33 
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented. Mr. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall said: 
For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Board of 
Regents v.. Roth, . . . • I would modify the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to 
enter summary judgment for respondent entitling him to 
a statement of reasons why his contract was not renewed 
and a hearing on disputed issues of fact.3^ 
The Roth and Sindermann cases clarified the rights of non-
tenured teachers to due process when denied continued employment: 
The nontenured teacher does not have a constitutional 
right to public employment. Once employed, however, 
he acquires not only contractual rights but also consti-
tutional rights which could include the right to due process.^ 
33 Ibid., p. 603. 
34 Ibid., p. 605. 
35 Marilyn Henderson, "Roth and Sindermann: Which Direction 
Now?" New Directions in School Law (NOLPE 21st Annual Convention, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1975), p. 178. 
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Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle (1977) concerned the 
failure of a school board to rehire a non-tenured teacher.^ 
Fred Doyle brought action in Federal District Court for the South­
ern District of Ohio, alleging that the school board's decision 
not to rehire him for the coming year was based on several inci­
dents in which he had exercised First Amendment rights to free 
speech and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. The district 
court ruled for the teacher, directing reinstatement with back pay. 
The Sixth' Circ'uit Court of Appeals affirmed. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Court 
of Appeals1 judgment and remanded the case for determination of 
school board action had certain incidents not occurred which affec­
ted the teacher's exercise of free speech. Justice William H. 
Rehnquist announced the decision of the Court. 
We are thus brought to the issue whether, even if that were 
the case, the fact that protected conduct played a "substan­
tial part" in the actual decision not to renew would necess­
arily amount to a constitutional violation justifying 
remedial action. We think that it would not.37 
The Court opinion focussed on the effect that presence or absence 
of specific conduct on the part of "the teacher would have on board 
decisions to rehire or not to rehire. 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the 
employment question resolved against him because of consti­
tutionally protected conduct.3o 
36 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Fred Doyle, k29 U.S. 27k (1977). 
37 Ibid., p. 285. 
38 Ibid., p. 286. 
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Cleveland Board v. LaFleur (1974) challenged the constitution­
ality of school regulations dealing with maternity leaves of 
teachers. ^ Two cases were joined for decision: 
1* A suit was brought in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio challenging the legality of 
a maternity leave rule of the Board of Education of Cleve­
land, Ohio. The rule provided mandatory starting of leave 
beginning 5 months before the expected birth of her child. 
Employment could commence at the beginning of the next 
echool semester after her child was 3 months old. 
2. A suit was brought in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Virginia challenging the legality 
of a maternity leave rule of the School Board of Chester­
field County, Virginia. The rule provided 6-month notice 
and 4-month mandatory termination before the expected 
birth of her child. Employment could commence after 
determination of physical fitness examination guaranteed 
no later than the first day of the school year following 
the physical examination apd certificate of health. 
In the Cleveland case, the District Court found against the 
JfO 
teachers.- in the Virginia case, the District Court found for 
3? Cleveland Board of Education et al. v. Jo Carol LaFleur 
et al., klk U. S. 632 (1974). 
40 Ibid., p. 636. 
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teachers, holding that the school board regulation violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.^ 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
finding of the District Court in the Cleveland case. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the District Court 
in the Virginia case. 
Both cases were then reviewed by the Supreme Court in order 
to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeal regarding 
the constitutionality of such mandatory maternity leave rules 
for public school teachers. 
The Court reviewed the reasons for establishing a cut-off 
date for teacher employment prior to termination of pregnancy. 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court decided that the mandatory rule was 
unconstitutional. Justice Potter Stewart expressed the majority 
opinion of 5 members of the Court, saying: 
Thus, while the advance-notice provisions in the Cleveland 
and Chesterfield County rules are;wholly rational and may 
well be necessary to serve the objective of continuity of 
instruction, the absolute requirements of termination at , ~ 
the end of the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy are not. 
The rules were judged to permit permanent, irrebuttable presump­
tions about the capability of individual teachers to perform 
classroom work at different stages of pregnancy, presumptions 
VMch the Court would not permit. 
ifl Ibid., p. 637. 
i*2 Ibid., p. 642. 
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With regard to the re-employment regulations, the Court 
decision was split between the Cleveland situation and the 
Virginia situation: 
We conclude that the Cleveland return rule, insofar 
as it embodies the three-month age provision, is 
wholly arbitrary and irrational, and hence violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
age limitation serves no legitimate state interest, and 
unnecessarily penalises the female teacher for asserting 
her right to bear children. 
The Chesterfield County rule manages to serve the 
legitimate state interests here without employing 
unnecessary presumptions that broadly burden the 
exercise of protected, constitutional liberty.^ 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the 
Cleveland case was affirmed by the Court. By this action, the 
Court struck down the maternity leave rule of the Board of 
Education of Cleveland, Ohio. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the Virginia case 
was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court 
struck down only the mandatory termination provision of the 
Chesterfield County School Board maternity leave rule. 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. 
Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that the majority's reliance 
on the invalidity of irrebuttable presumptions endangered the 
43 Ibid., p. 650 
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validity of countless state and federal statutes, and that if 
any generally applicable rule concerning mandatory termination 
of employment was permissible, the rules in the instant case 
were not valid. Mr. Justice Rehnquist said: 
Since this right to pursue an occupation is presumably 
on the same lofty footing as the right of choice in 
matters of family life, the Court will have to strain 
valiantly in order to avoid having today's opinion 
lead to the invalidation of mandatory retirement 
statutes for governmental employees.44 
Hortonville School District v. Hortonville Education Assoc­
iation alleged noncompliance by the Board of Education with due 
process requirements in the dismissal of teachers.^ The teachers 
in this Wisconsin school district went on strike on March 18, 
197kt in direct violation of Wisconsin law.*^ The district super-
intendant contacted all striking teachers and invited them to 
return to work* On April 1, most of the striking teachers 
appeared before the Board with counsel to demand collective bar­
gaining of grievances which led them to strike. On April 3» the 
Board voted to terminate the employment of striking teachers and 
advised them by letter to that effect. ̂  
The teachers then brought suit in the Circuit Court, Outa­
gamie County, Wisconsin, against members of the Board.of Education. 
The Circuit Court rejected teachers' claim that they were denied 
44 Ibid., p. 659« 
45 Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 et al. v 
Hortonville Education Association et al., i+26 U. S. ̂ 82 (19?6). 
46 Ibid., p. 
47 Ibid., p. 485. 
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due process, since the teachers admitted they were on strike after 
receiving adequate notice and a hearing, including the warning 
that they were in violation of Wisconsin law. 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
although the teachers had admitted being on strike, and 
although the strike violated Wisconsin law, the Board 
had available other remedies than dismissal, including 
an injunction prohibiting the strike, a call for media­
tion, or continued bargaining. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that the Board was not suffic­
iently impartial to make this choice of remedy. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered 
• • • whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits this School Board from making the 
decision to dismiss teachers admittedly- engaged in a 
strike and persistently refusing to return to their 
duties. ̂ 9 
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and remanded the case. Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger announced the majority opinion of the 
Court: 
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision 
to terminate their employment was infected by the sort of 
bias that we have held to disqualify other decisionmakers 
as a matter of due process. . Accordingly, we hold that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not guarantee respondents that the decision to terminate 
their •employment would be made or reviewed by a body other 
than the School Board. 
if8 Ibid., p. 486. 
it9. Ibid., p. 488. 
50 Ibid., p. 497. 
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Justice Potter Stewart, Joined by Justices William J. Brennan 
and Thurgood Marshall, dissented: 
I would therefore remand this case to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court for it to determine whether, on the one 
hand, the School Board is charged with considering 
the reasonableness of the strike in the light of its 
own actions, or is, on the other, wholly free, as the 
Court today assumes, to exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether to discharge the teachers. ̂  
The voting pattern of the Supreme Court Justices in cases 
involving teacher employment is summarized in Table 12 on page 173* 
The decisions of Roth and Sindermann (1972) were decided by a 
majority of 5-3> with one non-participant. The decision of 
Cleveland (197*+) decided by a firmer 7-2 vote. The Hortonville (1976) 
case marked the entrance of Justice John P.' Stevens to the Court 
and the retirement of Justice William 0. Douglas. Finally, the 
Mt. Healthy case (1977) was decided by unanimous vote of the Court. 
Since 1972 the various federal appellate courts have cited 
Roth and Sindermann numerous times during litigation on rights of 
52 non-tenured teachers. Issues which were clarified in subsequent 
cases included the following: 
1. Government employment was a privilege and not a right; 
2. A teacher's tenure status was irrelevant when he was 
denied substantive rights; 
3» Without proof of denial of substantive rights, a non-
tenured teacher needed to prove denial of liberty or 
property to be entitled to procedural due process; 
51 Ibid., p. if98. 
52 Henderson, "Roth and Sindermann," p. 188. 
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if* Simple nonretention in a position did not constitute 
denial of due process; 
5» Longevity in a teaching position alone did not support 
a claim of denial of property. 
Substantive due process involves protections specifically 
listed in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Such rights 
&8 freedom of speech, freedom of association and religious free­
dom are protected by substantive due process. Procedural due 
process involves the right to a fair procedure to determine the 
necessity for depriving an individual of substantive rights, life, 
53 liberty, or property.^ 
53 Ibid., p. 179. 
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Student Suspensions 
Five cases were decided by the Supreme Court during the 
period from June 23, 1969 through June 29, 1977, in which student 
suspensions were litigated. As will be seen in following sections, 
students said that substantive rights were denied by school author­
ities, and in one case damages were awarded to students for the 
action of school authorities in suspending the students from 
school. 
Jones v. State Board (1970) involved suspension of a univer­
sity student for distributing leaflets urging a boycott against 
registration at the university•^ Jones was suspended indefinite­
ly as a student of A. & I. State University at Tennessee in the 
summer of 1967* Charges against him were specified, evidence 
taken, and findings made after a hearing in September, 1967. 
Jones and others brought suit in the Federal District Court to 
set aside the suspension on First Amendment and due process 
grounds. 
The District Court granted judgment for the defendants on the 
merits. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 55 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court examined the record of the 
case and found that Jones' indefinite suspension was based in 
part on a finding that he lied at the hearing on the charges 
5k Kenneth R. Jones v. State Board of Education of and for 
the State of Tennessee et al., 397 U. S. 31 (1970). 
55 Ibid., p. 32. 
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against him. Therefore, the writ of certiorari was dismissed 
as improvidently granted. 
Papish v. Board (1973) involved the expulsion of a student 
for distributing a newspaper which contained allegedly indecent 
articles.^ The student sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri on the grounds that the expulsion was improperly prem­
ised on activities protected by the First Amendment. The District 
Court denied relief, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The majority of the Court 
held that: 
1. The university's regulation of the content of speech 
was not immune from the First Amendment; 
2. Neither the political cartoon nor the article could be 
labeled constitutionally obscene or otherwise unprotected; 
J. The university was required to reinstate the student 
unless she was barred from,, reinstatement for valid 
academic reasons. 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun 
dissented on the grounds that the case was not squarely governed 
by prior Supreme Court decisions. 
% Barbara Susan Papish v. The Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri, et al., ^10 U. S» 6^7 (1973). 
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Goss v. Lopez (1975) challenged the constitutionality of an 
Ohio statute which empowered the principal of an Ohio public 
school to suspend a pupil for up to 10 days or to expel him, 
subject to notification of parents concerned as to the reasons 
57 
for such action within 2.1+ hours. Nine students, each of whom 
alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high 
school in Columbus, Ohio, for up to 10 days without a hearing 
pursuant to the Ohio code, filed an action against the Columbus 
C O  
Board of Education and others. 
The District Court determined that suspensions occurred during 
a period of student unrest during February and March, 1971, and 
that plaintiffs Lopez and others were denied due process of law 
because they were "suspended without hearing prior to suspension 
or within a reasonable time thereafter," and that the Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. par 3313»66 (1972) and regulations issued pursuant there-
59 to were unconstitutional in permitting such suspensions. 
The school administrators appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
District Court. Mr. Justice Byron R. White announced the decision 
of the Court: 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to 
57 Norval Goss et al. v. Eileen Lopez et al.t 419 U. S. 
565 (1975), at 567. 
58 Ibid., p. 568. 
59 Ibid., p. 571. 
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establish and maintain a public school system, it has 
nevertheless done so and has required its children to 
attend. Those young people do not "shed their consti­
tutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. 
DesMoines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). 60 
The majority decision of the Court claimed that deprivation of 
education for 10 days constituted what was severe enough to 
serve as a basis for complaint: 
The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations 
of liberty. "Where a person's good name, reputation, 
honor or integrity is at stake because of what the govern­
ment is doing to him," the minimal requirements of the 
Clause must be satisfied.61 
The decision of the Court identified two interests of the 
students which are entitled to constitutional protection: 
1. The first is the "property" interest in a public school 
education. Turning aside arguments that the Constitution 
does not guarantee a public education and, therefore, 
there can be no protection from suspension and expulsion, 
the Court held that, having extended that right, Ohio 
may not withdraw it on grounds of misconduct without 
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether or 
not the misconduct has occurred. 
2. The second is the "liberty" interest, wherein the Court 
concluded that suspensions for up to 10 days could 
60 Ibid., p. 574 
61 Ibid. 
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seriously damage the students* standing with fellow 
pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with 
later opportunities for higher education and employment. 
The Court then outlined the minimum procedures required by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspen­
sion and the consequent interference with a protected 
property interest must be given some kind of notice and 
afforded some kind of hearing. 
The Court then mentioned some types of situations wherein prior 
notice of suspension would not te practical due to students whose 
presence on the school grounds poses a continuing threat to persons 
or property.^ In that case, the hearing should follow, even in 
rudimentary form, as soon as practicable. 
The Court did not construe the Due Process Clause to require 
a formal hearing in every instance of student misconduct: 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to 
require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with 
short suspensions must afford the student the opportun­
ity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own 
witnesses to verify his version of the incident.6^-
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Blackmun, 
Powell and Rehquist dissented. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the 
dissenting opinion: 
62 
63 
6^ 
Ibid., p. 579. 
Ibid., p. 582. 
Ibid., p. 583. 
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The Ohio statute allows no serious or significant infringe­
ment of education. It authorizes only a maximum suspension 
of eight school days, less than 5% of the normal 180-day 
school year. Absences of such limited duration will rarely 
affect a pupil's opportunity to learn or his scholastic 
advancement.°5 
Speaking of the necessity for school discipline and the need to 
permit school authorities a free hand in running the schools, 
Justice Powell said: 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an orderly 
school system is not incompatible with the individual 
interest of the student. Education in any meaningful 
sense includes the inculcation of an understanding in 
each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto. 
Justice Powell expressed anxiety over the formalization of 
relationships between student and teacher: 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked out 
under Ohio law. One must doubt, then, whether the 
constitutionalization of the student-teacher relation­
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law.67 
Board v. Jacobs (1975) challenged the constitutionality of 
laws which interfered or threatened to interfere with publication 
6 8 
of a student newspaper. The Board of Commissioners of the City 
of Indianapolis, Indiana, or their subordinates, were accused 
65 Ibid., p. 588. 
66 Ibid., p. 592. 
67 Ibid., p. 596. 
68 The Board of School Commissioners of the City of 
Indianapolis et al. v. Jeff Jacobs et al., /+20 U. S. 12$~(1975)« 
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of taking certain actions toward interfering or threatening to 
interfere with the publication and distribution of the newspaper 
which was prepared by high school students. Six named plaintiffs 
brought action in District Court to have declared unconstitutional 
certain regulations and rules promulgated by the Board, as well 
as expunction from their records of certain information and 
compensatory and punitive damages against the Board. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana decided for the students in declaring such regulations 
in violation of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The District Court denied the petition for damages and expunction. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.^ 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court was informed that all of the 
named plaintiffs in the action had graduated from the Indianapolis 
school system. The Court ruled 8-1 that a case or controversy 
no longer existed and that the case was therefore moot. The 
Court found inadequate compliance with Rule 23(c)(3) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure which required proper definition of the 
plaintiffs as a class. Therefore, the Court said: 
Because the class action was never properly certified 
nor the class properly identified by the District Court, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the 
case is remanded to that court with instructions to order 
the District Court to vacate its judgment and to 
dismiss the complaint.™ 
69 Ibid., p. 129. 
70 Ibid., p. 130. 
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Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas dissented, saying that 
the absence of such a written order (formally certifying 
the class) is too slender a reed to support a holding of 
mootness, particularly in the face of the incontrovertible 
evidence that certification was intended and did, in fact, 
take place.71 
Since the Jacobs case was decided on February 18, 1975> 
two cases reached the appellate courts in which First Amendment 
rights of free speech conflicted with school board regulations 
regarding school publications. 
Since Jacobs was held moot on February 18, 1975> and, 
for lack of the nationally controlling case law which 
Jacobs might have supplied, it is not surprising that 
at least two appellate court cases have been decided 
with holdings that have prompted little dancing in the 
streets by school officials in Baltimore County or Los 
Angeles City. Apparently, neither case.had as yet been 
Standardly reported, although the Nitzberg opinion was 
by Justice Tom Clark, Retired Supreme Court Justice, 
sitting by designation. 
Apparently both Nitzberg and Bright were prior-
restraint problems with the courts being unable to blink 
the carefully couched and official board regulations and 
procedures that were found wanting. . . .72 
No subsequent case to Jacobs has reached the Supreme Court 
which applies the weight of Court decision toward the resolution 
of student publication conflicts with school board regulations. 
The question which remains unanswered is whether or not freedom 
of the press applies to school newspapers in the same way that 
it applies to publications in general. 
71 Ibid., p. 131. 
72 Robert M. Shaw, "Student Publications: After Jacobs, 
What Next?" New Directions in School Lav/ (NOLPE 21st Annual 
Convention, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1975)» P* 63» 
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Wood v. Strickland (1975) concerned an improper expulsion 
of two high school students.73 Two tenth-grade students, Peggy 
Strickland and Virginia Crain, were expelled from school for alleg­
edly "spiking" the punch served at an extracurricular meeting of 
parents, students and teachers. Prompted by the spreading of talk 
about the incident, the students were a6ked by the teacher involved 
in the extracurricular activity to report their role in the incident 
to the school principal. The principal suspended the students from 
school for a maximum two-week period, subject to the decision of 
the school board.74 That night, the school board voted to expel 
the students from school for the remainder of the semester, a period 
of approximately three months. Two weeks later, the board 
reviewed the facts of the case and confirmed the expulsion order.75 
The students then brought suit against individual members of 
the school board, claiming damages and injunctive and declaratory 
relief, alleging that their federal constitutional rights to due 
process were infringed by their expulsions.^ The jury failed to 
reach a verdict, and the District Court found "as a matter of law" 
that there was no evidence from which malice (on the part of the 
school board in expelling the students) could be inferred.^ 
73 John P. Wood et al. v. Peggy Strickland, i+20 U. S. 308 
(1975). 
?k Ibid., p. 312. 
75 Ibid., p. 313. 
76 Ibid., p. 310. 
77 Ibid., p. 314. 
183 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, viewed tooth 
the instruction of the District Court as to the necessity for a 
finding of malice on the part of the school board members in this 
matter and the decision of the District Court as erroneous. 
Specific intent to harm wrongfully, it held, was not a 
requirement for the recovery of damages. Instead, "it 
need only be established that the defendants did not, 
in the light of all the circumstances, act in good faith. 
The test is an objective, rather than a subjective, one."78 
On appeal by the school board to the Supreme Court, the 
board members asserted an absolute immunity from liability under 
Section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 and sought 
reinstatement of the judgment of the District Court. 
In a 5-*f decision, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Byron R. White announced the 
Majority decision of the Court. The majority opinion favored 
extension of a qualified good— faith immunity to school board 
members from liability for damages under Section 1983: 
Liability for damages for every action which is found 
subsequently to have been violative of a student's 
constitutional rights and to have caused compensable 
injury would unfairly impose upon the school decision­
maker the burder of mistakes made in good faith in the 
course of exercising his discretion within the scope of 
his official duties. 
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with 
a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a 
student's constituional rights can be no more justified 
by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law 
on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students' 
daily lives than by the presence of actual malice.79 
78 Ibid., p. 31J+. 
79 Ibid., p. 319. 
184 
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consider­
ation of whether procedural due process had been violated and 
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 
Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell dissented from the majority 
finding of the Court on the immunity issue, joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist: 
The holding of the Court. . . would impose personal 
liability on a school official who acted sincerely and 
in the utmost good faith, but who was found—after the 
fact—to have acted in "ignorance ... of settled, 
Indisputable law."8° 
These officials will now act at the peril of some 
judge or jury subsequently finding that a good—faith 
belief as to the applicable law was mistaken and hence 
actionable. . . . Consider, for example, the recent 
five—to—four decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 
holding that a junior high school pupil routinely 
suspended for as much as a single day is entitled to 
due process. I suggest that most lawyers and judges would 
have thought, prior to that decision, that the law to the 
contrary was settled, indisputable, and unquestioned. 
In view of today's decision significantly enhancing 
the possibility of personal liability, one must wonder 
whether qualified persons will continue in the desired 
numbers to volunteer for services in public education.82 
On remand, the Court of Appeals later found a violation of 
constitutional rights—a violation that was not excused by the 
Q "2 
good -faith immunity possessed by the school board. The case 
was then sent back to determine damages that should be awarded. 
80 Ibid., p. 327. 
81 Ibid., p. 329. 
82 Ibid., p. 331. 
83 Robert E. Phay, "1975 Student Discipline Decisions by 
The United States Supreme Court," New Directions in School Law 
(NOLPE 21st Annual Convention, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1975), 
P. 74. 
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School Finance 
The Rodriguez case (1973) contested the constitutionality of 
the ad valorem tax authorized by the State of Texas for financial 
support of public education. A class action suit was brought 
by Mexican-American parents whose children attended the elementary 
and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, 
85 
an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. This school 
district had a low property tax base compared with eleven other 
86 
San Antonio school districts. 
The (Edgewood) district is situated in the core-city of 
San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little 
commercial or industrial property. The residents are 
predominantly of Mexican-American descent: approximately 
90% of the student population is Mexican-American and 
over 6% is Negro. The average assessed property value 
per pupil is 85,960—the lowest in the metropolitan 
area. • . The Foundation Program contributed 3222 per 
pupil for a state-local total of 5248. Federal funds 
added another $108 for a total of $356 per pupil."' 
Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in 
San Antonio. . . Supplemented by a $36 grant from federal 
sources, Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil. 
These disparities were largely attributable to differences in the 
go 
amounts of money collected through local property taxation. 7 
In December, 1971, a three-jutfge District Court decided that 
the Texas school finance system was unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but stayed 
San Antonio Independent School District et al. v. 
Demetno P. Rodriguez et al., 411 U. S. 1 (1973)» 
85 Ibid., p. 4. 
86 Ibid., p. 137., APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, T., 
DISSENTING. 
87 Ibid., p. 12 
88. Ibid., P. 13 
89 Ibid., p. 16 
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its mandate for two years to provide Texas an opportunity to 
remedy the inequities found in its financing program,^® The 
District Court based its finding on rulings that 
1. Wealth was a suspect classification, and education was 
a fundamental interest, thus requiring the state to show, 
under the strict judicial scrutiny test, a compelling 
state interest for its system, which the state had failed 
to do, and 
2. In any event, the state had failed to establish even a 
reasonable basis for its system. 91 
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the District Court in a 3-k decision which was announced by Mr. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell. The issue to be decided was: 
First, whether the Texas system of financing public 
education operates to the disadvantage of some suspected 
class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requir­
ing strict judical scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas 
scheme must still be examined to determine whether it 
rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state 
purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 92 
90 Ibid., p. 6. 
91 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 
337 F. Supp. 280 (1971). 
92 Ibid., p. 17. 
188 
Disadvantaging of Suspect Class 
The majority opinion held that a simplistic process of 
analysis relied upon by other states to identify wealth discrim­
ination 
• • . largely ignores the hard threshold questions, 
including whether it makes a difference for purposes 
of consideration under the Constitution that the class 
of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be identified or defined 
in customary equal protection terms, and whether the 
relative—rather than absolute—nature of the asserted 
deprivation is of significant consequence.93 
The Court pointed out that "at least where wealth is involved, 
the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality 
qi, 
or precisely equal advantages.I|7n Failing to define the offending 
party in this case as a "suspect class," the Court ruled that 
there was no showing that any definable category of "poor" per­
sons was discriminated against, that any children were suffering 
an absolute deprivation of public education or that there was 
any comparative discrimination based on relative family income 
05  
within districts. ^ 
Education Wot a Fundamental Interest 
The majority opinion of the Court held that 
. . .  t h e  k e y  t o  d i s c o v e r i n g  w h e t h e r  e d u c a t i o n  i s  
"fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the 
relative societal significance of education as opposed 
to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by 
weighing whether education is as important as the right 
to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether 
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
93 Ibid., P. 19 
9*f Ibid., P- 2if 
95 Ibid., P. 28 
96 Ibid., P. 33 
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The Court failed to find an affirmative answer to this 
question, although the following qualifying statement was added: 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum 
of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite 
to the meaningful exercise of either right (to debate and 
to vote), we have no indication that the present levels of 
educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that 
falls short.97 
More explicitly, the Court emphasized the holding with respect 
to education: 
Since the Court now suggests that only interests guaran­
teed by the Constitution are fundamental for the purpose 
Of equal protection, and since it rejects the contention 
that public education is fundamental, it follows that the 
Court concludes that public education is not constitution­
ally guarante ed.98 
Following the above logic, the Court concluded that the 
right of children to an education is not a fundamental right 
because it is not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Legitimate State Purpose Furthered 
The Court held that the state's financing system had a 
rational relationship to legitimate state purpose: 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today—including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid—was implemented in an 
effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality. Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails to 
accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, thepp 
thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory. 
97 Ibid., p. 36. 
98 Ibid., p. 110. 
99 Ibid., p. 39. 
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Justice William 0. Douglas joined Justice Thurgood Marshall 
in dissent, expressing the view that: 
1« The Texas financing scheme discriminated from a consti­
tutional perspective against the identifiable class of 
school children residing in property-poor districts; 
2m Strict judicial scrutiny should depend on the constitu­
tional importance of the interest adversely affected; 
The Texas financing system discriminated on the basis of 
district or group wealth and created a suspect class; 
!*« The Court should scrutinize the reasonableness of the 
Means by which the state sought to advance its interest 
In universal quality education; 
Local control of education did not justify the Texas 
system's discrimination in educational opportunity; 
6« Wide disparities in taxable district property wealth 
inherent in the local property tax element of the Texas 
system rendered the system violative of the equal protec­
tion clause in view of the denial to children in 
property-poor districts of equal educational opportunities. 
Justices Brennan and White dissented on much the same grounds. 
However, the narrow majority vote of the Supreme Court removed 
a threat to the legality of the property tax as a means of raising 
funde with which to finance public schools. 
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Compulsory School Attendance 
In State of Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) the constitutionality 
of Wisconsin school attendance laws was challenged by members of 
the Amish religious sect.100 The laws required school attendance 
from age eight to age sixteen. As in a preceding case, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters (1925), the Amish declined to send their 
children, ages lk and 15, to public school after they completed 
the eighth grade.101 The reasoning of the Amish was that contin­
ued public education after the eighth grade exposed Amish children 
to conflicting influences which would seriously interfere with 
their future relationship to the Amish community. 
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is 
contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places 
Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs 
with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and 
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners 
and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them 
away from their community, physically and emotionally, 
during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life. 
The trial court found the Amish parents in violation of Wis­
consin law and imposed fines. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed 
the convictions, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the 
convictions and sustained the defendants' claims that their 
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion had been vio­
lated.103 
100 State of Wisconsin v. Jonas Yoder et al», 406 U. S. 
205 (1972). 
101 Ibid., P. 207 
102 Ibid., p. 211 
103 Ibid., P. 213 
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding Amish right to withdraw their 
children from public schools after completion of the eighth grade. 
In a 6-1 decision, Justices Powell and Rehnquist not participating, 
the Court opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 
held that: 
1» In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts 
in education and religious history, ... and strong 
evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating 
respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that 
enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal 
education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger 
if not destroy the free exercise of respondents* religious 
beliefs.10Zf 
2* In these terms, Wisconsin's interest in compelling the 
school attendance of Amish children to age 16 emerges as 
somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance 
105 
for children generally. 
3. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for 
failing to cause their children to attend school, and it 
is their right of free exercise, not that of their children, 
that must determine Wisconsin's power to impose criminal 
penalties on the parent. 
104 Ibid., P. 218 
105 Ibid., p. 219 
106 Ibid., P. 230 
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In further defense of parents' rights, the Court majority 
opinion said: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State 
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruc­
tion from public teachers only. The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog­
nize and prepare him for additional obligations.1*7 
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas dissented, saying: 
I agree with the Court that the religious scruples of the 
Amieh are opposed to the education of their children be­
yond the grade schools, yet I disagree with the Court's 
conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of 
parents alone.1^)8 
Where the judgment was proper as to one of the defendants, Frieda 
Yoder, who testified that her own religious views are opposed to 
high-school education, Justice Douglas felt that the other 
children, Vernon Yutzy and Barbara Miller, may not hold the same 
views; therefore, the judgment in the latter cases was not proper. 
Legal scholars have indicated that this is the first time 
in the history of America that compulsory education laws have 
109 
been successfully challenged. ' Although early reaction to the 
Supreme Court decision envisioned similar suits by other religious 
groups, the special nature of the case has served to preserve it 
as an exception that proves the rule. Few, if any, religious 
groups are anxious to disavail their children of the benefits of 
10? Ibid., p. 233. 
108 Ibid., p. 241. 
109 Joe Wittmer, "The Amish and the Supreme Court Ruling," 
Phi Delta Kappan. LIV (September, 1972), p. 50. 
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a public education system which is supported by the efforts of all 
citizens. Education is a very expensive undertaking, requiring 
upwards of $1000 per pupil per year expenditure of public funds. 
Most religious orders are more concerned about acquiring their 
fair share of public funds without sacrificing religious training 
objectives than undercutting the vast system of public education 
which has served so many millions of Americans so well. 
Student Discipline 
Baker v. Owen (1975) concerned possible violation of a child's 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by corporal punishment administered by 
school officials.Plaintiffs brought suit in District Court 
against V/. C. Owen and other school personnel who were involved in 
paddling their child, thereby depriving him of procedural due proc­
ess guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The North Carolina 
General Statutes, paragraphs 115-146, gives teachers and principals 
authority to use reasonable force in exercising lawful authority 
to restrain or correct pupils and maintain order. The lawsuit 
challenged the constitutionality of this statute."'"^''" 
The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights embrace the 
right of parents to control means of discipline of their children, 
110 Virginia Baker and Russell Carl Baker, Appellants v. 
W, C. Owen, .etc., e_t al., i+23 U. S. 907 (1975). 
111 Baker v. Owen. No. C-74-46-G, 395 F. Supp. 29^ (1975), 
p. 296. 
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but the state has a countervailing interest in the maintenance or 
order in the schools sufficient to sustain the right of teachers 
and school officials to administer reasonable corporal punishment 
for disciplinary purposes. The Court further held that 
1, Teachers and school officials must accord students 
minimal procedural due process in the course of 
inflicting such punishment; 
2, The spanking of the student in question did not amount 
to cruel and unusual punishment.H2 
The school authorities argued that school officials can 
corporally punish pupils over parental objections and without ante-
113 cedent procedural safeguards. On the other hand, the District 
Court held that a rational and legitimate state interest in main­
taining disciple and order in the public schools counteracted the 
Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty which embraces the right 
of a parent to determine and choose between means of discipline 
of children: 
We reject Mrs. Baker's suggestion that this right is 
fundamental, and that the state can punish her child 
corporally only if it shows a compelling interest that 
outweighs her parental right. We do not read Meyer 
and Pierce to enshrine parental rights so high in the 
hierarchy of constitutional values. In each case the 
parental right prevailed not because the Court termed 
it fundamental and the state's interest uncompelling, 
but because the Court considered the state's action 
to be arbitrary, without reasonable relation to an end 
legitimately within its power. 1^ 
112 
113 
114 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 297. 
Ibid., p. 299. 
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The District Court prescribed minimal procedures in use of 
force to maintain order in the public schools: 
1* corporal punishment may never be used unless the student 
is informed beforehand that specific misbehavior could 
occasion its use; 
2a a teacher or principal must punish corporally in the pres­
ence of a second school official, who must be informed 
beforehand and in the student's presence of the reason 
for the punishment; 
3a finally, an official who has administered such punishment 
must provide the child's parent, upon request, a written 
explanation of his reasons and the name of the second 
115 official who was present. 
In summary, the District Court held that 
la North Carolina General Statutes, paragraphs 115-1^6, 
constitutional; 
2a To implement the statute without recognition of students' 
procedural due process would be a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendmenti 
3a Punishment contested was not cruel and unusual within the 
116 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
115 Ibid., p. 302. 
116 Ibid., p. 303. 
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On October 20, 1975» the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
of the District Court in a Memorandum decision. 
117 Baker v. Owen, Memorandum Case No. 75-279. 423 U. S. 
907 (1975). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to examine and analyze public 
school cases decided by the Supreme Court since Warren E. Burger 
became Chief Justice on June 23, 1969, up to the end of the June, 
1977, term. This was achieved through a study of cases in the 
following three subject areas: 
Religion 20 cases. 
Desegregation 20 cases. 
Academic Freedom 13 cases. 
Religion 
All of the 20 cases litigated during the designated time period 
were initiated to challenge state statutes which permitted the 
allocation of public funds to aid private sectarian and non-
sectarian schools. With legal precedent based on Cochran (1930), 
Everson (19V7) and Allen (1968), the Court has successfully widened 
the scope of constitutional state aid beyond textbook loan and bus 
service to include standardized testing services, diagnostic 
services, therapeutic, and guidance services authorized in Wolman 
(1977). 
Higher education constructional grant programs were affirmed 
^•n Tilton (1971) and Roemer (1976). Bonds to benefit a Baptist 
college were legitimized in Hunt (1973). 
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The Lemon I (1971) decision resulted in the development of 
a four-part test of litigated aid to nonpublic schools: 
1. Legislation awarding such aid must have a secular purpose, 
but no case failed on this account. 
2. Legislation must not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion, which test was failed by Nyquist (1973) due to 
provision for direct money grants for maintenance and 
repair, and Lemon II (1973) tuition reimbursement plan. 
3. Legislation must not promote "excessive entanglement" 
of church and state, which test was failed by Wolman 
(1971), Kosydar (1972), and Marburger (1973). The 
"insoluble paradox" expressed by Mr. Justice William J. 
Brennan in dissent over the Lemon I decision made it 
impossible for sectarian schools to accept public aid 
without accepting monitoring of how the money was spend, 
thereby creating the forbidden entanglement. 
if. Legislation must not cause political divisiveness due to 
the necessity of appropriating increasingly more money 
from the public treasury to aid sectarian schools. 
The threat of such divisiveness caused Mr. Justice Brennan 
to vote against every parochial aid statute from Lemon I 
on. 
The erosion of the "wall separating Church and State" was 
reviewed in the light of Court decisions and dissenting opinions 
of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Wolman (1977). These Justices 
favor recission of decisions in Allen and previous cases which 
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legitimized free textbook and free busing programs for nonpublic 
school children 
However, the Chief Justice and a majority of other Justices 
favor aid to nonpublic school children, as opposed to their parents 
or to the sectarian school. The "child benefit theory" first 
advanced in Cochran (1930) appears to have won a more dominant 
position in the decisions of the Burger court. 
Review of the 20 cases litigated by the Burger court reveals 
an increasing inclination among certain Justices to permit aid to 
nonpublic schools. Justice Byron R. White dissented in the opinion 
rendered in Lemon I (1971) which denied all salary reimbursement 
provisions of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island plans for parochial 
school aid. In 1973j Justice 'White was joined by the Chief Justice 
and Justice Rehnquist in dissent with regard to the Court decision 
in Nyquist (1973) which denied tuition reimbursement and tax credit 
for parents of parochial students under a New York statute. The 
trend toward liberalization of Court attitudes toward aid to 
parochial schools culminated in the Wolman (1977) decision which 
permitted textbook loan, testing services, diagnostic, and thera­
peutic services for nonpublic school children. Whether this trend 
will continue or not is yet to be seen. 
Despite the fall of constitutional constraints against aid to 
parochial schools, certain reaffirmations of legal precedent in 
such cases are evident: 
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1* The direct disbursement of funds from the public treasury 
to any parochial or otherwise denominational school is 
prohibited; 
2. The child attending a private or parochial school can be 
the legitimate recipient of textbooks purchased from tax 
funds; 
3* Reimbursement of parents for transportation of their child­
ren to private religious schools is constitutional; 
if. The allocation of federal funds to private colleges for 
construction purposes is legitimate, even though the relig­
ious purpose and curriculum of the colleges is significant; 
5# Aid to private schools which practice segregation in 
hiring or enrollment policies is unconstitutional. 
Desegregation 
The legacy of freedom and equality of educational opportunity 
bestowed by the Court in Brown I and Brown II encountered many 
problems of implementation. These problems included the operation 
of "freedom of choice" and "free transfer" student enrollment 
plans which served to perpetuate segregation of school facilities 
until the Green decision (1968) and companion cases declared such 
tactics unconstitutional. The Green mandate to desegregate immed­
iately led to much activity on the part of school boards in the 
•arious states to implement necessary desegregation plans. Some 
order was restored in the frantic effort to desegregate when the 
Swann decision (1971) was announced. 
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Swann decided the following issues: 
1* Racial quotas; 
2« . Existence of all-Negro and ail-White schools; 
3* Rearrangement of school boundaries; 
Busing. 
Racial quotas were sanctioned as a starting point for the 
development of desegregation plans. It was recognized that some 
all-Negro and all-white schools, or nearly so, would exist as a 
result of some desegregation plans. Rearrangement of school 
boundaries to facilitate desegregation of public schools was 
sanctioned, even in extreme forms. Finally, busing to achieve 
desegregation results was sanctioned when historic operation of 
dual school systems in the district concerned was proven. 
Desegregation by reassignment of faculty was sanctioned by 
Swann and other cases. Creation of new school districts to avoid 
integration of schools was not permitted by the Court. 
Beginning in 1973» a series of desegregation cases arose in 
which one-district and multi-district desegregation plans were 
not approved by the Court because one of the following factors 
was missing which, if present, would otherwise compel acceptance 
Of the desegregation plans: 
1. There must be evidence of de jure segregation, or 
segregation of school facilities sanctioned by law or 
caused by legislation with regard to school boundaries, 
residential patterns, etc., which had the intent of 
segregating the races; 
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2,  Where multi-district remedies are sought, there must be 
proven an offense to the Constitution involving each of 
the districts concerned. 
The Denver school district case in Keyes (1973) involved a 
western school district in which no prior de jure segregation was 
evident, such as prior maintenance of a dual school system. The 
remedy was confined to the core city problem in that case# The 
Detroit case in Mllliken I (197**) involved 53 outlying school 
districts and the core City of Detroit school district which could 
at best achieve only 6l$> Negro students in each school. Again, the 
fremedy was confined to the core city, although Milliken II (1977) 
granted funds to Detroit public schools to provide remedial 
services to disadvantaged students. The Pasadena case (1976) 
resulted in disapproval of annual adjustment of school attendance 
zones to maintain racial balance in the schools. The Austin case 
(1976) brought disapproval of cross-town busing as too extensive 
a remedy in light of lack of intent on the part of school officials 
to segregate the school children by race. Busing plans in Dayton 
(1977) and Omaha (1977) were disapproved on the same basis. 
Efforts have begun anew by the Executive Department, through 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to force 
colleges and universities to admit Negro and other minority 
students on a ratio basis. However, in 1978 the Court termed 
"the H. E. W. threat to withhold federal funds unconstitutional 
in a Maryland case. It seems that other avenues of approach 
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are favored by desegxegationist forces today over access to the 
judicial process. 
It appears that many of the original objectives of civil rights 
groups pertaining to desegregation of public school facilities and 
integration of the races have fallen short of expected achievement. 
Mandates of the United States Supreme Court have been consistently 
directed toward the elimination of de jure segregation; that is, 
segregation fostered by law. While much progress has been made in 
obtaining equal protec tion under the Fourteenth Amendment for 
minority students, more progress remains to be made. 
Freedoms Guaranteed by the Constitution 
The Constitution of the United States of America provides 
safeguards to human rights which enjoin any governmental body from 
causing loss of these rights. These rights are both substantive 
and procedural. In the field of public education, institutional 
authorities assume the role of governmental bodies which have the 
same legal impact as elected governmental officials. 
During the period studied, several cases arose in the field 
of public education which involved alleged violation of both 
substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The Connell case (1971) challenged the constitutionality of a state 
oath as a condition of employment. The Roth and Sindermann cases 
(1972) sought to establish property rights of non-tenured teachers. 
Cleveland (1973) tested the validity of state statutes which 
governed the treatment of pregnant teachers before and after 
termination. The Hortonvl]le case tested the teachers right to 
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strike without fear of dismissal. The Court established the 
following principles in deciding these cases: 
1« The oath requirement is a legitimate prerequisite to 
public employment; 
2. Nontenured teachers do not have a property right in their 
positions unless they have a "reasonable expectancy" of 
being rehired, in which case procedural rights are 
protected; 
3« Due process does not extend to protection of striking 
teachers by disallowing lawful termination procedures 
which are initiated by the school board; 
J*. The rule that teachers must leave their jobs by any arbi­
trary date prior to termination of pregnancies is 
unconstitutional, and the rule that teachers must return 
to their jobs by any arbitrary rule will not stand. 
Several cases arose in the area of student suspensions. The 
Jones case (1970) involved the suspension of a student for distrib­
ution of leaflets critical of the university officials. The 
Papish case (1973) involved expulsion of a student for publishing 
allegedly obscene material. The Jacobs case (1975) tested the 
constitutionality of school board actions which threatened to 
interfere with publication of a student newspaper. The Goss case 
(1975) involved property interests of students who had been 
unlawfully suspended by school board members. The Strickland 
case (1975) involved award of damages for unlawful suspension 
Of students. 
20$ 
The Court established the following precedents in deciding 
these cases: 
1, Although employment by the State is still regarded as a 
privilege rather than a right by most members of the Court, 
three Justices expressed the opinion that any State job 
may be claimed as a right by any citizen unless some 
reason can be found for denying that right; 
2. Although a teacher who is untenured according to the laws 
of the State may not claim property rights by virtue of 
tenure, circumstances may be such that implied tenure 
exists and deprivation of the right to employment may not 
be permissible constitutionally without due process; 
3» Students may not be prevented from free expression which 
may violate certain, standards of decency under threat of 
expulsion; 
/f. Students are entitled to due process in spite of State 
statutes legislating summary suspension without a hearing 
of any kind, and such legislation will be found unconsti­
tutional by the Court; 
School board members are not completely immune from suits 
for damages by students for violation of students' rights 
to due process. 
One case arose in the area of school finance. The Rodriguez 
case (1973) established the legitimacy of the property tax as a 
means of providing public funds for support of schools. 
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One case arose in the area of compulsory school attendance. 
The Yoder case established the right of parents to take their 
children out of public schools after the eighth grade and enter 
them into an informal program of vocational training not approved 
or supervised by the state. 
There is a reluctance on the part of the Court to interfere 
with normal operations of local and state governments unless 
deprivation of fundamental individual freedoms is involved. There 
is a trend to discourage the use of federal courts to decide 
issues which may conflict with State constitutional provisions. 
There is a trend toward pursual of civil rights cases in State 
courts where judgments are localized in impact and further appeal 
to federal courts may be relied upon in the event of an unfavorable 
ruling. 
The Court continues to extend to all citizens the protection 
of substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
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TABLE 14 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
INVOLVING CHURCH-STATE ISSUES 
1970-1977 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. DiCenso, Robinson v. DiCenso, 
403 U. S. 602 (1971). 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). 
Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U. S. 965 (1971). 
Essex v. Wolman, 406 U. S. 912 (1972). 
Johnson v. New York State Education Department, 409 U. S. 75 (1972). 
Alton J. Lemon v. David H. Kurtzman, Etc., 411 U. S. 192 (1973). 
Dolores Norwood et al. v. D. L. Harrison, Sr., et al, 413 U. S. 
455 (1973). 
Levitt v. Committee For Public Education and Religious Liberty et 
al., 413 U. S. 472 (1973). 
Richard W. Hunt v. Robert E. KcNair et al., 413 U. S. 734 (1973). 
Committee For Public Education and Religious Liberty et al. v. 
Ewald B. Nyguist. 413 U. S. 756, 793, 813 (1973). 
Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey v. Marburger, 
93 S. Ct. 2728 (1973). 
Kosydar v. Wolman et al., 353 F. Supp. 744 (1972). 
Sloan v. Lemon et al., 413 U. S. 825 (1973). 
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402 (1974). 
Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 95 S. Ct. 167 (1974). 
Franchise Tax Board of California v. United Americans for Public 
Schools. 95 s. Ct. 166 (1974). 
Marburger v. Public Funds For Public Schools of New Jersey, 
417 U. S. 961 (1974). 
Sylvia Meek et al. v. John C. Pittenger, Etc., et al., 421 U. S. 
349 (1975). ~~ 
John C. Roemer, III, et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al., 42b U. S. 736 (1976). 
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
INVOLVING CHURCH-STATE ISSUES 
1970-1977 
Benson A. Wolman et al. v. Franklin B. Walter et al.. U. S. 
(1977). 
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TABLE 15 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURP CASES 
INVOLVING DESEGREGATION ISSUES 
1969-1977 
Cases Decided By Individual Justices 
As Circuit Court Justices 
Dr» J* !• Edgar v. United States, J*04 U. S. 1206 (1971). 
Corpus Christi School District v. Jose Cisneros, ifO^t U. S. 
121L (1971). 
Winston-Salem/Fors.yth County Board of Education v, Catherine 
Scott, U. 3. 1221 (1971). 
Robert Gomperts v. Charles E. Chase, kOk U. S. L237 (19?1). 
Ann Gunter Druramond v. Robert L. Acree, i*09 U. S. 1228 (1972). 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Nancy Anne SDangler, /f23 
U. S. 1335 (1975). 
Cases Decided by the Full Court 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S, 19 (1969) 
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969) 
Powell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools, 
396 U. S. 269 (1969). 
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U, S» 290 (1970) 
Horthcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, City 
Schools, 397 U. S. 232 (1970). 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg; Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 
(1971). 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, >+02 U. S. 
33 (1971). ~ 
Charles WcDaniel et al. v. Joseph Barresi, Jr., et al., 402 U. S. 
39 (1971). ~~ 
Uorth Carolina State Board of Education v. James E, Swann. *+02 
U. S. U3 (1971). 
Mrs. Robert lee Moore et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Educatioa et aL. , 402 U. S. J*7 (1971). 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
INVOLVING DESEGREGATION ISSUES 
1969-1977 
Pecola Annette Wright et al. v. Council of the City of Eraooria et 
al., ̂ 07 U. S. 1+^1 (1972). 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education et al., 
If07 U. S. i+8i+ (1972). 
School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, et al. v. State 
Board of Education of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al., 412 
U. S. 92 (1973). 
Wilfred Keyes v. School District No. 1, 415 U. S. 189 (1973). 
Carolyn Bradley et al. v. School Board of City of Richmond et al. , 
M16 U. s. 696 (1974). 
Mllliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 71? (1974). 
Mllliken v. Bradley, U. S. (1977). 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Nancy Anne Soang;ler» U. 3. 
(1976). 
Dayton Board of Education et al. v. Mark Brinkman et al., U. S. 
(1977). 
School District of Omaha v. United States, U. S. (1977). 
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TABLE 16 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
1969-1977 
Loyalty Oath 
Stella Connell v. James M. HiRftinbotham et al., 403 U. S. 207 
11971). 
Teacher Employment 
The Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v. David F. Roth, 
Etc., 408 U. S. 564 (1972). 
Charles R. Perry et al. v. Hobert P. Slndermann, etc., 408 U. S. 
593 (1972). 
Cleveland Board of Education et al. v. Jo Carol LaFleur et al., 
bit* U. S. 632 (1974). 
Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 et al. v. Hortonville 
Education Association et al., 426 U. S. 482 (1976). 
Student Suspensions 
Kenneth R. Jones v. State Board of Education of and for the State 
of Tennessee et al., 397 S. 31 (1970). 
Barbara Susan Papish v, The Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri et al., 410 U, S. 667 (1973). 
Norval Goss et al. v. Eileen Lopez et al., 419 U. S. 565 (1975). 
The Board of Scho_ol Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis et 
al. v. Jeff Jacobs et al., 420 U. S. 128 (1975). 
John P. Wood et al. v. Peggy Strickland, 420 U. S. 306 (1975). 
Compulsory School Attendance 
State of Wisconsin v. Jonas "yoder et al. , 406 U. S. 205 (1972). 
School Finance 
San Antonio Independent School District et al. v. Demetrio P. 
Rodriguez et.al,. 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
LISTING OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
1969-1977 
Student Discipline 
Virginia Baker and Russell Carl Baker, Annellants v. W. C. Owen 
et al, 423 U. S. 907 (1975). 
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